Broadening the Lens: Peter Leitner’s Revelations on ’60 Minutes,’ Capitol Hill Indict Clinton Technology Insecurity
(Washington, D.C.): Peter Leitner is one of the most courageous men in Washington today.
In
an interview to be broadcast tomorrow night on CBS “60 Minutes,” Dr.
Leitner will once again
put his job as a Senior Strategic Trade Analyst in the Pentagon’s Defense Technology Security
Administration (DTSA) on the line by telling the truth about the Clinton Administration’s reckless
disregard for national security when it comes to exporting dual-use technologies to China and
other potential adversaries. His appearance on television’s most widely watched program
promises to put into focus for the American people a critical fact: The Clinton
Administration’s conduct with respect to assisting the Chinese military’s rocket program
—
which is now the subject of myriad congressional investigations — is not an isolated
incident,
but part of a pattern that threatens incalculable harm to the United States and its vital
interests.
Tick-Tick-Tick-Tick
According to a partial transcript made available by the Drudge Report, the subject of the “60
Minutes” segment entitled “The China Connection” will be a sale of advanced dual-use
machine tools to the PRC that was approved by the Clinton Administration in 1994 — over
Dr. Leitner’s objections. Technology transfer expert and University of Wisconsin
professor
Gary Milhollin, sets the stage for how China induced the owners of a plant-full of sensitive
manufacturing equipment to sell it to the PRC: “It was blackmail….The Chinese were
telling
McDonnell Douglas, ‘Look, if you want to make a big airline package deal…we want some
sensitive machine tools that you would not otherwise sell us… And we want the [Clinton]
Administration to close its eyes.”
“60 Minutes” goes on to report that machinery from a shuttered McDonnell Douglas weapons
factory in Columbus, Ohio eventually made their way into a Chinese missile plant — fulfilling Dr.
Leitner’s warnings at the time the export license was up for review. Drudge says “[Leitner] tells
Sunday’s broadcast that superiors directly told him to change his recommendation: ‘I
was told
the decision was made at high levels within the government. The decision was made to
approve this case. And that was that.’“
Dr. Leitner’s comments appear to jive with those of another official interviewed for the story,
the
Commerce Department’s Marc Reardon. Drudge reports that “60 Minutes” reveals that:
- “Reardon was told to investigate how sensitive technology from the U.S. licensed for
civilian-use only, wound up at a Chinese missile factory — but not to try too hard.
‘Somebody really didn’t want the truth to come out’ the Commerce Department
employee tells CBS cameras…. Commerce…had granted the license for exporting the
machinery — highly sophisticated metal cutting and shaping tools used to make military
aircraft and missiles — on condition that it be used for civilian purposes only. Six
months after some of the tools were found at a Chinese missile plant, Reardon was told
to investigate. He tells [interviewer Steve] Kroft that he was told whom to interview
and what questions he could and couldn’t ask!
- “McDonnell Douglas, now under federal investigation in the matter, notified the
U.S. Government, which convinced the Chinese to put the machinery in storage,
but did not request its return, reports Kroft.”
Other Travesties
Dr. Leitner’s interview comes on the heel of his appearance in April before the Joint
Economic
Committee, chaired by Rep. Jim Saxton (R-NJ)
Clinton misfeasance, if not malfeasance, with regard to technology security policy
long before the
present Loral-Hughes satellite controversy made it fashionable. The Leitner testimony put a
spotlight on several other areas where national security interests appear to be at risk of getting
short shrift by the Administration’s trade uber alles philosophy:
- Supercomputers: “As we meet today, the Administration appears poised
to announce yet
another round of unilateral supercomputer decontrols. This time it is feared by many that
administration excesses will extend well above the current, unjustifiable 7,000 MTOP
level(2)….Providing access to even greater
processing power will impart to potential
adversaries and proliferators the ability to pursue design, modeling, prototyping and
development work across the entire spectrum of weapons of mass destruction….
“There is growing speculation that the Clinton administration’s furious
push to
decontrol supercomputers, widely seen as a payoff for generous campaign support and
contributions, was also intended to underwrite Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) signatures, by providing an avenue for weapons testing, stockpile
stewardship, and ongoing weapons development without the need for the physical
initiation of a nuclear chain reaction…
- “The following types of verification technologies, among others, would be
rendered ineffective or irrelevant by the migration of nuclear weapons testing to
supercomputer-based simulation and modeling: Space-Based Optics and
Sensors…Radar…Listening Posts…Radionuclide Monitoring Network…[and]
Seismic Detectors….One of the lessons learned from the destruction of Saddam
Hussein’s nuclear weapons program was that a proliferant may be quite willing to settle
for hydrodynamic testing of its prototype nuclear weapons as an uneasy certification
for including them into its arsenal…
- “U.S. actions to promote the availability of high-performance supercomputers will
likely contribute to the proliferation problem by facilitating access
to modeling and
simulation, which will give clandestine bomb makers greater confidence in the
functionality of their designs.(3) This increased level of
confidence may be all that a
belligerent may require to make the decision to deploy a weapon. Sophisticated
modeling and simulation will enable clandestine programs to advance closer to
the design and development of true thermonuclear weapons….”
- “If, as a price for Russia’s signature, the Clinton administration was willing to
- Telecommunications Technologies: “The blind pursuit of market share
and the disregard of
our national security were again demonstrated by the February 1998 U.S. proposal to the
Wassenaar export control forum for the accelerated de-listing of virtually all
telecommunications technology and equipment. If this proposal goes through it
will result
in free and open access by even the rogue states to state-of-the-art optical fibers,
transmission equipment, switches, repeaters, high- speed computer network systems,
advanced encryption, etc., which forms the backbone of military battle management, air
defense, command and control, missile launch, and joint R&D development
efforts….
provide the means of circumventing both its spirit and explicit goals, then the treaty
should be regarded as little more than a sham to be rejected by the U.S. Senate…”
- “To maintain these items on the export control lists requires unanimity from the
- Advanced Transport Aircraft: “To compound these problems…is the
pending
Administration decision to perpetrate another technological fiction known as the MD-17.
Basically the MD-17 is the brand-new C-17 [the Defense Department’s premier
airlifter]…incorporating some other minor cosmetic changes so that it may soon be termed a
‘civil’ aircraft by the Administration….The game is to free this aircraft from the control of the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) administered by the State Department and
place it under the jurisdiction of the extraordinarily weak Commodity Control List (CCL) run
by the Commerce Department.
member states. Unfortunately, as the organization’s membership has expanded to
include countries that were historically the target of export controls — some of
which still should be — the likelihood of these controls surviving beyond this fall is
very remote….“
- “If the MD-17 is termed a civil airliner it will no longer be subject to sanctions
- “The items transferred to Commerce’s control — commercial jet engine hot section
technology and commercial communications satellites — are militarily sensitive items.
Hot section technology gives U.S. fighter aircraft the ability to outlast and outperform
other
aircraft, a key element in achieving air superiority. Because of the military significance of this
technology, State does not allow the export of the most advanced hot section technology
for either military or commercial use….
such as those imposed upon the PRC after the Tiananmen Square massacres. It will be
free to be sold to China so long as a Department of Commerce export license is
obtained. Unfortunately, as the Commerce Department controls are extraordinarily
non-specific when it comes to ‘non-military’ transport craft, you can expect to see the
People’s Liberation Army’s Air Force flying MD-17’s in future military
adventures. The MD-17 will provide the PRC with the long-range military logistics
support it currently lacks.”
Required Reading
Speaking of ITAR and CCL, congressional investigators, journalists covering the unfolding
U.S.-PRC technology scandals and other Americans concerned about the national security would
be
well advised to examine a General Accounting Office audit NSIAD-97-24, entitled “Export
Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items.” This audit
was conducted for the House National Security Committee in January 1997 to review the Clinton
Administration’s decision to transfer responsibility for export decisions affecting both satellites
and jet engine “hot sections” — the most technologically challenging and strategically
important
portion where the actual combustion of fuel occurs. Highlights of this GAO report include
the
following (emphasis added throughout):
- “Because of the military importance of hot section technology and the similarity
between commercial and military technology, Defense officials are concerned about the
diffusion of technology and availability of hot section components that could negatively
affect the combat advantage of U.S. aircraft and pose a threat to U.S. national security
concerns.
- “To protect national security interests, Defense officials review applications
- “Commercial communications satellites being transferred to Commerce’s
jurisdiction
contain militarily sensitive characteristics, such as cross-link capabilities that transmit
data
from one satellite to another without going through a ground station and thus permit very
secure communications. Defense and State officials expressed concern about the
potential
for improvements in missile capabilities through disclosure of technical data related to
integrating the satellite with the launch vehicle and the operational capability that
specific satellite characteristics could give a potential adversary. State has approved the
export of commercial communications satellites for foreign launch with conditions for
safeguarding sensitive technologies for certain destinations, such as China.” - “The Arms Export Control Act [the statutory basis for ITAR] gives State the authority to
use
export controls primarily to protect U.S. national security without regard to economic or
commercial interests. Under the Export Administration Act [the statutory basis for the CCL],
on the other hand, Commerce weighs economic and trade interests along with national security
and foreign policy concerns. These differences in the underlying basis for decisions
create
uncertainty as to whether the changed procedures for making licensing decisions will
result in changes in licensing policy.
referred by State to determine whether the export would undermine the U.S. lead in
hot section technology and, consequently, U.S. air superiority. Defense and State
have not approved the export of the most advanced hot section technology for
either military or commercial use, although certain exports have been allowed under
government-to-government agreements with U.S. allies that restrict transfer beyond the
government.”
An Early Warning of Clinton’s Insensitivity to Technology
Security
There has, in fact, been less “uncertainty” than the GAO suggests. From its
earliest days, the
Clinton Administration has demonstrated a wholesale disregard for national security
concerns to the extent they interfered with economic interests such as trade.
One of the first, symbolic indications of this proclivity was made clear in the wake of the
publication on 9 November 1992 of a Center for Security Policy Transition Brief entitled
Putting
the Security into the New Economic Security Council (
- “The Clinton transition team has served notice that one of its first priorities will be
the establishment of a new ‘Economic Security Council’ (ESC) within the White
House, reporting directly to the President. While the ESC will presumably be designed
to elevate the stature of both domestic and international economic issues — an activity
that the Center for Security Policy deems fully warranted — the structure and
decision-making process of the new Council will ultimately determine whether this
mechanism actually serves to advance U.S. long-term national interests, as opposed to
those of narrow parochial constituencies.
- “In formulating his Economic Security Council, President-elect Clinton
must
begin by properly defining ‘economic security.’ On the international front, that
definition must embody the appropriate balance between trade
competitiveness/promotion and fundamental national security, human rights and
foreign policy priorities of the United States….”
The Center’s paper went on to urge that the new Clinton-Gore Administration adopt the most
successful bureaucratic model for assuring such an integration of national security and economic
policies — the Reagan Administration’s cabinet-level Senior Interdepartmental
Group-International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP) created pursuant to NSDD 48
“Many of the components of the proven SIG-IEP institutional arrangements should be
incorporated into the Economic Security Council. This would include the active
participation of the National Security Advisor — in tandem with his ESC counterpart
— in the preparation of agendas, coordination of presidential decision memoranda and
the resulting directives. This approach would ensure that an effective counterweight is
in
place to agencies enjoying undue influence….In the process, the ‘big picture’ synthesis
required for balanced, successful and visionary presidential policy-making is also assured.”
- A Preordained Disaster
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration never adopted this advice. In fact, shortly after the
Center’s analysis was published, the Clinton-Gore team even dropped “Security” from the title of
its new organization, which became known, instead, as National Economic Council (NEC).
Matters were made worse by the seconding or hiring of individuals to staff it who were
ideologically aligned with the trade-first priorities of the Commerce Department and its Secretary,
Ron Brown (whose career in Democratic party politics made combining business with partisan
advantage second-nature).
During the Clinton-Gore years, the deck has been thoroughly stacked against those
interested in safeguarding national security interests during the formulation of economic
policy. In contrast with the SIG-IEP, the Defense Department and the Intelligence
Community
were not made charter members of the NEC and the role of the NSC was
downgraded. Principal
responsibility for sensitive export control decisions was increasingly consolidated in the
Commerce Department. While — as National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and the current
Secretary of Commerce, William Daley, have stressed in recent op.eds. published as part of the
Administration’s strategy for belatedly limiting the damage flowing from the China satellite
controversy — the Pentagon is still permitted to “review” DoC decisions, as a practical
matter it has lost any real ability to influence many sensitive decontrol and licensing
decisions.(6)
‘People Is Policy’
This deplorable outcome has been rendered even more certain by the nature of
personnel choices
made in staffing the Clinton Pentagon. As the Center noted on 26 May 1998:
- “The senior Defense Department leadership has all too often been part of the problem
when it comes to dual-use technology transfers to China. For example, former
Secretary of Defense William Perry created and co-chaired a so-called “Joint
Defense Conversion Commission” with his Chinese counterpart. This entity served as
a mechanism for facilitating the sale of many American strategic technologies to the
People’s Liberation Army. And Mitch Wallerstein, the former Deputy
Assistant
Secretary of Defense responsible for evaluating such transfers, spent much of his
professional life prior to his arrival at the Pentagon arguing for the evisceration of
national security-minded export control regimes.
- “Given such policy predilections in the Defense Department’s hierarchy, is it any
wonder that such technologies as a factory full of machine tools used to
manufacture F-15s and B-1 bombers, advanced U.S. jet engines suitable for
powering Chinese long-range cruise missiles and supercomputers valuable to the
PRC’s nuclear weapons program have been approved for sale to China with the
Pentagon’s blessing? Should we take any comfort from the claim that the
Defense Department approved the presidential waiver necessary to launch a Loral
satellite aboard Beijing’s Long March rocket — notwithstanding that agency’s
[i.e., DTSA’s] reported conclusion that the company had harmed national security
by helping China’s ballistic missile program?”
Sowing Salt in the Ground at DTSA
Leaving nothing to chance, the Pentagon recently decided to render Peter Leitner’s
organization,
the Defense Technology Security Administration, even less able to oppose dangerous dual-use
exports. Pursuant to a reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense unveiled late last
year, DTSA is to be physically relocated to the vicinity of Dulles airport — too far removed from
downtown Washington to be much of a player in inter-agency meetings and related
decision-making. Congressional investigators are on notice: If this move is allowed to
occur, it is a
safe bet that information in DTSA files that would shed unflattering light on
Administration technology transfer decisions might be unavailable, at least for some period
of time.
If the physical relocation to Dulles were not bad enough, DTSA is also slated to be
moved to
the bureaucratic equivalent of Siberia. Under the reorganization plan, it would report to
low-level officials in the Pentagon’s Acquisition organization — an institution that, like the
Department
of Commerce, is inclined to put perceived parochial equities (in Acquisition’s case, supporting the
DoD industrial base and achieving greater economies of scale for its purchases from “dual-use”
manufacturers) ahead of the national interests. Should this happen, the front office at
the DoD
may not even learn that there are legitimate concerns about whatever strategic technology might
be left to decontrol.
The Bottom Line
Peter Leitner, Rep. Saxton and “60 Minutes” are to be commended for their efforts to put the
true
scope and gravity of the Clinton “China Connection” — and the reckless technology transfers that
are at its core — into proper perspective. As congressional, media and public scrutiny is applied
to the broadening scandal arising from the Clinton-Gore policy of technology
insecurity, however,
attention must be paid not only to the ominous results of this policy for U.S. national security
(notably, the additional costs it will likely impose on the Defense Department if its vital
qualitative edge is to be preserved.)
Corrective action must also be undertaken to address the bureaucratic, institutional
and
personnel factors that have been responsible for formulating and implementing this
disastrous policy. One place to start would be to halt the dismantling of the Defense
Technology Security Administration and to appoint Peter Leitner its director,
with a charter
that allows his watchdog agency’s views to be reported directly to the Secretary of
Defense.
– 30 –
1. Dr. Leitner’s 28 April 1998 testimony actually was his
second appearance before Rep.
Saxton’s Joint Committee. The first occasion was on 19 June 1997 as discussed in the Center’s
Press Release entitled Profile In Courage: Peter Leitner Blows
The Whistle On Clinton’s
Dangerous Export Decontrol Policies (No. 97-P
82, 19 June 1997). As the Center noted at the
time:
- “Dr. Leitner’s testimony illuminated the particular danger associated with the
access the People’s Republic of China has achieved to a host of U.S. and Western
military and dual-use technologies. His remarks — and prescriptions for corrective
action — are especially timely given that Congress is preparing to debate President
Clinton’s proposal to renew China’s Most Favored Nation status, a status that is
contributing to Beijing’s systematic efforts to acquire and otherwise compromise
American strategic technologies.”
2. MTOPS stands for Million Theoretical Operations Per Second, a
commonly used measure of
computational power. For more on why the current 7,000 MTOPS standard is too
high, see the
Center’s Decision Brief entitled What’s Good For Silicon
Graphics Is Not Necessarily Good
For America: Some Supercomputer Sales Imperil U.S. Security (
3. This concern has been borne out in a series of hearings conducted
by the Senate Governmental
Affairs International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee chaired by Sen.
Thad Cochran (R-MS). The Subcommittee’s majority issued highly critical findings of U.S.
policies contributing to proliferation in its Proliferation Primer released in January
1998. See the
Center’s Decision Brief entitled A Policy Indictment: Sen.
Cochran’s Subcommittee
Documents Clinton Incompetence/Malfeasance On Proliferation (
1998). A copy of the report can be obtained on the Subcommittee’s Web site (4. There are, in fact, a number of reasons for regarding the CTB as a
sham — or worse. See the
Center products entitled Clinton, Albright Pursue Delusory Arms Control
Response To South
Asian Nuclear Tests; Center’s Gaffney Offers Alternative (
Needed: A ‘Loyal Opposition’ to Clinton’s Anti-Nuclear Policy (
5. The Center recalled that:
- “The SIG-IEP was chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and included as
members — at the Cabinet level — most of the relevant economic agencies of
government (State, Commerce, OMB, USTR, Council of Economic Advisors and the
White House Office of Policy Development) and the national security community
(Defense, CIA, and NSC). As issues under consideration warranted, other agencies
were invited to participate (e.g., Eximbank, USDA, Energy, Transportation, Labor and
Interior). The Executive Secretary for the SIG-IEP who, in coordination with the
Secretary of the Treasury determined the agenda, was the senior director for
international economic affairs of the National Security Council.
- “An important advantage of this structure was that it enabled the NSC (in effect,
the President’s personal staff) to serve as an “honest broker” in recording the
competing views of government agencies in options papers presented to the President.
As a result, the NSC also retained control over the preparation of the presidential
decision memoranda and resulting implementing directives.”
6. The GAO noted the cumbersome mechanism put into place by the
Clinton-Gore team for inter-agency consultations on export control decisions.
“An agency disagreeing with a decision made by the [low-level] Operating Committee
can appeal it to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy, which is composed of members
at the assistant-secretary level from the same agencies represented in the Operating
Committee and makes its decision based on majority vote. If the dissenting agency
disagrees
with this decision, it can be appealed to the Export Administration Review Board, which is
composed of the secretaries of the same agencies represented in the Operating Committee
and also makes its decision based on majority vote. If the dissenting agency still
disagrees
with the decision, it can then be appealed to the President. In practice, decisions are
rarely
escalated beyond the Advisory Committee on Export Policy.” (Emphasis added.)
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