Chemical weapons treaty quicksand

by PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
The Washington Times, JULY 25, 1996

The U.S. Senate should reject
ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), a treaty that purports
to ban chemical weapons and forbid their
production, stockpiling, and use.

Contrary to its announced purpose,
this foolish treaty would increase, not
eliminate, the risk of chemical weapons
use, and would seriously damage U.S.
national security interests.

Bad guys are deterred by force, the
threat of force, or by their cold
calculation that the costs of evil
behavior are not worth the risk. Many
dangerous countries such as Libya, Syria,
Iraq and North Korea, have not signed the
CWC and would not be deterred by pieces
of paper.

China and Iran, which have significant
chemical weapons programs, are unlikely
to comply. Of particular concern is
Russia, which has the largest arsenal of
chemical weapons; the actions and
statements of its military leaders
confirm that Russia would not comply at
all.

Even though the CWC would not rid the
world of chemical weapons, it would
impose a terrible regulatory and
reporting burden on every U.S. company
that produces, processes or consumes a
scheduled chemical. The CWC would affect
U.S. firms that make dyes and pigments,
insecticides, pharmaceuticals, ceramics,
nylon, paint and varnish, electronics,
textiles, and soap and detergent.

The Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency estimates that 2,175 U.S.
companies would be saddled with reporting
requirements and data declarations;
others estimate that the burden will fall
on 10,000 U.S. production facilities.
This time-consuming reporting could, in
turn, produce additional government
oversight and regulation by agencies such
as the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Internal
Revenue Service.

No previous treaty has ever subjected
U.S. private industry to international
inspection. CWC is the New World Order
closing in on American business.

The process of allowing teams of
foreigners to investigate, inspect and
challenge all facets of private U.S.
businesses could open them up to
industrial espionage and the theft of
their proprietary information. Forcing
them to spend unnecessary funds to hire
more people to fill out more government
forms, and submit to routine inspections,
would reduce their ability to compete in
world markets.

In addition to the costs to be borne
by private industry, the treaty would
require the United States to pick up the
tab for 25 percent of the cost of
implementation and verification, at an
estimated cost of $200 million a year.
Other countries would probably demand
that the United States pay their cost of
implementation, too.

Of course, the CWC would give birth to
a new international bureaucracy. The
Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons is already headquartered
in the Hague with a Conference of State
Parties, an Executive Council, and a
Technical Secretariat whose verification
responsibilities extend over 100 pages.

Every time we hear trendy slogans such
as “global village,”
“world economy,” or
“international cooperation,”
Americans should remember that other
nations have no familiarity with or
understanding of our Bill of Rights or
our federal structure of government with
separate state laws. Treaties are
customarily written as though all power
to make and fulfill international
commitments resides in the hoed of state
who signs the document.

If the CWC goes into effect, what
happens to our Fourth Amendment? The
CWC’s Technical Secretariat, without a
warrant, would be empowered to inspect
virtually everything within the premises,
including records, files, papers,
processes, controls, structures and
vehicles, and to interrogate on-site
personnel.

Under CWC, what happens to our First
Amendment rights? Freedom of Information
requests will not be permitted under the
proposed CWC implementing legislation, so
Americans would have fewer rights under
this treaty than if a U.S. agency, such
as the FBI, investigated them.

As implemented by the Clinton
Administration, the CWC would have a
meddling effect in U.S. affairs. It would
forbid U.S. commanders to use tear gas
and other riot-control substances to
protect our soldiers and minimize
civilian casualties.

The CWC is unverifiable and
unenforceable. Former CIA Director James
Woolsey testified on June 23, 1994, that
“The chemical weapons problem is so
difficult from an intelligence
perspective, that I cannot state that we
have high confidence in our ability to
detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale.”

In closed societies, factories making
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals or plastics
can easily cover their production of
chemical weapons. After receiving
notification of a challenge, a facility
has six days to hide the evidence before
inspectors are admitted.

Small amounts of concealed chemical
weapons can be militarily very
significant. Used against critical
military targets, chemical weapons can
have dramatic consequences.

To paraphrase a popular bumperstrip,
when chemical weapons are outlawed, only
outlaw governments will have chemical
weapons. Our World War II experience
shows that the best way for civilized
countries to prevent the use of chemical
weapons is for the good guys to have
their own deterrent arsenals of chemical
weapons.

In any event, the Senate must not make
matters worse by ratifying the
unenforceable, costly and probably
unconstitutional CWC.