Castro’s Cuba: A Classic ‘Asymmetric’ Threat

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(Washington, D.C.): In recent days, the Pentagon has signaled its intention first to release, href=”#N_1_”>(1) then
to revise, a controversial assessment of the threat posed to the United States by Fidel Castro’s
Cuba. According to leaks to the Miami Herald last week, in its original form, the
study reflected
the sentiments of the recently retired Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command,
General
John Sheehan.

Gen. Sheehan — who is rapidly becoming the poster child for the campaign to normalize
relations
with Castro’s regime — was quoted yesterday by the Washington Times as saying:
“Cuba does
not have a an offensive capability. It is zero — none.” Fortunately, Secretary of Defense William
Cohen decided to subject such a dubious conclusion to his own, adult supervision. If he does so
in a rigorous manner, he must conclude that Castro’s Cuba continues to pose a
significant
threat to the U.S. and its interests.

The ‘Superpower Paradox’

After all, in a speech to the National Press Club on 17 March, Secretary Cohen commented:

    “We have a superpower paradox because our potential adversaries know they
    can’t
    win in a conventional challenge to the United States forces.
    So they’re more
    likely to try unconventional or asymmetrical methods
    , such as biological or
    chemical
    weapons. But we can’t afford to allow this vulnerability of ours to turn into an Achilles
    heel.”

What is more, Secretary Cohen observed in his 1998 Annual Defense
Report
:

    “Those who oppose the United States will increasingly rely on unconventional
    strategies and tactics to offset U.S. superiority. The Department’s ability to adapt
    effectively to adversaries’ asymmetric threats — such as: information
    operations;

    nuclear, biological and chemical weapons use; and terrorism
    — is critical to
    maintaining U.S. preeminence into the next century.”(2)
    (Emphasis added.)

Castro’s Cuba is a prime example of a nation developing such “unconventional or
asymmetrical methods” of challenging or threatening the United States. Consider the following:

Let Us Count the Ways

Using the Secretary’s own standard, consider the ways in which Castro’s Cuba clearly
continues
to constitute a threat — albeit an asymmetric one — to the United States and its
interests:

    Information Warfare

Thanks to the vast electronics intelligence facilities operated near Lourdes, Cuba by
Castro’s and the Russians’ intelligence services — facilities that permit the wholesale collection of
sensitive U.S. military, diplomatic and economic data(3) and
the invasion of millions of Americans’
privacy (4) — the Cuban regime has the capability to conduct
sustained and systematic Information
Warfare (IW) against the United States.

This reality, combined with the hostile use made of these assets for their primary purpose of
intelligence collection, makes absurd Clinton Administration statements to the effect that Russia’s
continued use the Lourdes complex is desirable from the U.S. point of view. This
sentiment —
rooted in the hopelessly archaic Cold War theology of bilateral arms control, according to which
the Kremlin’s spying on the United States is a desirable component of treaty monitoring — has
previously been expressed publicly by Alexander Watson, then-Assistant
Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs.(5) On 16 March 1995 before the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of
the House International Relations Committee, Watson stated that:

    “Provisions of the [Helms-Burton] bill which would require the President to withhold
    an amount equal to the assistance and credits Russia provides to Cuba in return for the
    use of the Lourdes signal intelligence facility could limit our ability to promote reform
    and stability in Russia. In addition, pressing Russia to cease its use of Lourdes could
    be seen by the Russians as interfering with their exercise of their right under the
    START Treaty to monitor compliance with the agreement, and could complicate
    Russian ratification of START II.”

In point of fact, Russia has no need of espionage to satisfy itself that this open
and
democratic society is complying with its arms control commitments.
href=”#N_6_”>(6) Rigorous
congressional oversight, the unblinking scrutiny of a free press and the Clinton Administration’s
demonstrated determination to bend over backwards so as not to violate even the
spirit, let alone
the letter, of American treaty obligations assures U.S. compliance.

Obviously, the Clinton Administration has no business helping to justify the
preservation of
Russian, to say nothing of Cuban, intelligence operations — electronic or otherwise — that
compromise Americans’ security and privacy.

    A Nuclear Time-Bomb

Castro is also pursuing what amounts to a nuclear threat
to the well-being of perhaps as
many as 50 to 80 million Americans. Due to design, construction and other irremediable flaws,
the two reactors that have long been under construction near Juragua, Cuba — 180 miles upwind
from the American mainland — will almost certainly fail catastrophically if allowed to come
on-line. According to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, depending
upon
the prevailing winds at the time of such a Chernobyl-like disaster, areas as far north as
Washington, D.C. and as far west as Texas could fall under the resulting radioactive plume.

The danger posed by the Juragua complex seems finally to be getting through to
the Clinton
Administration(7): According to the Wall Street
Journal
of 1 April 1998, “Senior U.S. officials
attending an international energy summit in Moscow are expressing concern over Russia’s plans
to build a nuclear reactor in Cuba.” The report goes on to note:

    U.S. Secretary of Energy Federico Pena said in an interview that he has ‘grave’
    reservations about Russian negotiations with Cuba to complete a partially built
    nuclear power plant near Havana.
    Though Mr. Pena stressed that Russo-Cuban
    talks in the $700 million deal are still preliminary, he said he is worried about the
    safety implications of finishing a project
    that was [started] nearly 20 years ago.”
    (Emphasis added.)

Of course, it remains to be seen whether such concerns will prompt the Clinton
Administration to do what it should: withhold aid to Russia unless and until it renounces
once
and for all any intention to complete and fuel the ticking nuclear time-bombs being built
at Juragua.
An early indication of the Administration’s seriousness will be whether the
Defense
Department report on the Cuban threat, when it is finally released, accurately treats the security
implications of this menacing aspect of Castro’s “asymmetric” activities.

    Biological Weapons

In the attached letter to Secretary Cohen dated 31
March, Speaker of the House of
Representatives Newt Gingrich
(R-GA) wrote, “I am very concerned about recent
reports
indicating that Castro’s secretive network of sophisticated biological and genetic research labs are
being used by the military and Interior Ministry to develop chemical and biological weapons.”

According to the 31 March editions of the Washington Post this topic is receiving
particular
attention by Secretary Cohen. As the Post put it:

    “The classified report was slated to be released today to members of Congress who
    requested it last year. But Defense Secretary William S. Cohen said he wanted to read
    the report before it was distributed, and other administration and defense officials met
    yesterday in an effort to harden the language, to ‘make it more presentable,’ in the
    words of one defense official …. Officials said that among areas of the report that
    were considered for tougher language were sections dealing with Cuba’s capacity
    to produce biological weapons. While administration officials do not allege that
    Cuba has such weapons, ‘You can’t say there’s no capability,’ said one defense
    official.”

    “Cuba has one of the most sophisticated biotech and pharmaceutical industries in
    the hemisphere. Because lethal biological materials can be produced by countries
    with biotech industries, it is difficult to determine when a country moves from
    simply having the capability to produce deadly viruses, to the intent or plans to do
    so.” (Emphasis added.)

    Support for International Terrorism

As the Casey Institute noted earlier this week(8):
[There is] a continuing involvement on
Castro’s part with terrorist and anti-democratic movements throughout Latin America.

While these operations may currently pale by comparison to the corrosive effects of the region’s
narcotics cartels, they remain a menace to U.S. allies and interests.”

With regard to narco-terrorism, the Institute observed: “Both Fidel and his
brother and
presumptive heir, Raoul, are directly implicated [in drug-trafficking]. The lives of perhaps
millions of Americans are being destroyed by narcotics smuggled into the United States with the
connivance, if not active involvement, of the Cuban government. This reality, not Castro’s
Potemkin ‘cooperation’ with U.S. authorities on drug enforcement, should guide determinations
of the actual threat.”

The Bottom Line

The William J. Casey Institute applauds the Center for Security Policy’s 1996 “Keeper of the
Flame” award recipient, Speaker Gingrich, for his bottom line on the pending
Pentagon study:

    “Any assessment by the Pentagon supporting the notion of a diminished U.S. national
    security threat from the Castro dictatorship will raise serious questions of credibility.
    Given Castro’s proven instability, ongoing anti-Americanism, and proximity to the
    U.S., it would be an unacceptable mistake to underestimate his capabilities or his
    intentions.

– 30 –

1. See the Casey Institute’s Perspective
entitled No Apologies to Castro: Politicized Pentagon
Study Misses Abiding Nature of Threat From Cuba, Promotes Wrong Response

(No. 98-C 54,
30 March 1998).

2. Annual Defense Report to the President and the Congress,
1998
, p. 20.

3. For example, prior to the Gulf War, using these same facilities, the
Russians were able to
intercept U.S. war plans, including information relating to Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf’s famous
“Hail Mary” end-run into western Iraq.

4. See the Casey Institute’s Perspective entitled
Guess Who Else Was Listening to Newt
Gingrich’s Phone Call — And Those of Millions of Other Americans Every Day?

(No. 97-C 09,
16 January 1997).

5. Taken to its logical conclusion, Mr. Watson’s proposition suggests
that other forms of
intelligence collection — including recruitment and suborning of U.S. government officials in the
service of the successors to the KGB and GRU — would also be desirable from the American
point of view as long as it conduces to Moscow’s participation in the arms control process.

6. The same cannot be said, of course, of the U.S. challenge of
monitoring Russian behavior that
remains shrouded by secretiveness apparently aimed at concealing Moscow’s continuing, chronic
violation of its arms control commitments.

7. The Center for Security Policy and its William J. Casey Institute
have been warning about this
danger for years. See, for example: Clinton Legacy Watch # 19: Will
Gore-Chernomyrdin At
Last Put A Halt To Russia’s Dangerous Nuclear Sales to Cuba, Iran?
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_40″>No. 98-D 40, 6 March
1998); Will Moscow Be Allowed To Recreate In Cuba the Nuclear Nightmare It
Has
Bequeathed To Bulgaria?
(No. 97-C 91, 2
July 1997); How to Respond to the Cuban K.A.L.
007: Shut Down the Cuban Chernobyl
(No.
96-D 19
, 26 February 1996); Castro’s Potemik
Nuclear Shutdown: Chernobyl at Cienfuegos Still in Prospect
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=92-D_108″>No. 92-D 108, 10 September
1992); and Cienfuegos — ‘A Hundred Fires’:
Muchas Gracias Moscow, But No American
Chernobyls
(No. 91-P 44, 31 May 1991).

8. See No Apologies to Castro: Politicized Pentagon
Study Misses Abiding Nature of Threat
From Cuba, Promotes Wrong Response
(No. 98-C
54
, 30 March 1998).

Center for Security Policy

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