Adel Guindy: Islamism & the Facade of Egyptian Democracy

Adel Guindy testified before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission in the House of Representatives. Reps. Frank Wolf and James McDermott presented “Under Threat: The Worsening Plight of Egypt’s Coptic Christians.”

Mr. Guindy is President of the Board of Coptic Solidarity. He is also President of Solidarité Copte (France), is a Member of the Board of Directors of the Middle East Freedom Forum (USA, Egypt), Le Monde Copte (France) and Egyptian Democratic Solidarity (Egypt).

He has been an activist for several years, and frequently writes on political transformation in Egypt, the Coptic issue and Islamism. He has authored several articles in English (MERIA and other publications), three books in Arabic, and co-authored one book in French. He was a senior editor of Egypt’s Coptic community weekly Watani.

Other witnesses included Kathy Fitzpatrick (Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State); Nina Shea (Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute); Dina Guirguis (Member, Egyptian American Rule of Law Association); Raymond Ibrahim (Middle East specialist and Associate fellow, Middle East Forum); and Cynthia Farahat (Egyptian political activist).

The following is Mr. Guindy’s testimony for the record and, below, is a transcript of his comments at the hearing.

Adel Guindy: Testimony before the Tom Lantos Commission, December 7 2011. Click here for a PDF of his testimony for the record.

TESTIMONY OF ADEL F. GUINDY

TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this important hearing entitled “Under Threat: The Worsening Plight of Egypt’s Coptic Christians.” I am honored to be here today, and I would like to request that my entire written statement be made part of the Record, however I will highlight some of the key points and would be happy to answer questions.

In keeping with the “seasonal” depictions of the situation in Egypt, such as “spring of this” or “winter of that,” I would venture to say that Egypt, indeed the region, is entering – at least for the short- and medium-term – a harsh summer with little to be seen in its arid deserts beyond thirst, agony and mirage.

In my testimony, I will touch more on the general political situation in Egypt and its projected evolution, because it is only by understanding the overall picture, that we can fully understand the implications and consequences for the Copts.

TAHRIR-II

In order to better understand the admittedly confusing situation, let me begin with what happened during Tahrir-II.

On Friday Nov 18, 2011, hundreds of thousands of Islamists-mainly Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists-set out to protest the inclusion of the term “civilian” to describe  the future state. This term was mentioned in a document on constitutional principles that have been in the works for months. The term “civilian” is generally understood to mean “non-religious and non-military,” but Islamists loathed the possibility that it might be understood to mean “secular.” This, despite the fact that the text of Article II of the old Constitution in which Islam is the religion of State and the principles of  Sharia the main source of legislation, was  still upheld by the document. This same new document gave the Army a special, almost supra-state, status. Just hours after the November 18 march, the government caved to pressure and removed the contested term.

The next day, the docile government turned into a lion, when a sit-in by some 150 protesters from the families of the injured revolutionaries demanding treatment by the government, was brutally disbanded by the anti-riot forces. Furious at the attack and more so at the apparent complicity between the Military and Islamists, crowds poured into Tahrir Square. As the oppression increased, the crowds became even more determined and aggressive, trying to attack and burn the Ministry of Interior building. The majority of the anti-government slogans were directed at the SCAF and its Chief, al-Moushir (Field Marshal) Tantawi, calling for his ouster and trial. At least 38 people were killed and thousands wounded.

THE ORIGINAL SIN: THE MILITARY’S OBSESSION WITH POWER

To try and understand the full picture, we need to go back to what the Military did when they took over governing Egypt last February. It was a manifestation of what I like to call the even-older “Original Sin” that bred what we are in today and will continue to do unless redeemed – that “original sin” is the Military’s attachment to power since 1952. Ever since that date, they have enjoyed unparalleled power; apart from a unique position of behind-the-scenes authority, all the presidents, many prime ministers, ministers, governors and heads of public organizations have come from their ranks. Coupled with that are the huge financial and economic interests (estimated by some to reach 30-40% of Egypt’s economy) with which the military is involved The Army’s budget is beyond any scrutiny and the Army’s ranks can be only judged before military tribunals.

The stakes for the Military are high and however they may deny it, numerous acts show their intention to hold on to that unique position.

For the Military, it is almost unavoidable that the they enter into alliance with the Islamists while at the same time – in a twisted form of machination – use them to scare Egypt’s citizens, and the World, to justify the need for the Military’s very strong role in maintaining peace and stability.  Whether or not SCAF or other military lean towards the Brotherhood is not important, but the issue of the alliance is what is important.

It is fair to claim that both the Military and the Islamists have a strategic interest in working together. Why is that?

The generals know that there are strategic imperatives for the U.S., whatever the U.S. Administration’s political party:

• Maintain U.S. interests in Egypt; after all huge sums have been invested there. By one account, what Egypt has received since the Camp David agreements is about the same as the entire Marshall Plan (both in current dollars) devoted to rebuild several western European countries after WW-II (it appears to roughly be about 85 billion);
• Maintain the security of Israel and the peace treaty;
• Not allow a military regime to rule in Egypt – at least in appearance.

The generals are also aware and are proponents of a fourth strategic element, specific to the current Administration, which is to operate with a policy of open arms towards Islamist parties, as long as those parties come to power through the “ballot box.” I will touch on this point a bit later in my testimony.

The generals are certainly not interested in directly “governing” Egypt. A country with so many chronic problems, not to mention the chaos created after January and the new rebelliousness of the people, makes it more of a liability for them to be involved in the country’s  day-to-day governing. They are, however, intent on maintaining the power and authority the Army has enjoyed over the past six decades.

On the other hand, while the Brotherhood is known to have reassured the U.S. in contacts over the past few years of its intentions regarding the above-mentioned American policy imperatives, it knows well that an alliance with the military is useful, at least in the short term.

In order to further improve their hand, the Military has reverted to the usual scare tactics, in which Mubarak had excelled for decades. They raised the possibility of some truly disturbing situations in which only the Military can be trusted to maintain peace and stability, such as:

1. Islamists cannot be trusted – (and we must ask, when was the last time they upheld their commitments and promises anywhere they took over?  Note – they DO uphold promises to enforce Sharia so perhaps better to ask “when did they uphold their promises for transparency, freedom, and democracy”);

2. An Islamist rule in Egypt will only represent strategic depth to Hamas. Any planned, or even unplanned, action by a Hamas zealot could drag Egypt into war with Israel, unless the Army is there to calm things;

3. An uncontrolled Islamist regime could lead to hazardous and adventurous regional activities (remember Iran);

4. Radicalization as a means to survive by diverting the people’s attention, especially if it fails internally to resolve daily-life problems. As a hint for future repetitions, please note the recent case from  Friday November  25, 2011, when the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar mosque lead thousands from Hamas, the Brotherhood, Jamaa Islameya and Azhar scholars in a big rally “in support of Al-Aqsa Mosque” and denouncing Israeli “attempts at Judaization of Jerusalem.” (Note that there was nothing particular in the news that warranted such a rally).

And if these were not enough reasons to appreciate the need for the Army to reign in the   unbridled Islamists, the Military threw in some extra factors to emphasize the above-mentioned “potential” risks with real, actual ones. The Military:

1. Released from prison thousands of Islamists, including the killers of Sadat, and turned them into instant heroes on state-owned TV stations;

2. Allowed thousands of Jihadists, who had lived in exile for years, to enter Egypt;

3. Encouraged the most radical factions of Salafists (literally “ancestral;” an offshoot of Wahabis) to surface and even dominate the scene;

4. Even though the existing laws prohibit the creation of political parties based on religion or race, no less than 15 out of 31 newly created parties after January 25, 2011, are Islamist  in ideology;

5. Adopted a roadmap for political transition that was devised by, and in the interest of, the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, it was the request of the revolutionaries and many intellectuals to start with working on a Constitution, as a consensual charter taking into account the interests of all the nation’s segments. Instead, the Military started with the parliamentary elections, whose partisan winners – widely expected to be the Islamists – would monopolize writing the Constitution to their own advantage;

6. Implicitly encouraged terror campaigns against the Copts and even took part in them directly, such as in the October Maspero massacre;

7. Raised anti-Americanism and the xenophobic tone, blaming foreigners of all kinds of wrongdoings.

Meanwhile, the Military also sought by all means to strangle the few active NGOs by accusing them of receiving “illegal” funds from abroad, particularly from the U.S. and the E.U., at a time where Islamists are reported to have received over a billion pounds from some Gulf countries over a few months.

In sum:

• With the “Original Sin” of the Military’s attachment to power over six decades fully in action, it is unimaginable that the Army in Egypt will relinquish willingly the powers it wields and turn into simply another army which receives orders from civilians. It is worth noting that on February 8, 2011, just before toppling Mubarak, General Omar Soliman, for years in charge of the Intelligence Services, and his newly appointed Vice President, told the various political forces: “either dialogue, or face a coup d’État.” That intriguing expression may hold a key to better understanding the “Original Sin.” The Military would stop short of nothing in order to maintain their special status.
• It is unimaginable that the Brotherhood, and other Islamists, will miss this golden opportunity to take over Egypt at such a time when they are finally nearing triumph in their global campaign, spearheaded from Qatar (the de facto regional headquarters of the Brotherhood, where its propaganda arm-al-Jazeera TV-is based) across the Sunni Near East and North Africa.
• The other forces, be it the original revolutionaries, the Copts, liberal and secular Muslims, or simply average people who are wary of an Islamist or a military rule, are quite fragmented.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

This Tahrir-II episode of the revolution shows that the Egyptian people are starting to realize the formidable challenge ahead with the Military-Islamist alliance. If a large portion of the population  is willing to accept an Islamist regime (for reasons outside the scope of this testimony) the majority are increasingly loath to swallow the alliance.

That’s the crux of the matter, and the outcome of this bras-de-fer will influence the future of Egypt, and the region, for years.

Egypt’s dilemma now is that the options appear rather bleak:

• A Military-Islamist ruling alliance, is the most probable outcome with a “civilian” façade after “democratic” elections, thus presenting a more appealing face to the U.S. and the West;
• A power struggle, in the short term, in which the Islamists (who dominate the “street”) benefit from the latest gaffes by the Military, leading to a purely “civilian” Islamist regime with the West indifferent, as long as the ruler remains allegedly “civilian.” In this scenario, the army might eventually take a subdued role – but after ideological (and physical) “cleansing” (à la Iran);
• An extended power struggle, with the possible entry into a cycle of coup d’etats.

ISLAMIST AND CHRISTIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would like to focus on the West’s seeming obsession with the idea that democracy equals a “ballot box,” irrespective of whether the foundations and the environment of democracy are in place.

I would like simply to comment on one statement made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner on November 7 of this year.  After explaining how the U.S. works with many different governments, she asked the question, “How will America respond if and when democracy brings to power people and parties we disagree with?” and then she answered,

“We hear these questions most often when it comes to Islamist religious parties. Now, of course, I hasten to add that not all Islamists are alike. Turkey and Iran are both governed by parties with religious roots, but their models and behavior are radically different. There are plenty of political parties with religious affiliations-Hindu, Christian, Jewish, Muslim-that respect the rules of democratic politics…”

I respectfully disagree with the Secretary. Any objective study on the history and evolution of the Christian parties (such as Germany’s Christian Democratic Party, headed by Angela Merkel) in Europe and some other parts of the world, shows clearly that their founding principles revolve around a commitment to particular values such as human dignity, justice, equality, social responsibility and effective citizenship, thus putting these parties on the conservative part of political spectrum.

However, none of these Christian political parties advocate the establishment of a local or international “Christian State or Caliphate.” In looking at several mainstream “Christian” parties in Europe and South America, none of them demanded that a Christian version of Sharia be the source of the country’s Constitution.  None of them sanction violence to advance their goals, speak in the name of God, adorn their programs with biblical verses, or a chain of referrals or edicts. None of them set women lower than men, discriminate between citizens based on belief, or demand to impose a Jizyah on non-Christian citizens. None of them use logos of a bible embraced by two crossing swords. None would interfere in what people eat or drink or how they dress.  None would enforce a penal code where the condemned may be whipped, lapidated or have their limbs amputated.

Here is but one, out of many, recent illustrations which give a more accurate reflection of who Islamists really are. On the Friday after the fall of Mubarak, Youssef El Qaradawi, the Qatar-based prominent Egyptian Islamic preacher and spiritual leader of the Brotherhood, descended on Tahrir Square in a Khomeini-like show of force, to preach to the victorious believers. To his credit, he appeared conciliatory towards the Copts, trying to calm their anxieties. But that was in February. On his November 18, 2011, Friday address, he, according to CNN Arabic, urged Egyptian electors not to “vouch for a secularist, an agnostic, or those who don’t accept Allah as their God, Islam as their religion and Mohamed as their prophet.” So much for democracy, liberty, and basic freedoms.

This is not a call for mobilizing armies to fight Islamist parties whenever they take over. But it is a reminder that we need to be vigilant when these parties take over.

At the very least, the international community must hold them fully accountable to fundamental principles of human rights which are universal, and to take them to task when they fail to respect those rights. This is not out of a utopian, altruistic view, but from down-to-earth sense of preservation of the basics of civilization.

THE COPTS: SIMPLY COLLATERAL DAMAGE?

This brings me to the question: Where are the Copts in all this? The following may be telling.

On October 24, 2011, the Coptic Pope Shenouda III  “met with” (according to the local media) or was “summoned by” (according to sources close to him) Egypt’s ruling military council for an urgent meeting at the Ministry of Defense. The ailing Patriarch, age 88, whose fortieth anniversary in office was celebrated November 14, 2011, was told to come alone.

At the meeting, the Pope was berated by the top three generals. After the meeting, the Pope would not say much but the official declaration emphasized “putting Egypt’s interest above all.” I, like many Copts, thought it was likely the generals had bullied him.

If the Generals truly want to quiet the situation, why don’t they address and try to resolve Coptic grievances?

Copts, as we all know, have been subjected to systemic discrimination for years, often accompanied by sectarian attacks. The general reaction pattern was to swallow their pain and humiliation, groan in private,  take refuge in prayer, and depend on the church’s clergy to beg the authorities on their behalf.

The October 9, 2011, Maspero massacre, which will be covered in more detail by another colleague, claimed 27 deaths and 300 injured. Despite overwhelming evidence, the Military continues to deny any responsibility for the violence and in a press conference on October 12, 2011 – just three days after the massacre – even praised the performance of its soldiers as well as the state media’s performance.  Of course they never regretted, let alone apologized for, the heinous act. In fact, 28 Copts are still imprisoned and are “under investigation,” for these attacks, which amounts to nothing less than keeping them as hostages as a means of future blackmail.

Since it’s February takeover, the Army vowed never to shoot at citizens. It largely has kept to its promise, (up until the events of November 19-22, 2011, referred to above), despite numerous cases when huge demonstrations went out of control, or even when mobs cut roads, attacked public buildings, churches, or other Christian-owned properties.

So the Maspero massacre can only be interpreted as an escalation to intimidate further Coptic protest. This brings us back to the Generals’ hurried meeting with the Coptic Pope. They were clearly trying to achieve three objectives.

First, by dealing directly-and only-with him, the Military gives the Copts a taste of their status in an Islamic state where they will be treated as a minority religious community (“dhimmis“) rather than as a large portion of Egyptian citizens with a grievance.

Second, that the Copts’ religious “chief” will be held responsible for the acts of his people and hence is expected to control them, or else. By the same token, this is intended to intimidate the Copts (inside Egypt and in the Diaspora) since they do not want to place their elderly spiritual leader in danger.

Third, the Copts should put “Egypt’s interest above all” by shutting up and not doing anything – however legitimate – that can be used as a rationale by Islamists to attack them.

However, and despite such singling out, Copts are aware that they are not only defending their own rights but also participating in a battle, alongside secularist and liberal Muslims, to stop Egypt from “democratically” turning into an Iran-like or Taliban-like state. In fact, given the above-mentioned background, one could warn the Copts, “Behind you is the Military; before you, the Islamists.”

Thousands of Christians have fled the country since the revolution. Others are determined to remain in their ancestors’ homeland and to resist the advance of Islamists.

As for the international community’s attention to the issue, it is important  to realize  that the Copts may not be seen to represent much strategic importance. They have no oil, and don’t represent a security threat that would warrant appeasing them! Hence, apart from occasional sympathetic statements, the world is likely to turn a blind eye and consider the oppressed Copts as mere collateral damage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Instead of supporting the military and/or embracing the Islamists, there must be a “Alternative Way.”

Constitution:  We urge the U.S. Government and the international community to press Egypt to ensure that its commitments to international human rights norms are upheld in the foundational sections of the new Constitution and are not undermined by any subsequent articles or passages. It would be extremely dangerous if “democracy” were used as a pretext to impose stipulations that defy those international norms, such as imposing Taliban-like laws on all Egyptians.

NGOs:  The international community must support the liberal and secular forces in Egypt. The NGOs and emerging political parties should be assisted through adequate training programs as well as through appropriate funding. In this regard, the Egyptian authorities must stop their tactic of choking NGOs operating with transparency, while turning a blind eye to massive amounts of money channeled from certain Gulf countries to Islamist and Salafist groups in Egypt.

Implementation of Justice:

• We strongly urge the U.S. Government to press the Egyptian authorities to prosecute perpetrators of violence before, during and after the uprisings and the historic events in Egypt this year, including the Maspero massacre and the excessive violence at Tahrir square during November. Further, the extensive contacts between the U.S. and Egyptian militaries should emphasize the importance of prosecution of military personnel involved in Maspero.
• We also urge the U.S. Government to ban visas and travel to the U.S. for any government official involved in torture. While this may be difficult to implement immediately, the U.S. could assist in setting up a mechanism that would allow for victims of violence to report the names of their torturers. With the proper instruments and processes in place to allow for confirmation that a government official is indeed involved in torture, the U.S. could easily implement a visa ban against these officials similar to that in the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.
• We strongly urge the Egyptian authorities to stop arresting both Christians and Muslims when Christians and their property are attacked and instead bring the real perpetrators to justice.

Foreign Aid: While we welcome efforts to help Egypt in its current economic situation, we believe that unconditional aid would be a strategic error. Financial and military aid should be linked to Egypt’s human rights record in terms of constitutional stipulations, laws and practices over the short and medium terms.  We urge the U.S Government, European governments and others in the international community providing financial aid to Egypt to tie that aid to Egypt’s upholding and protecting fundamental human rights norms now and in any new Constitution.

Please note, that we believe all international aid should support democracy, freedom and fundamental human rights.. For instance, the G-8 summit held in May 2011 in Deauville in France was marked by the “Deauville Partnership” with the people of North Africa. As a start, $20 billion was pledged in support for Tunisian and Egyptian reforms after the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, France’s ex-Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, was charged by the G8 Presidency to follow-up on the issue. In an article dated November 14, 2011, he reports that $30 billion would be earmarked for Egypt alone over the period 2011-2013. However, he adds an astonishing remark, which sounds like a guideline by the G8 leaders, “Obviously, there shouldn’t be through the (Deauville) Partnership any attempt of political tutelage over the aid- receiving countries, which would be doomed to fail.”

The simple question is why should the U.S. and the international community pours in such colossal sums without even seeking the least guarantee to respect the principles of human rights – especially towards minorities?

Special Envoy:  We support and strongly urge the passage of S. 1245, after the adoption of H.R. 440, which provides for the appointment of a Special Envoy for minorities in the Middle East.  We also strongly urge the Administration to appoint someone to that position who is highly qualified and has the stature needed to ensure the issues related to minorities are included in the highest level of the U.S. Government’s policy and diplomacy, particularly during this historic transition in Egypt and other countries in the region.

The U.S. and international community must stop appeasing Islamists and instead hold them accountable when they abuse human rights. This means to publicly and strongly condemn abuses, and not hesitate to impose sanctions when issues are not addressed or corrected.

Mr. Chairman, Egypt is at crucial crossroads. The U.S. needs to lead the international community in helping Egypt go in the right direction. It is in Egypt’s own, and everybody else’s strategic interest.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to provide this testimony to this distinguished commission. Again, I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

TRANSCRIPT OF ADEL GUINDY’S TESTIMONY

TOM LANTOS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

DECEMBER 7, 2011

Thank you very much. Thank you also for your leadership and that of Chairman Wolf and Franks and other distinguished congressman who have been giving us unwavering support over the years. I’m honored to be here today and I would like to request that my entire written statement be made part of the record. It’s too long to read. Of course, it’s nine pages long. So I’m going to pick on a few important things which are, I think, are indicative of what’s going on in Egypt. I would start by describing the situation in Egypt, the depiction – in keeping with the depiction of summer of – spring of this and winter of that, I think Egypt is entering into a harsh summer with little to be seen in its Arab deserts beyond thirst, agony, and mirage. The first mirage is what has been – is being hailed as historic transition to democracy. It’s a charade of a democracy. What’s going on in Egypt today. Right from the beginning, by design, in this land here, you start with a Bill of Rights, Constitution to set the rules of the game, and then you build the institutions. In Egypt, by design, the military and the Islamist Brotherhood have reversed the sequence and were intent against the desires and the requests of the revolutionaries and many secularists, politicians, right from the beginning, right from February, to start with a decent constitution and they reversed the sequence to start with elections. That way, the elections, everybody, every kid in Egypt knew that was going to be won by the Islamists. That way they will make the constitution that’s to their liking. So what’s going on today? It’s a charade of a process. Right from the beginning.

Apart from the irregularities in the process itself of the elections, the past, the first – phase one. And in fact, even all along the process, you know, in Egypt, even by law you do not make a party which is based on religious or race a foundation. Fifteen out of the thirty-one newly authorized parties in Egypt over the past ten months have been all religious based, religious based and openly asking for the application of shariah. So that’s the first charade. The second mirage – the second mirage is going into civilian government. Egyptian is going – is entering a phase of an alliance of rule by the military and civilians. The facade will be similar to the liking of the United States and the international community. But the force and the power behind the scenes will be held by the military. There is marriage of convenience, or maybe by conviction. I don’t know. I doesn’t matter at that stage. Between the two groups. And this is going to be the phase of the ruling in Egypt for the next years, so these expectations – and we see op-eds here and there asking for passage from military, civilian – it’s going to happen. There’s no problem at all.

The military are not interested in governing Egypt on a day to day basis. That’s a fact. A non-starter there. Not interested at all. They are interested in the authority and the power which they have held for the past six decades. All the presidents so far came from between them, many prime ministers, ministers, heads of organizations, the economy, the army controls an economy which is about thirty or forty percent of the economic vision. It’s a black economy, it’s a black box without any scrutiny or control of anybody. The budget, it’s out of the scrutiny of the people’s assembly. And they have said clearly, they will maintain that in the future. So the couple – or the alliance of military and Islamists are going to take over Egypt. The road may be rocky over the time. Maybe the balance of power is not clear. Today they both have interest in working together in joint – in rule – in governing Egypt for the next few years, but you don’t know, we don’t know. In fact, one prediction is that the Islamists will control the street, may feel strong enough at one point to subdue the army, which is the same situation that happened in Iran, in fact, that you subdue the army by doing some kind of, you know, cleansing, ideological or physical. Pledging to have an army under the arms of the Islamists. So we are entering a very rocky period. It’s not a rocky transition towards democracy like some people would like to imagine or think. It’s a rocky downhill process which is not at all encouraging. I think we need to be prepared for what’s going on and do not applaud all of the appearances of democracy in Egypt. Which takes me, I mean, there’s so many theories about why is this alliance between the two – and what the army is, the staff has been doing over the past few months, but for the sake of time, I’ll skip that. I may come back to it if you have any questions. The second mirage is, in fact, the idea that the Islamist parties are just like any other religious parties. You know, why not the Christian parties.

And I quote here your Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, which – when she spoke at the National Democratic Institute’s 2011 Democracy Alliance Dinner, just November 7. She said, it’s a long quote, I’m just going to say – there are plenty of political parties with religious affiliations. Hindu, Christian, Jewish, Muslim, that respect the rules of democracy. The suggestion – I mean, I would very respectfully, but strongly, disagree with that statement. If you take the Christian parties in the world, you know, take the Germany’s Christian Democratic Party and try to think for a second that it has anything to do with a party like the Brotherhood, it’s outrageous, in fact. The history, you know, the movement of Christian parties started early 19th Century. If you look at the history, the evolution, the what they stand for, the current agenda and you compare that with, you know, any Islamist party, it’s like, you know, pretending that sulfuric acid and water are equal because they’re both of them fluids. They are – it’s a day and night. Islamist parties are followers of totalitarian ideology. In fact, it’s even worse than the other totalitarian ideologies the world knew and that during the 20th Century, because they pretend to speak in the name of God. So we – the world needs to be aware that what’s happening there, it’s not democracy. They pretension that these parties will become democratic, I mean, we hear some amazing things like, you know, mainstream Islamists or, you know, moderate Islamists. It’s like talking about, you know, mainstream Nazi party or moderate fascist party. These are equivalent – contradiction of terms there are amazing. I will – then the Copts. Where do the Copts fit in? The whole situation is going into, if it is not a theocratic military, theocratic state, it is a semi-theocratic state. Everybody – you know, what is being called sometimes Tahrir Two, which is the demonstrations that happened in Tahrir over the week from the 19 to the 24, 25 of November, was preceded by enormous demonstration of Islamists on Friday the 18. For what? For one word – you know, people have been working on a kind of a constitution of principles, a document for the past six or seven months, you know, has many things. Sometimes mostly contradictory fact.

But anyway, at one point, at one phrase, sentence, to describe a future state was saying that it’s a civilian state. Civilian – it’s to avoid talking about secular, not only that, but it means non-theological, non-theocratic, rather, non-theocratic and non-military. Okay, with these two meanings in mind, in fact, in the same document, there is also the stipulation which is – which has been in the past, the old defunct constitution about Islam being the religion – the religion of state and the principles of shariah being the main source of legislation. So that’s really in there. Yet the Islamists said, started to worry about the word, or the expression civilian might be construed, as the lawyers would like to say, into the possibility of becoming a secular state and they were, you know, violently, you know, demonstrating in the streets at Tahrir, hundreds of thousands there. Of course, by the evening of that date, the commission, which is a governmental commission deleted that single word or description from the committee and caved in completely. And, of course, the next few days, you know, the [UNCLEAR] government turned to align against the revolutionaries [UNCLEAR] has described before. Where do the Copts fall into that? The Copts, apart from the systematic persecution, in fact, it’s systemic also. And it’s going to be more so when they are treated as dhimmis in an Islamist state. And the gist of that has been given to them again and again over the past six months, not only by the street, by the parties, by the Islamists. By the military council itself when – the way they treated them. And in fact, what happened to [UNCLEAR] Maspero on October the 9, was made to give them a harsh lesson. In fact, the – when the military took over from Mubarak in February the 10 or 11, they committed not to shoot at citizens, never ever. They have largely kept that until the 9 of October. The first time that army shoots and crushes people. And these were the Christians, the Coptic Christians. That happened again on November 25, a story there.

I’ll jump straight to the recommendations and I have six of them. One is the constitution. There must be an assistance by the international community about the inclusion of the adherence – full adherence and acceptance of human rights, norms upheld in the foundation part of the new constitution. The word needs a distance to it. There must be a third alternative. Because, you know, you ask pragmatic governments. We have the army on one hand – on the one hand – and Islamists. Which one. We should – should not be stuck with one or the other. The world must be able to choose to encourage – for the sake of Egypt, for the sake of the world, for the sake of the security of the area, to encourage the liberal, secularist forces in Egypt, which do include the Copts, the Copts are part of that. Part of that movement. There hasn’t been enough. In fact, with so much open doors and channels and discussion and talks between Western countries, especially the US administration and the Islamists has been very, very modest effort to engage with the liberal secularist movements there. Third recommendation is implementation of justice. There’s been very seldom implementation of justice in Egypt. We encourage the authorities there to take it more seriously. The massacre of the Maspero – for example, they basically, not the only, I mean, the majority of those arrested are Copts. The perpetrators are the army. The other thugs on the street were mobilized by the secret police and so on, but yet the only people in jail are twenty-eight Copts, plus a few Muslim activists who have been bravely supporting the cause of the Copts.

We would like to request a – encourage the US government to create a kind of blacklist to ban certain officials who might be identified by victims from entering the United States. This is not difficult. There are usually enough evidence against these people. They can be given the right to defend themselves if that’s required to be fair. But at least that is the least of things to be done so that, you know, you don’t kill somebody and then the next day you get a visa to the States and Europe. The fourth point is about foreign aid. I’m delighted to hear again and again the idea of the linkage of aid to performance of human rights. In fact, it’s not only the United States. This applies to the rest of the world. I was amazed to discover a couple of weeks ago that the G-8 in its meeting in France in May has started working on a package of aid for our spring countries and they gave an ex-prime minister of France the duty of investigating the subject and he presented his report in the G-20, at the G-20 meeting in France two, just three weeks ago, during which he’s talking about allocating about twenty billion dollars, or thirty billion dollars to Egypt over the next three years. And not only that, I mean, he’s – he makes an astounding statement. You know, not only that people don’t want or hesitate to link aid to any constraints, he makes a commitment to the opposite. He says, obviously, there shouldn’t be through that partnership any attempt of political tutelage over the aid-receiving countries which would be doomed to fail. I found that flabbergasting.

Okay, the next point is the special envoy, the HR-40 has been adopted and we strongly recommend that as well for the five to be adopted to. And the last one is the US enter – I mean, the international community must stop appeasing Islamists and instead hold them accountable when they abuse human rights. Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much and I repeat it’s in the interest in Egypt and the world that Egypt be guided properly in the right direction in the next few years. Thank you very much.

Adel F. Guindy is President of the Board of Coptic Solidarity. He is also President of Solidarité Copte (France), is a Member of the Board of Directors of the Middle East Freedom Forum (USA, Egypt), Le Monde Copte (France) and Egyptian Democratic Solidarity (Egypt).

He has been an activist for several years, and frequently writes on political transformation in Egypt, the Coptic issue and Islamism. He has authored several articles in English (MERIA and other publications), three books in Arabic, and co-authored one book in French. He was a senior editor of Egypt’s Coptic community weekly Watani.

Previously, he had a long international management career with a large technology company in the energy sector.