Center’s Crouch Offers Senate Compelling Basis For Preserving U.S. Chemical Deterrent, Rejecting The C.W.C.

(Washington, D.C.): In powerful testimony delivered yesterday
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. J.D. Crouch
persuasively argued that the pending Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) fails the most basic test to which any arms control
agreement must be subjected: “Will it make the
United States of America safer?” Dr. Crouch, who
served as a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
during the Bush Administration when negotiations on the CWC were
concluded, answers this question with the searing indictment: “I
cannot imagine an agreement less suited to our security needs in
the post-Cold War security environment than the Chemical Weapons
Convention.”

As the five pages of attached excerpts
suggest, Dr. Crouch — who has long served as a valued member of
the Center for Security Policy’s Board of Advisors — dissects
the flawed premise upon which the Chemical Weapons Convention is
based. He describes this premise as follows: If “the United
States…abandon[s] completely its offensive chemical weapons
deterrent…the states of the world will follow our lead.”
After subjecting such a proposition to close analysis, Dr. Crouch
concludes:

“…The United States is abandoning, with the CWC,
one of the most effective deterrents to chemical use against
itself and its allies: the right to an extant and mature
offensive chemical weapons program. No matter what the
perceived benefits of the CWC from a diplomatic or political
standpoint, the Senate should understand that it will
contribute to the weakening of deterrence, not to its
strengthening, by eliminating the ability of the United
States to respond in kind to chemical attack. A
weakening of deterrence means in practical terms that
American and allied soldiers are more, not less,
likely to be attacked with chemical weapons.” (Emphasis
added.)

Of particular relevance to upcoming Senate deliberations
should be Dr. Crouch’s review of the myriad nations currently
judged to have active chemical weapons programs. In this
connection, he cites an unclassified report published in March
1995 by the U.S. intelligence community on The
Weapons Proliferation Threat:

“Chemical weapons proliferation will continue
to be a serious threat for at least the remainder of the
decade, despite a number of arms control efforts such as the
CWC. Several countries of proliferation concern —
including Libya, Syria and Iraq — have so far refused to
sign the CWC, and some CW-capable countries that have
signed the CWC show no signs of ending their programs.“
(Emphasis added.)

Dr. Crouch’s testimony also provides an extraordinarily
thoughtful critique of claims made by proponents of the CWC that
the United States will be able to maintain effective deterrents
to chemical attack without an in-kind retaliatory
capability by relying upon nuclear or advanced conventional
forces.

The Center for Security Policy commends J.D. Crouch for his
impressive contribution to the needed debate on the Chemical
Weapons Convention and urges the Foreign Relations Committee — and
the full Senate — to heed his recommendation that this
treaty be rejected.