A Different Approach to Nonproliferation (2005)

A wiser test resumption strategy is to plan a two-step process.  Be open and honest with our people and the world, and give them notice that we are terminating our test moratorium long before we conduct our first test.  Our two-step handling of ABM Treaty withdrawal–while different in some respects–is a good model.

• In the first (termination) announcement we might:  Make reference to the NPT’s implicit obligation for each NWS to maintain a safe, reliable, and effective deterrent force.  State our view that the rise of terrorism as a global threat makes this even more imperative.  Cite our twelve-year experience under the test moratorium, and describe the multiple weaknesses that have developed.  Point out that in our judgment a test moratorium or test ban is not sustainable over the long term for theU.S., and possibly not for other NWS.  State that we have no specific tests planned at this time, but there is no question but that we will have compelling needs to conduct occasional tests in the future as we transform our arsenal to be an effective deterrent in the changed world situation.  Reaffirm our long-term commitment to Article VI.  Combine this announcement-of-intent with our total support of proliferation prevention, provide a  summary of our many recentU.S.initiatives to advance it, and express our increased commitment to assist other nations of the world and the UN to make the major changes required of them.  We should, of course, provide private advance notice of our intentions to the other four NWS and our major allies, and be willing to discuss joint termination of test moratoria, if there’s an interest.

• In our second (testing) announcement, before we resume testing several years later, we might describe in some detail the purpose and nature of the test, and document the reductions to date (and planned) in numbers and yield of our stockpile.

In sum, a remarkable opportunity—not to be missed—occurs by the juxtaposition in time of:  (1) The start of a second term; (2) the grave condition of theU.S.nuclear weapon enterprise; (3) the urgent need to redirect international nonproliferation efforts onto the right path; and (4) the NPT RevCon.