AS HAITI MELTS DOWN, REASONS MOUNT UP WHY NO U.S. TROOPS SHOULD GO TO BOSNIA ABSENT CONGRESS’ O.K.

Precis: Today, the House of
Representatives is expected to act on the Hefley bill —
binding legislation barring the use of appropriated funds
to deploy U.S. ground forces to Bosnia without
congressional approval. As evidence mounts that it was a
mistake to allow American forces and resources to be
employed absent Congress’ assent to restore
Jean-Bertrande Aristide to power in Haiti, the case for
avoiding a similar, and far more serious, debacle in
Bosnia becomes all the more compelling.

(Washington, D.C.): Bill Clinton’s luck may have run
out. Just as the U.S. House of Representatives begins
consideration of legislation that would require prior
congressional approval of any American deployment of
peacekeeping forces to Bosnia, the arguments for doing so
are being given fresh impetus in Haiti. If as seems
likely, President Aristide continues to revert to form as
a ruthless, unstable dictator — increasingly presiding
over, if not responsible for, the shredding of such
trappings of democracy as have been put in place since
his return to Port-au-Prince — the lessons should not be
lost on Congress: In non-emergency situations, as a
general rule, the legislative branch ought to have a say
in the deployment of U.S. troops to dangerous overseas
assignments.

Haiti — A Case in Point

President Clinton insisted on invading Haiti
and reinstalling Jean-Bertrande Aristide in the face of
strenuous, bipartisan objections from Congress. Thanks
largely to the efforts of former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Senator Sam Nunn and former
President Jimmy Carter, the invasion was effected
virtually without bloodshed. It nonetheless occurred
without congressional assent; indeed, it was timed so as
to preempt scheduled votes on Capitol Hill that
would almost certainly have disapproved of such military
action on behalf of Arisitide.

In recent weeks, congressional reservations have been
increasingly borne out. In the wake of parliamentary
elections characterized by widespread fraud and voting
irregularities, President Aristide has apparently been
emboldened to employ anew the techniques of mob violence
and political coercion that he has used before to
maintain control. Several of the President’s political
opponents have been brutally murdered with axes and
machetes in recent weeks, with the residences of many
more set afire. Two days ago, a female Haitian journalist
who had courageously published articles documenting
widespread corruption in the Aristide regime was attacked
by a mob while driving with her two small children. Her
car was destroyed and she and her children were last seen
being dragged away by the attackers.

In the past, such street violence has been used by
Aristide to preserve his hold on power. It should come as
no surprise if, in the weeks leading up to the scheduled
17 December presidential elections, mobs are heard
demanding that the President seek reelection. Of course,
to do so, Aristide would have to disregard a
constitutional prohibition against such a possibility and
his repeated promises not to run again — centerpieces of
the Clinton Administration’s case that a U.S.
intervention in Haiti would lead to democratic rule.
Whether President Aristide actually stands for a rigged
reelection or chooses to exercise effective control over
a successor government dominated by his party, the bottom
line is the same: The deployment of tens of thousands
of U.S. troops and the infusion of many hundreds of
millions of American tax-dollars into Haiti has not
assured the functioning of democracy there, to say
nothing of ensuring that it will survive the scheduled
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island in March of
1996.

No Better Prospects for a Lasting Peace in
Bosnia

The deal under negotiation in Dayton, Ohio shows
little sign of being more effective or durable than that
used to justify the American intervention in Haiti.
To the contrary — as evident in President Clinton’s 13
November 1995 letter to the congressional leadership —
there are serious questions about the viability of any
peace agreement in Bosnia that is predicated upon the
good faith of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and a
de facto division of territory that rewards aggression he
inspired. Mr. Clinton’s assurances about the
Implementation Force’s mission, its command and control
arrangements, its costs, the “exit strategy,”
the “evenhanded” or neutral status of American
forces and the impact on U.S. military readiness all
warrant the most careful and skeptical prior
congressional scrutiny.

Unfortunately, that is clearly not what the Clinton
Administration has in mind. While the President’s letter
assures Congress that “our troops will not be
deployed unless and until there is a genuine peace
agreement” and that “there will be a timely
opportunity for Congress to consider and act upon [his]
request for support before American forces are deployed
in Bosnia,” Mr. Clinton notes “there is a
requirement for some early prepositioning of a small
amount of communications and other support
personnel.”

The Bottom Line

In other words, the President hopes to achieve
precisely the same sort of fait accompli with
respect to Bosnia that he perpetrated in Haiti — get
started with a deployment before Congress can interpose
objections or conditions, then insist that the
legislative branch “support the troops” by
authorizing deployments and paying the bills. As the
folly of this approach becomes clear in the context of
Haiti, it should be evident that the mistake should not
be repeated in the case of a far more volatile Bosnia.

Starting with today’s vote in the House of
Representatives on legislation offered by Rep. Joel
Hefley and a large, bipartisan group of cosponsors, the Congress
should establish that no U.S. ground troops may be
dispatched to Bosnia for peacekeeping, peacemaking or, as
the President put it, “peace implementing”
purposes without express and prior congressional
approval.