An Alternative “National Strategy Review”

DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE POLICY FOR
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS:
"HELPING GORBACHEV SUCCEED" OR
TRANSFORMING THE USSR?

(Washington, D.C.): Around the globe today, there is a seemingly irrepressible demand for the rule of law to replace that of dictators; for basic human freedoms to be protected, not trampled, by those who govern; for free choice in economic as well as political matters. This demand is giving rise to powerful popular forces — forces that are seeking and, with varying degrees of success, achieving dramatic changes throughout the non-democratic world. The result has been the creation, from Chile to China, of a highly dynamic international environment replete with exciting new opportunities, and potential perils, for the United States and other Western powers.

Nowhere are the manifestations of this phenomenon producing greater opportunities — and more serious potential perils — for Western security than in Soviet Union. The USSR has not been immune to the popular demand for change; in fact, under the current Soviet policy of glasnost, there has been more evidence of the deep-seated dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with the ruling communist regime and their lot in life than at any time since the Russian Revolution.

What is Gorbachev’s Response?

A central question for contemporary Western security policy is: How will the Soviet leadership respond to this phenomenon? Does it recognize that the growing evidence of failure on the part of totalitarian communism’s political and economic systems can only be addressed by radical change in both?

To the extent that the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev really accepts this reality and is willing to effect a fundamental transformation of its political, economic, and military structures, there is the possibility of genuine reform in the Soviet Union that can substantially alter the threat posed by that nation and its allies to the West.

On the other hand, if — as has been the case in the past — the Soviet regime remains unwilling to cede real power and determined to prevent fundamental structural change, its current, highly publicized efforts at "reform" may amount to nothing more than temporizing measures, calculated to stave off rather than effect the necessary transformation. Under such circumstances, undisciplined Western assistance to Gorbachev could reduce, not increase, the prospects for democracy, private enterprise and liberty in the Soviet Union. The result could also be to improve the USSR’s present, prodigious capacity to threaten American interests and those of its allies.

U.S. Policy at a Crossroads

Recent events suggest that the Bush Administration has, on balance, concluded that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev is committed to the former path. Despite some officials’ obvious concerns about Gorbachev’s program of reforms known as perestroika (notably those of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney who said on April 29, 1989, "I would guess that he would ultimately fail" and of Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates who wrote on April 30th, "We can hope for such change, but all of Russian and Soviet history tells us to be skeptical and cautious"), President Bush announced on May 1, 1989 that "I made clear to Mr. Gorbachev…we wanted to see perestroika succeed."

Given this indication of presidential commitment to the success of Gorbachev’s program, taken together with a number of recent actions by the Administration (e.g., the encouragement of joint business ventures financed by Western capital, a new subsidized deal for wheat to the Soviet Union, a major economic package for Poland, and evident interest in easing restrictions on transfer of high technologies to the Soviet bloc), the United States appears poised to adopt a policy designed to "help Gorbachev." It would seem that the five month-long "National Strategy Review" (NSR) — ordered by President Bush, among other things, to assess U.S.-Soviet relations — has concluded that such an approach is both warranted and advisable.

An Alternative Assessment of Gorbachev’s Agenda

In the interest of facilitating an informed debate on this momentous policy decision, the Center for Security Policy has prepared an Alternative "National Strategy Review." It offers a rather different analysis of the character and objectives of Soviet "reform" policies under Gorbachev. For example, the Alternative NSR finds reason for concern about the Gorbachev program concerning:

• Domestic Politics: Such liberalization as is occurring is taking place firmly within the existing, totalitarian political system. All of the levers of power remain in the hands of the regime. There has been no change in the ability of the population to influence basic decisions that affect its future well-being. For all their novelty, the March 1989 elections did not alter this reality.

•  

• Foreign Affairs: The highly publicized changes in Soviet foreign policy, including their flagship — the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan — is typical of Gorbachev’s apparent, wholesale adaptation in foreign affairs of the Leninist doctrine of "reculer pour mieux sauter," tactical retreat in order to advance strategic objectives. Evidence of assiduous Soviet exploitation of divisions within the Western alliance (notably those relating to its defense) is particularly troubling in this regard.

•  

• Human Rights: While there have been numerous improvements made in the treatment of Soviet citizens by their government, the Gorbachev regime has made no move to change the legal relationship between the two. In particular, no firm basis for the exercise of political and human rights has been created; the Soviet Union has granted somewhat greater permission for individuals to emigrate, dissent, worship, and possess property but not entitled them to the right to do so.

•  

• Economic Policy: Just as political liberalization of the Soviet Union is intended to take place within the context of the existing structure, the economic reforms being introduced are designed to decentralize and introduce private enterprise only within politically controllable parameters. Optimism about the effect of economic reforms in the Soviet Union is, therefore, unwarranted.

•  

• Military Affairs and Arms Control: This is the area of Gorbachev’s "reforms" that has most dramatically affected Western attitudes about, and support for, his regime. It is equally true, however, that this is the area in which the least material change has taken place to date. The principal result of Soviet military "reform" efforts thus far appears to be that Western governments, media and publics have become convinced that the threat posed by the USSR’s armed forces is diminished when, in actuality, little has changed in the Soviet ability to threaten the West’s strategic interests.

An Alternative Approach to U.S.-Soviet Relations

Historically, the best guarantor of peace is democracy, since democracies do not use arms to wage war on each other. Wherever a government of checks and balances subject to the popular will — as opposed to the dictates of undemocratic regimes — has determined the allocation of national resources and the direction of foreign policy, military forces are maintained at modest levels and the peace is not threatened by territorial or ideological ambitions. In contrast, where it has held sway, totalitarian communism has given rise to powerful military establishments vastly in excess of legitimate national defense requirements and with a propensity to employ arms in pursuit of aggressive foreign policy ends. Such capabilities concentrated in the hands of undemocratic regimes pose the only real threat to the physical security of the United States and its allies.

Accordingly, it is in the interest of the United States to encourage fully the growing, world-wide movement toward self-governance — the institutionalization of human rights and legally protected freedoms and the growth of free enterprise.

This principle should above all govern U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

Toward this end, the Alternative "National Strategy Review" recommends to the Bush Administration a different approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. In contrast to an approach which principally entails subsidizing and otherwise propping up Gorbachev and his vision of perestroika, this strategy would entail seizing the historical initiative by using all available Western resources and leverage to transform the totalitarian Soviet system. It envisions working concertedly with private, non-communist groups in the Soviet Union and the East bloc (not simply the ruling regime’s leaders) to bring about fundamental changes in the existing political and economic structures.

To implement such an approach, the Alternative "NSR" recommends specific changes in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union: a "cash-and-carry" policy in economic relations; intensive efforts on behalf of full human rights; vigorous public diplomacy; sound intelligence programs; strong leadership and a robust Western military posture.

Conclusion:

This is no time for a passive, reactive or paralyzed American foreign policy. Now more than ever, U.S. initiative and leadership are required if the West is to define Gorbachev’s success in terms consistent with democratic interests rather than his own. Both will be required in quantity if the present impulse to accede to Gorbachev’s efforts aimed at sowing discord within the Western alliance and obtaining a massive economic bail-out is to be resisted and the conditions for lasting peace and prosperity created.

Now — as the West is faced with the tantalizing prospect of the triumph over communist totalitarianism of ideals, values and institutions with which it has long been associated — is not the time to shrink from the challenge. Instead, the United States must seize the momentous opportunity to press its considerable advantages toward the end of enabling the peoples of the Soviet Union and other nations of the Eastern bloc to express and fulfill the same, basic aspiration increasingly evidenced elsewhere: the right to live in a society of laws made by a free citizenry.

If the policy prescriptions contained in this Alternative "National Strategy Review" are implemented, the world may be able to realize an era of peace and prosperity without historical precedent. It is up to us to choose; it is time to act.