CENTER SYMPOSIUM EXAMINES FALSE PROMISES, COSTLY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

(Washington, D.C.): As the Senate
prepares to debate the advisability of
providing its advice and consent to U.S.
ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), the Center for Security
Policy released a summary of its 15 July
half-day symposium on this treaty.
Specifically, the symposium was designed
to assist representatives from the many
industries likely to be affected by the
treaty in understanding its inadequacies
from a national security perspective —
and its significant costs and other
burdensome implications.

The diverse group of presenters and
attendees — including senior members of
the chemical and defense industry
communities, scientists and policy
analysts — agreed that the global
elimination of chemical weapons was a
desirable goal. But the general sentiment
of the participants appeared to confirm
the Center’s longstanding belief that the
Chemical Weapons Convention will not
appreciably advance this goal; to the
contrary, it may actually create greater
dangers of chemical attack against
law-abiding nations like the United
States.

This conclusion resulted from the
following findings:

• The CWC does not live up
  to its billing as a global,
  comprehensive and verifiable ban
  on chemical weaponry.
  The CWC will become binding on
  the United States even if rogue
  states like North Korea,
  Syria, Libya, Serbia and
  — most alarmingly in light of
  its periodic use of chemical
  weapons — Iraq
  are not party to it.
• The treaty does not
  actually prohibit all chemical
  arms or the means of producing
  them. For example, two
  chemical agents which were used
  with lethal effect in World War
  I, chlorine and hydrogen cyanide,
  are not banned. Moreover, since
  virtually any industrial facility
  designed to manufacture or use
  chemical agents is inherently
  capable of producing lethal
  chemical agents, the treaty
  only bans declared
  chemical weapons production. To
  date, out of some 25 countries
  believed to have chemical weapons
  programs, only the United States
  and Russia have identified
  production facilities; all of the
  declared U.S. facilities are out
  of business.
• And, despite the large numbers of
  international and U.S.
  bureaucrats who will be involved
  in the implementation of the CWC
  and notwithstanding its onerous
  reporting and inspection
  requirements, any
  government that wishes to can
  pursue covert production and
  stockpiling of chemical weapons
  with confidence that it will
  neither get caught nor be
  punished for doing so.

In light of these findings, the
consensus of the symposium appeared to be
that it would be irresponsible to impose
the considerable costs and other, onerous
burdens associated with the Chemical
Weapons Convention — particularly upon
private American companies, many of
whom have no idea that they are going to
be affected by this accord’s inspection,
reporting and monitoring requirements.
In fact, the direct and
indirect costs — to the chemical,
pharmaceutical and other industries
(notably, those involved in the
manufacture of shampoos, soaps,
cosmetics, fertilizers and pesticides) —
will be staggering. Estimates of
inspection and data reporting costs run
as high as $500 million annually.

A seven-page summary of the Center’s
symposium concludes with the
strong recommendation to the Senate that
it examine with care the defects and
implications of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Such an examination, at a
minimum, is required if Senators are to
be prepared to deal with the political
repercussions that may result as a large
number of American employers and
their employees demand explanations
concerning — if not relief from or
compensation for — a useless, but very
costly, arms control agreement.

Copies of the href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-P_82at”>summary of
the Center for Security Policy’s
symposium on the Chemical Weapons
Convention may be obtained by contacting
the Center.