A Different Approach to Nonproliferation (2005)

If we do not seize the initiative and launch the campaign this spring, what do we have to look forward to at the 2005 NPT RevCon?  First, we can anticipate being continually on the defensive against the nuclear disarmament and CTBT demands of most of the nations of the world.  Second, in order to leave the RevCon with some measure of international good will we may have to agree to some statement or commitment which, at best will create uncomfortable future obligations, and at worst might limit our future options.  Third, because of our general position in opposition to stronger nuclear disarmament measures we may have difficulty in getting other states to agree with our own proposals for meaningful steps to prevent proliferation.  Fourth–and very important–we are unlikely to be successful in sowing, within the CD, seeds of change from their past and present counterproductive approach (a terrible waste of much-needed resources) to a more enlightened one which would actually help prevent proliferation.  Fifth, we risk being in such a defensive posture during the months leading up to the NPT RevCon–and for many months (years?) thereafter–that we take no U.S. action to resume nuclear testing.

How much better it will be to take positive action and launch a major international campaign to meet the world’s changing security needs, than to continue to allow the U.S. to be cast in the negative light of a continuing dissenter.  We will still face strong opposition, of course; but how much better to face it while advancing a proposed new global change in which we believe.

Such a major shift will require–as a prerequisite–a national debate to generate strong public and bipartisan Congressional support, and this requires a large and continuing expenditure of political capital by the Administration.  Throughout the Cold War the U.S. built–and maintained for almost half a century–just such a consensus concerning our nuclear weapons strategy and weapons systems.  There was no lack of opposition to various aspects of this program, but–once the issues were explained and debated–an overwhelming majority concurred.  Today that consensus has eroded, and it must be recaptured if we are to revitalize our nuclear deterrent capability.

But for over a decade no Administration has explained to the nation the key role that nuclear weapons must play in future U.S. national security strategy.  Instead, the public and Congress have been on the receiving end of a veritable blizzard of papers, articles, studies, and speeches to prevent nuclear modernization.  If America is to revitalize its nuclear weapons enterprise, the President must explain to the nation exactly why nuclear weapons play such a different, but important, future role.  Supporting detail must be provided on a continuing basis by the White House, OSD, the Joint Chiefs, the combatant commanders, DOE, NNSA, the weapons labs, etc.  Once the people hear and understand the issues, history has demonstrated they will provide strong support, and Congress will follow.

In considering test resumption, it’s important to understand how ill-advised our past policy has been.  For more than a decade the U.S.has put “test resumption” in a box from which there’s no exit.  We’ve done this by making the following two assumptions and never thinking them through.  First, we’ve assumed our only reason for test resumption would be a problem with the existing stockpile.  This has us looking backward when we need to be focused on the future.  Moreover, without testing, it will be increasingly difficult to know if  we really have a problem.  Instead, test resumption should hinge on the overall health of the U.S.nuclear weapons enterprise (summarized in the first section).  Second, we’ve assumed test resumption would be a one-step process:  We discover a stockpile problem, and the President announces a need to test.  The fact that it would probably require several years to carry out the test (more likely, tests) creates difficulties which have not been thought through.  Nor have we seriously considered that the time for the U.S.to reclaim the freedom to test is not when we have an immediate, crisis-level need for it!