A Different Approach to Nonproliferation (2005)

These degradations, to large degree, result from the absence of underground nuclear testing; and most of them cannot be corrected without a resumption of testing.    This is because of testing’s central role in our nuclear weapons world.  For almost fifty years testing was the hub of the nuclear weapons wheel–“ground truth.”  It was the main contributor to the way we did science, the way we trained designers, the way we certified warheads, the way we found problems, the way we identified fixes, the way we validated solutions, the way we integrated DOE/NNSA and DOD into a tight-knit producer-user community, and the way we hardened key DOD weapons systems to survive the effects of nuclear weapons.  In sum, the issue of underground nuclear testing is so central to our future nuclear weapons capability that U.S. decisionmakers must now address it directly and establish the approach to test resumption.  This is the principal “unfinished business” of the Nuclear Posture Review.  We have learned, time and again, that we cannot expect vital, complex systems to perform flawlessly without testing.  In no other critical area of modern life do we tolerate untested systems.

The need for testing arises also from an even more basic cause.  Mankind’s remarkable technological advances over the last half-millennium all had their roots in the discovery and development of the “scientific method:” Identify a problem or issue, develop an hypothesis to solve it, design a test, predict results, perform the test, compare actual with predicted results, adjust the hypothesis, repeat the cycle.  Eliminate testing and you eliminate the essential basis for scientific progress!  No wonder our nuclear weapons enterprise is grinding to a halt!  Today’s Stockpile Stewardship is a valuable program, but it is not “science-based,” and it cannot replace testing.  Intelligent long-range planning for nuclear weapons simply cannot be done unless there is absolute confidence that testing can be done when needed to resolve physics issues, to tailor weapon effects for new-design warheads, to qualify new pits, to certify new-design weapons before commencement of production, to correct detected failures, etc.  In summary, the only measure that can cure our nuclear weapons malaise is resumption of testing!

The deterioration of the nation’s nuclear weapons capability is actually more advanced than indicated by the factual markers described above.  A “no-test mindset” has become pervasive throughout the nuclear weapons community.  Many lab scientists and engineers are convinced that testing will continue to be denied.  Thus a great many promising approaches to new knowledge, new concepts, new weapons, new threats are not even considered because they would require testing.  But the no-test mindset goes even farther:  Since we won’t be able to test, it is then but a short step to a belief that we don’t need to test.  And lacking any prospect of gaining hard, empirical data, our designers are becoming more and more comfortable with results of computer simulations.  The danger is serious!  We are accelerating down a slippery slope on which the point of no return cannot be identified.  After twelve years under a test moratorium the decline in U.S. nuclear weapons capability has reached a critical state!

Does this matter?  Does it matter that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise is in extremis, that it has been without dynamic, national-level leadership for a decade and a half, that even today the enterprise has no agreed plans to correct the serious problems noted above, and that there is no strong national consensus on our future nuclear weapons strategy and forces?  YES!  In spades!  Consider:

• Nuclear weapons exist!  They aren’t going to go away–ever!  There are tens of thousands of them in the world today, many of which are inadequately secured.  More states today possess nuclear weapons than ever before in history.  More than half the world’s population now lives in states which have nuclear weapons.  Many other states–and terrorists–are determined to acquire them…and use them!

• Nuclear deterrence works!  For over half a century, throughout a hostile bipolar confrontation of nuclear-armed superpowers, through hundreds of major crises, through dozens of smaller hot wars–pilot lights of the apocalypse–the poised, ready existence of nuclear weapons, fine-tuned to destroy assets the adversaries valued most, was 100 percent effective in preventing their use!

• Deterrence must be credible, however!  It exists only in the minds of our adversaries.  They must be absolutely convinced that our  nuclear weapons have been designed and tested specifically to destroy the assets they value most, that collateral damage will be limited, that we are trained and prepared to use them, and–most of all–that we have the will to use them!  Our current stockpile raises serious credibility questions on every count.  And we cannot hope to prevent proliferation without a credible deterrent.

• Testing, by itself, greatly strengthens deterrence!  During our half-century of nuclear testing we demonstrated to the world that we had the strength to pursue our commitments to nuclear deterrence despite frequent criticism and great expense.  It was also clear to the world that our weapons were effective, that we had great confidence in them, and that we were prepared to use them.  Now, with our not having tested for over a decade, what adversary will believe we have the resolve to use them if needed–or that they will perform as designed?