Castañeda’s Legacy for U.S.-Mexico Relations

Castañeda’s Regressive Foreign Policy

There was some concern among mainstream Mexican opinion makers when Castañeda was designated as foreign minister. The writer and intellectual Jaime Sánchez Susarrey reflected this view when he wrote that “[Castañeda’s] appointment can be interpreted as a hostile act….Fox, however, seems to ignore these signs….The relations with our northern border are already quite complicated so as not to complicate them even more.”^[xxi] Even moderate leftist intellectuals such as Sergio Aguayo wondered openly if Castañeda would be able to follow his mandate and work in symphony with other parts of the Cabinet in the task given by Fox.^[xxii]

Were Sánchez Susarrey’s and Aguayo’s concerns well-founded?  Castañeda, after all, was under a mandate to use the foreign ministry to promote foreign investments in Mexico, not to promote his personal agenda.^[xxiii]

There is no obvious answer to the above question, but there are some indications that Castañeda indeed used his office to promote views that are not congruent with Fox’s overall interests – or those of a democratic Mexico. Additionally, Castañeda harbored presidential ambitions and was seen as building a platform for that office.

While to most Mexicans it was only slightly ironic and surreal that the man who may have positioned himself to become the viceroy of a sovietized Mexico would formulate the foreign policy of a Mexico embracing a liberal regime, it was downright worrisome to some Central American governments and some circles in the United States. Mexico’s foreign policy rhetoric (although not necessarily its actions) also became more anti-American than any time since the early 1980s.

The Bilateral U.S.-Mexico Relationship

Castañeda during the campaign oftentimes espoused the theory that the PRI had become “pro-American” in its last three presidencies (1982-2000) solely to compensate for its lack of domestic legitimacy. His conclusion was that Mexico should “return” to the time prior to that period, when his father was foreign minister and practiced in essence a zero-sum relation with theUnited States. During the campaign, he mentioned to aU.S. reporter that Fox would represent a “Nixon in China” with theUnited States—essentially having the (center-right and democratic) legitimacy to challenge U.S. interests. Castañeda, by his own admission, represented a regression of Mexican foreign policy.

During his tenure as foreign minister, Castañeda apparently continued to believe, as the illiberal Left generally does in Mexico, that more can be obtained from the United States through aggressive negotiations, open demands, interference in internal affairs (through alliances with “progressive forces” inside the United States) and virulent rhetoric.^[xxiv] Castañeda’s success in obtaining a seat for Mexico in the UN Security Council, and the use of that vote (particularly during the Iraq disarmament resolution debate in the fall of 2002), was widely perceived in Mexico as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the United States.

Mexico’s capricious withdrawal in 2001from the decades-old mutual defense Treaty of Rio was seen in Washington as a particular and unnecessary affront. There was also some speculation in Mexicoas to why Castañeda insisted on this policy, whose timing (announced less than a week before the September 11 attacks) was unfortunate. One commentator believed it was because of a desire to appease the Left and the hardliners in Mexico’s Congress.^[xxv] In reality however, there was no debate about that treaty, not even in most Leftist circles of the country. The official reason was “because Mexico has no enemies.”^[xxvi] However, more mainstream Mexican opinion leaders regarded the abandonment of the Rio Treaty as a gratuitous provocation of the United States. In an editorial, the daily Reforma called it a “direct affront to the Bush government,” and speculated “it is not yet clear the size of the bill that Fox will pay for that decision.”^[xxvii] Mexico was also not endeared to other countries of the region for that decision, and was even left arguing against activating the Treaty after the terrorist attacks.^[xxviii]Brazil, traditionally critical of the United States, did activate it and ingratiated itself with Washington at Mexico’s expense. While Mexico still had a chance to change course, Castañeda officially proceeded with the notification of withdrawal exactly a year later.

Probably, the most telling “conversion” was Fox’s reaction to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. U.S. Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow summed up the situation, “After 9/11, theU.S.needed a hug, and Mexico was unable to give one.” Indeed, Fox was the only Latin American leader (including Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez) that did not offer assistance to theUnited Statesthat day. Mexican writer Enrique Krauze called it “the September mistake.” Castañeda at that time actually urged Fox to extend support to the U.S., mentioning “because everyone else is doing it.” However, Fox by then was already following the course Castañeda had set for him, preferring not to supportWashingtonin that hour of need, offering only lukewarm and tardy “concern.” American officials, many of whom had supported Fox during his campaign, expressed to this author and to PAN officials their dismay. The PAN did issue a timely statement of full support to the United States, penned by Rafael Elias Liñero and signed by the PAN chairman.