Shinzo Abe: He will be missed

Originally published in The Epoch Times

Foremost, he saw that close ties with the United States are indispensable for Japan—and that forging a strong Japan-U.S. relationship required Tokyo to become a more useful ally. And by playing an active regional and global role—including militarily—Japan could raise its stature and influence.

To this end, Abe traveled the world. Being seen and heard made a difference and contrasted starkly with the low international profile of most previous Japanese prime ministers.

Abe also directed the Japan Self-Defense Forces to expand military-to-military engagements, exercises, and talks throughout the Asia-Pacific region and even in Europe. This was unthinkable just a few years earlier.

Moreover, following Abe’s success in relaxing defense hardware export rules, Japan provided used aircraft and ships to the Philippines and Vietnam and, in the act of strategic vision, tried to sell Japanese submarines to Australia. This would have upended the regional strategic order—in a good way—had Australia’s Turnbull administration not lost its nerve and canceled what was reportedly a “done” deal.

The Australians instead went with a French bidder, and a few years later, the deal was terminated as an embarrassing, expensive failure.

Although China predictably complains, Japan’s military outreach is even now well-received in the region, with Australia, Vietnam, India, the Philippines, Pacific Island nations, and others welcoming Japanese security cooperation.

And were it not for Abe, there would be no “Quad,” the loose security alliance between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India.

It should be remembered that Abe was not the first prime minister to start this move to a more active defense and assertive foreign policy. Still, he moved things much faster and farther than anyone since former Prime Minister Nakasone in the mid-1980s.

The United States long wanted Japan to be a more active ally and to play a more substantial defense role—both in its own right and in league with the U.S. forces. Unfortunately, the U.S. government wasted a year after Abe’s election in 2012, keeping him at arm’s length for his views of history, comfort women, and reputation as a “rightist.”

However, the Americans finally got over this. They got what they wanted (and needed), as evidenced by the 2015 revision (and improvement) of U.S.-Japan defense guidelines and Abe’s successful passage of measures broadening what Japan can do under the doctrine of “collective self-defense.” There were no small feats.

As for resolving the Okinawa basing issues, Abe made an effort to look at Japan’s defense from a national perspective rather than the narrow viewpoint of Okinawan activists and outsider-incited opposition.

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