Center Reveals SS-18 Flim-Flam

The Center for Security Policy today revealed a pernicious mischaracterization of the Soviet strategic threat that has profound implications for the U.S. START negotiating position at the Washington summit, for the actual value of the agreement that may result and, ultimately, for American national security. In a paper entitled Missilegate: U.S.-Soviet Collusion in Misrepresenting Moscow’s ICBM Threat?, the Center emphasized that the latest Soviet heavy missile is not — as it has been represented to be by both the USSR and the U.S. intelligence community — simply a modification of the existing SS-18 missile. Instead, the so-called SS-18 Mod 5 is, by any reasonable definition, a brand new missile.

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., the Center’s director, said, "While the latest addition to the Soviet Union’s massive intercontinental ballistic missile force fits inside the silos of the SS-18 missiles it is intended to replace, it is no more a modification of the SS-18 Mod 4 than the MX was a modification of the Minuteman III. In fact, the ‘SS-18 Mod 5’ takes advantage of new technology to effect a massive improvement in the weapons-delivery potential and accuracy of its predecessor."

Gaffney added, "Thanks to this great increase in the new Soviet heavy ICBMs’ lethality, Moscow can confidently expect to enjoy the same ability to attack hard targets — if not better — with a force of only 154 such missiles as it previously obtained from 308 SS-18s."

The Center believes this fact makes a mockery of Secretary of State James Baker’s assertions earlier this week that the 50% reduction in Soviet heavy ICBMs is one of the major accomplishments of the emerging START treaty — and, by implication, an offset to ill-advised U.S. concessions he offered in Moscow last week to seal a strategic arms treaty and other arms control accords.

The Center’s analysis suggests that the American government’s willingness to be an accomplice to Soviet misrepresentations about the true character and significance of the USSR’s heavy missile force is not an isolated incident. Rather, it is part of a pattern of "looking the other way" on Soviet military practices that are inconsistent with, or otherwise inconvenient for, arms control and other political considerations. The Center urges President Bush to use the summit to rectify this situation somewhat by demanding than no new heavy ICBM’s such as the "Mod 5" be deployed by the Soviet Union and that other modernization and testing of improvements to the SS-18 system be banned.

The Center also renews its call for a new, formal "Team B" effort charged with independently reviewing the official U.S. intelligence community assumptions and judgments that give rise to such potentially dangerous findings as that involving the new Soviet heavy missile.