Arafat’s Bait and Switch on Statehood: Resolution 181

(Washington, D.C.): Today is the day Yasser Arafat had announced that he would
declare a
Palestinian state. Although he chose not do it today — so as not to hand Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu a potentially winning issue in the upcoming Israeli elections, Arafat’s
agenda remains unchanged: to challenge Israel’s legitimacy, strip away its territory and
ultimately to destroy the Jewish State. Two outstanding essays describing the newest gambit in
this
long-standing campaign are printed below as contributions to the security policy debate.

‘MAY 4TH AND THE DECLARATION OF A PALESTINIAN
STATE’

By Meyrav Wurmser and Aaron Mannes,
Middle East Media &
Research Institute

The PLO’s aspiration for Palestinian statehood was the center of its political activities for the
last
decade. Nevertheless, in 1993 the PLO engaged in an interim agreement with Israel that only
granted it a limited self-rule, the final status of which remained open-ended. For the PLO, May 4,
1999, the date on which the five-year interim period ends, is the day when the PLO must return
to its primary political course and unilaterally re-declare its state. Arafat’s spokesman, said: “the
4th of May [1999] is a holy date. The Palestinian state is a finalized historic fact; the struggle
today is not for the [Palestinian] state, but over its territory. The whole world knows it and treats
us accordingly.”(1)

But, on April 29th, the PLO Central Council adjourned until June 1999, postponing the
discussion of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) until after the
Israeli elections
on May 17, 1999 due to international, (mostly American) opposition.

Nevertheless, the PLO turned its retreat into political gain. It managed to separate its
unqualified
right to a state from the bounds of negotiations with Israel (2) and it succeeded in reintroducing
UN General Assembly Resolution 181, of 1947, as the source of legitimacy for Palestinian
claims to statehood.

To Declare or Not to Declare?

Despite the fact that in 1988 the Palestinian National Council [PNC] had already declared the
State of Palestine based on UNGA Resolution 181, a declaration that was recognized by over 100
states, Palestinians say a second declaration is needed to consolidate the state’s sovereignty over
its territories.(3)

Three rationales underpinned the planned May 4th UDI. First, since no agreement was
reached
on final settlement by May 4th – the PLO would be free of the Oslo Accord’s restrictions,
particularly those enforcing the continuity of the political and legal status quo in the West Bank
and Gaza. Second, the PLO believed that by declaring a state they would change the legal status
of the territories under Israeli control from “disputed land” to “occupied land.” (4) Finally, the
PLO feared that the termination of the interim stage would create a political and judicial vacuum
in the PA territories, and that the validity of the PA, its institutions and its Chairman would
expire, making a UDI on May 4th an absolute necessity.

Most Palestinians supported the UDI. Some, primarily in the Islamic camp, opposed it
because
“a UDI prior to the liberation of all Palestinian lands would mean a concession of legitimate
Palestinian rights.” (5) Also, it would transform what remains of the Palestinian question —
Jerusalem, the refugees, land still under Israeli occupation, and the settlements — into marginal
issues.(6) Despite the fact that these arguments did not attract wide followings, Arafat worked to
turn the UDI into an issue of the broadest possible national consensus, including the Hamas
leader Sheik Yassin in the PLO Central Council’s discussions. Yassin attended despite
opposition and public criticism from the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan. Hamas
agreed to support any decision that the PLO’s Central Council makes regarding the UDI as long
as Hamas’ goal, abandonment of the Oslo accords, is fulfilled on May 4th. (8)

International Reactions

The PLO claims that international reactions to the Palestinian UDI were generally
supportive.(9)
Most states support the Palestinian UDI in principle, except the US (and Israel) who opposed any
unilateral action. This opposition was shared, as a matter of tactics only, by the EU, Egypt and
Jordan, all of which were concerned that the UDI would help reelect Netanyahu.(10)

In light of this opposition, Arafat launched a series of international meetings in an attempt to
trade postponing the UDI for a recognition of the independent Palestinian state at a later date. He
was partially successful. The EU meeting in Berlin on March 26, 1999, declared its
reaffirmation of “the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination
including the option of a state” and announced its “readiness to consider the recognition of
a Palestinian state in due course.”(11) But, President Clinton’s letter to Arafat, a few
days
before the Central Council convened, did not go beyond his speech in Gaza [December 1998],
and evaded any reference to the term “self-determination,” which the PLO sought. Minister of
Planning and International Cooperation, Nabil Sha’ath, admitted that President Clinton’s letter
did not contain any of the expected guarantees. He added, “Guarantees would mean that the
Americans would be willing to add [to their commitment] the missiles of Kosovo, but they are
not ready to direct the missiles from Kosovo to Israel. “(12)

Expanding the Boundaries of the Future Palestinian State

The discussions of the boundaries of the future state paralleled the discussion of the UDI. In
the
last year, PLO leaders stated that the final settlement should be modeled on the UNGA
Resolution 181, (13) the Partition Resolution of 1947. Over the last five months, Resolution 181
has been transformed from a marginal demand that was only discussed in local forums in the
Palestinian Authority’s areas, to the centerpiece of PLO diplomacy in the UN and around the
world.

Once the Oslo agreements, based on 242, expire on May 4, the PLO argued, 242 should be
replaced by the preceding Resolution 181. As the PNC Chairman Salim Za’anun, said, “On May
4 the situation will return to the international [status] that Palestine had prior to the Oslo
agreement. namely [the status of] an independent Palestinian state according to 181.”(14)

On March 25, 1999 the PLO officially introduced Resolution 181 in a letter to the UN
insisting
that Israel “explain to the international community the illegal steps it took when it applied its
authority and jurisdiction to the territories it captured in the 1948 war, beyond the areas allocated
to the Jewish state in Resolution 181.” (15) On April 26, 1999 the Palestinian Legislative
Council, convening to discuss the UDI, stated that the ultimate goal of the Palestinian people, an
independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, is based “first and foremost [on] UN Resolutions
181 and 194 [Right of Return]…”(16)

PLO Central Council, having postponed the UDI until after Israel’s elections, also concluded
that
Resolution 181 is the source of legitimacy of the Palestinian state: “…a total consensus
has
been reached that the state of Palestine and its capitol, Jerusalem, is an existing reality on
the basis of the natural right of the Palestinian people to establish its state and on the basis
of Resolution 181…”(17)

The UN’s reaction to the PLO’s revival of 181 has yet to be determined. UN
Secretary-General
Kofi Annan did not confirm Arafat’s claim to have secured his “support for UN General
Assembly resolutions, including Resolution 181.”(18) In contrast, the UN Human
Rights
Commission in Geneva passed, on April 26, 1999, a resolution supporting UN Resolutions
181 and 194, while ignoring 242, 338 and the Oslo Accords.(19)

The US did not react to the PLO’s revival of Resolution 181. The official American
statement on
the Peace Process, made on April 26, 1999, ignored PLO claims based on UN Resolution 181.
The statement only reaffirmed that Resolutions 242 and 338 are the basis of the peace process.

Conclusions

By insisting on an unqualified right for a Palestinian state, Arafat managed to
separate the
issue of Palestinian statehood from the Final Settlement negotiations with Israel.
Focusing
attention on the May 4th date allowed Arafat to change the fundamental question from whether
or not the PLO could have a state, to the question of when its independence could be declared. In
exchange for postponing the UDI he received some international recognition of his right to
declare a state at a later date. In addition he managed to forge some unity within his own camp.

Removing the debate from the Oslo framework also gave the Palestinian leadership
the
opportunity to revive the Partition Plan of 1947 as a source of legitimacy for the Palestinian
state. This initiative, which allowed the Palestinians to expand their territorial claims,
also
received some international support. Stepping outside of the bilateral Oslo framework to the UN
forum opens new political options for the Palestinians. (20)

Dr. Meyrav Wurmser is the Executive Director of MEMRI. Aaron Mannes is
MEMRI’s Director
of Research.

1. Nabil Abu Rudeina, Al-Ayyam, February 16, 1999

2. Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Nabil Sha’ath, Al-Ayyam, April 24,
1999.

3. PNC Member Mahmoud Al-‘Ajarmi, Al Quds, August 28, 1998.

4. Salim Za’anun, PNC Chairman, in an interview with UAE paper Al-Halij, reprinted by
Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, April 24, 1999.

5. Hamas spokesmen in Jordan Ibrahim Ghosha, Al-Quds, August 19, 1998.

6. MK Azmi Bishara, “4 May 1999 and the Palestinian Statehood,” Journal of Palestine
Studies,
Vol. 28, No. 2, Winter 98.

7. As a goodwill gesture towards Hamas, three Hamas activists who were involved in the
1996
suicide bombings against Israel were freed from a PA prison. “PA Frees Three 1996 Bus Bomb
Planners,” Ha’Aretz, April 27, 1999.

8. Sheik Isma’il Abu Shanab on PA TV, April 28, 1999.

9. Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Nabil Sha’ath, Al-Ayyam, April 28,
1999.

10. David Makovsky, “If it is Good for Netanyahu then it is Bad, ” Ha’Aretz, January 19,
1999.

11.”EU Declaration on Middle East Peace Process,” from the EU’s Jerusalem Office on-line.

12. PA TV, April 28, 1999.

13. UNGA Resolution 181, granted 54% of the land is given to a Jewish state, 46% to an
Arab
state. Jerusalem was internationalized.

14. UAE paper Al-Halij, reprinted by Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam, April 24, 1999.

15. “Back to 181?” Ha’aretz, Tuesday, April 27, 1999.

16. Al-Ayyam, Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, and Al-Quds, April 26, 1999.

17. Al-Ayyam, April 29, 1999.

18. Reuters report, March 25, 1999

19. Ha’aretz, April 27, 1999.

20. One such option which the PLO seeks is the Namibia model. “Palestinians Reveal
Long-term
Plans,” MEMRI Special Dispatch, No.31, Apr. 23, 1999.

‘181- A DECLARATION OF WAR‘

Editorial, Ariel Center for Policy Research

In its session in Gaza on Tuesday, April 29, l999, the Palestinian National Council (PNC)
discussed the postponement of the declaration of Palestinian statehood, scheduled for May 4.
The debate centered primarily on the demand to establish a Palestinian state which will include
all territories designated as Arab land in UN Resolution 181.

For about a half a year now, the Palestinian Authority has vigorously pushed forward a
political
initiative calling for the implementation of UN Resolutions 181 (November 1947) and 194
(December 1948). In other words, fulfilling those resolutions which call for the State of Israel to
return to the partition borders and for millions of Arabs to overrun the emasculated stump which
will remain of the Jewish state.

After a series of meetings with personalities in Europe in which this matter was raised,
Arafat
met with Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, on March 21, 1999 and received his
blessing. Annan claimed that Arafat’s demand was firmly anchored in the General
Assembly’s
resolutions.

After receiving the green light from the UN Secretary-General on March 25, the PLO, now
operating in its role as the Palestine Liberation Organization, submitted an official request for a
General Assembly session in which Israel be called upon to explain its violations of the UN
Resolutions. The PLO demand is supported by all of the Arab states — led by
Egypt.

Europe, at the insistent urging of Germany, the dominant force on the continent and the
nation
currently presiding over the European Union, supports the Arab demand. It was Germany which
raised the demand for the internationalization of Jerusalem by transforming it into a separate
entity (corpus seperatum) based on the partition borders. The UN Human Rights Commission (a
body which enjoys great prestige and influence), in its annual meeting in Geneva on April 28,
l999, adopted a resolution calling for self-determination for the Palestinian nation on the basis of
Resolution 181 from November 1947, and demanding that Israel fulfill Resolution 194 from
December 1948. Of the committee’s 53 member nations (Israel’s candidacy was rejected due to
the claim that Israel violates human rights), 44 voted in favor of the resolution, including all the
European nations, and 8 abstained. Though the United States voted against, it adamantly
refused to accede to the Israeli request to expend efforts to prevent the resolution’s
adoption.

As a result, within a short time, the residents of Jerusalem, Nahariya, Lod, Ramle,
Jaffa
and Beersheba, to name but a few, can anticipate their cities being labeled “illegal
settlements and obstacles to peace” by the international community. The precedent for
the
new Arab demand is a direct result of the strategic abuse to which Israel has been subjected since
1990 (better known by its sarcastic euphemism: “peace process”). From the moment that Israel
waived its basic right as an attacked nation to maintain territories which served the aggressor as a
springboard for war, the return to the partition borders and the liquidation of Israel have become
merely a function of time.

Now that all pretenses have been eliminated and the malicious Arab intentions to annihilate
the
Jewish state have been exposed, the critical mass which demands courageous action required of
any sane nation standing on the verge of a national catastrophe has crystallized. The minimal
response required to upset the Arab strategy would be to immediately announce
suspension of
the “peace process”, annexation of those parts of Judea and Samaria which have not yet
been relinquished to the Palestinian Authority, expulsion of the PLO from Jerusalem and
disarming the “Palestinian police force”.

This step will almost certainly lead to the severing of diplomatic relations with Egypt and
Jordan,
riots in Judea and Samaria and possibly economic sanctions by the European Union. Taking all
factors into account, it is a reasonable price to pay. The probability of a comprehensive war is
low, as the Arabs are unprepared at this point. On the other hand, if the Arabs decide to wage a
war, there is a reasonable chance that they would be routed, as Israel has not yet squandered its
strategic holdings in Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights.

If Israel does not take the above actions and chooses “disgrace instead of war”, ultimately, to
paraphrase Churchill (“You chose disgrace instead of war, you got disgrace and war as well.”),
Israel will get both “disgrace and war”. However, one major distinction exists: Disgrace
was
the worst that Churchill feared as he never considered the possibility that Britain might be
destroyed. The Jewish state does not have that sort of British luxury at its
disposal.