Chairman Gilman’s Committee Highlights Need For Strengthened Missile Defenses In Asia

(Washington, D.C.): The ominous growth of the Asian missile threat (i.e. the robust
programs of
North Korea and China) has led to increasing American, Japanese, South Korean and
Taiwanese support for securing advanced early warning and missile defense capabilities. A
recent mission report authored by staff members of Representative Benjamin Gilman’s (R-NY)
Committee on International Relations delineates the elements of this growing regional consensus
and urges greater multilateral coordination and/or cooperation with respect to early warning
systems and TMD.

The Center for Security Policy applauds the International Relations Committee for
addressing
this critical, time-sensitive subject. However, as the Center’s Casey Institute has argued, ¹ the
U.S. and its Asian allies would be well-served by accelerated R&D, acquisition and
deployment
of interoperable AEGIS-based missile defense systems to augment early warning and
information-sharing. Below are excerpts of the Committee report which pertain to Japan.

Committee on International Relations

Excerpts of Report of Staff Study Mission to Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan Regarding
Prospects for Theater Missile Defense in Northeast Asia

May 4, 1999

North Korea’s August 31, 1998, firing of a Taepo Dong-1 missile over Japan has prompted
the
Japanese government to take a number of steps to enhance their nation’s security, including:

• Spending approximately $2 billion to develop an indigenous satellite imagery capability;

• Committing to finally obtain the long-delayed approval by the Diet of the revised
  Defense
  Guidelines with the United States; and

• Cooperating with the United States to develop and deploy a missile defense system
  capable
  of defending the Japanese archipelago.

In the area of missile defense, Japanese interest is focused primarily on the NTW system. As
a
demonstration of its interest in ultimately deploying NTW, Japan has decided to join with the
United States in developing key components of the system.

Japan’s commitment to cooperative development of the NTW system is reflected in a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that will be signed shortly with the United States to
undertake requirements analysis and design with regard to four components to be incorporated in
the NTW system. These components involve technologies in which Japan is a world leader, such
as composite materials and propulsion.

Under this MOU, Japan will spend approximately $8 million this year, and $36 million over
three years, on NTW-related research and development.

If the technology is validated and Japan remains interested in pursuing joint development of
elements of the NTW system, Japan ultimately will spend $300-500 million over the life of the
four technical cooperation programs.

These sums would, of course, be in addition to sums that Japan would spend to procure and
deploy NTW.

Japan’s interest in the NTW system (rather than THAAD) stems primarily from the fact that
NTW will be deployed on Aegis-equipped ships, four of which are already in Japan’s Maritime
Self-Defense Force.

One consequence of incorporating Japanese technology into the NTW system is that the
system
may become subject to Japanese export control laws, which are among the strictest in the world.
Japanese law essentially forbids the export of munitions from Japan to any country other than the
United States, and such exports to the United States are subject to re-export restrictions (similar
to those imposed by U.S. law on munitions exports from the United States) that require Japanese
consent for transfers to third countries.

It may be difficult politically for Japan to consent to the re-export by the United States of
Japanese technology incorporated in the NTW system to some allies and friends of the United
States, such as Taiwan. For this reason, care needs to be taken to ensure that co-development
with Japan of NTW components does not impede the ability of the United States to transfer the
system to other countries with a security requirement for the system.

Depending on how the North Korean missile threat evolves, Japan may wish to upgrade its
existing Patriot air defense system with PAC-3 technology when it becomes available, but at this
point Japan is singularly focused on the NTW system. PAC-3 should be available long before
NTW (2001 rather than 2007), but, like NTW, it will be expensive and potentially controversial.
For these reasons, the Japanese government considers any discussion today of PAC-3 to be a
distraction from its focus on NTW.

The North Korean threat has led some in Japan to suggest that Japan needs to develop the
military capability to retaliate if attacked. Some LDP lawmakers have gone even further and
suggested that Japan needs to consider preemptive strikes against North Korea if a missile strike
appears imminent.

This impulse is understandable, but profoundly unsettling to Japan’s neighbors who continue
to
fear a revival of Japanese militarism.

Given the concerns that would be aroused if Japan moved toward a deterrence-based model
of
defense against North Korea, Japan’s interest in missile defense should be regarded as highly
stabilizing and something to be encouraged.

¹ See the Casey Institute’s Perspective entitled
What Should top the U.S.-Japanese Summit
Agenda: Interoperable AEGIS-Based Missile Defense (No. 99-C 53, 2 May
1999).