A Different Approach to Nonproliferation (2005)

 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

In May 2005 most of the nations of the world will meet for their once-every-five-years NPT Review Conference.  This is an important event, for which preparations have long been underway.  This coming meeting is of particular‑-almost historic–importance because it’s the first RevCon to be held since the world realized the full magnitude of the threat posed by rogue states or terrorist groups which acquire nuclear weapons.  This new threat has markedly increased the emphasis we and other nations must place on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Earlier, this paper identified two serious challenges facing the U.S.:  The need to resume nuclear weapons testing to make deterrence effective; and the need to mobilize the nations of the world to assist in preventing proliferation.  These two challenges combine to create a remarkable U.S. opportunity–that of launching the campaign to meet both at the 2005 NPT RevCon!

So what needs to be done?  The key elements of the suggested U.S. RevCon position were summarized in the preceding section.  In terms of the two challenges we face, the U.S. might advance the following two positions:

• State that the U.S. is terminating our test moratorium.  State that we have no immediate need for testing, but it is absolutely clear we must significantly change our nuclear weapons arsenal if we are to continue to deter actual and potential proliferators, and the new weapons will require testing.  In changing our arsenal we will significantly reduce both the numbers of nuclear weapons in our stockpile and the aggregate yield of our stockpile, in conformance with Article VI.  State that we are convinced future worldwide progress in preventing proliferation can only be accomplished if the five internationally agreed nuclear weapon states exert a positive “policing” function as regards nuclear weapons.  This will require theU.S., and possibly others, to modernize their arsenals to deter potential terrorist threats.

• State that the world has undergone a virtual revolution from a decades-long nuclear confrontation of superpowers to smaller, widely distributed threats of terrorists’ use of weapons of mass destruction.  The global danger is so great that it can only be fully met by active participation of most of the nations of the world in prevention, forcible if necessary.  This change requires the UN and the CD to refocus their proliferation prevention emphasis from nuclear disarmament to actively stopping potential proliferators.  Nuclear deterrence and proliferation prevention are essential dual elements of the world’s response to global terrorism.

But urgent U.S. action is needed!  If  not now, when?  If not this Administration, then which other?  Both issues are incredibly urgent, so how can the U.S. not seize this once-every-five-years opportunity?  And, from the perspective of domestic politics, when will we next see the early months of the first year of the second term of a national-security-conscious President?  The challenges won’t give us that much slack.  As for “which Administration,” a bold initiative such as this would be out-of-character for most, but not for an Administration which has been straightforward enough to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, walk away from the Kyoto Global Warming Accord, renounce the enforcement protocol of the Biological Weapons Convention, refuse to consider the CTBT, reject the International Criminal Court, discard the Landmine Convention, etc.  Although those “international arrangements” were popular, they made no sense; and neither do the two identified in this paper.