A Tsar is Born: The Consolidation of Power in Putin’s Russia

As if regional interests were not sufficiently undermined thanks to the introduction of the polpredy, they received yet another blow in January 2002. It was at this time that Putin revoked the right of “governors and chairs of regional assemblies” to participate in the upper house of parliament, or Federation Council.^[xiii] Instead, their seats were filled by delegates chosen by regional assemblies and chief executives. While this change seemingly enhances democracy – after all, assemblies select their own delegates – it does little more than strengthen the Kremlin’s grip on localities throughout Russia. With influential polpredy available to recommend the president’s agenda, truly independent choice is unlikely. Since this initiative was introduced, members of the Federation Council have become more closely linked to “the federal government and capital-based big business,” which is unsurprising given that over 40% of the membership now lives in Moscow.^[xiv] In an attempt to advance themselves personally, regional delegates are more likely to comply with the Kremlin’s political agenda than faithfully pursue that of the citizens they are sworn to represent.

Another reform may prove to be the end of Russian federalism, as new laws granted Putin the power to remove popularly elected regional governors and dissolve their legislatures. No simple matter, regional governors can only be removed if convicted of two or more “regional acts” that are in direct violation of federal law.^[xv] Similarly, the president must have the approval of the State Duma before dissolving an assembly.^[xvi] Nonetheless, Putin was given the authority to unilaterally remove, albeit temporarily, governors who are under criminal investigation. This power is especially significant in view of the fact that Putin stripped governors of their criminal immunity when he removed them from the Federation Council. It was only after their loss of immunity that Putin acquired the power to temporarily remove and replace those under investigation. In other words, he is able to displace a popularly elected official simply because that individual was accused of a crime. In a country riddled by corruption, it is not difficult to imagine the ease with which such accusations could be brought against a troublesome governor.

Federal authority was further consolidated when Putin removed 86 popularly elected regional leaders and replaced them with his own appointees. Once again, a democratic façade remained, as assemblies were required to ratify these appointments. As was already established, however, these bodies are now largely controlled by the Kremlin. Putin also suggested that district elections be eliminated and that Parliament be elected proportionally. Such elections are “based on party lists compiled by the main parties, all centered in Moscowand susceptible to Kremlin influence.”^[xvii] Unsurprisingly, the result was a Parliament dominated by the United Russia party and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, both of which are avid supports of the Putin Administration. Though these actions were dubbed the “September Revolution” by the paper Izvestia, most political figures remained silent.^[xviii] Vladimir Ryzhkov, a liberal member of Parliament, was one of the few to speak out against the Kremlin’s policies and gave valuable insight into the culture of fear that prevents his colleagues from doing the same. According to Ryzhkov, regional governors understand that if they are “against Putin,” they will face “criminal investigation,” as did the governors of Atlai, Yaroslavl, and Kursk after questioning Putin’s authority.^[xix] This investigation, in turn, may result in their removal from office. Thus, the voice of dissent within government is silenced.

Civil Rights Besieged

Just as the Kremlin consolidated power within government, it also enhanced its control over the lives of its citizens by limiting their civil rights. Nowhere are these efforts more obvious than with regard to freedom of the press. While this freedom is sacrosanct in most democracies, it has been systematically restricted throughout Russiasince Putin ascended to the presidency. In fact, his campaign officials once declared that the president has the authority to “control the media to achieve national accord” and, more disturbingly, “punish critics.”^[xx] Still oddly concerned with international opinion, Putin employs financial pressures through pro-Kremlin corporations rather than directly censoring the media. For instance, the largely government owned energy giant, Gazprom, called in loans it had made to NTV – one of the few remaining independent television stations in Russia.^[xxi] This action enabled the government to take control of the station, just after it criticized the administration’s policy regardingChechnya. This process was repeated when TV-6 was acquired by Lukoil. In this way, the government gained control over a majority of both TV and radio outlets.