China’s Nuclear Theft, Strategic Build-up Underscore Folly of Clinton Denuclearization, C.T.B. Campaigns

(Washington, D.C.): For six years, the Clinton Administration has tried in every way
imaginable
to deprecate the importance of nuclear weapons. Notably, it has trumpeted — and is seeking
immediate Senate action on — the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) signed by the
President in 1996 as an indication that virtually the entire world agrees such weapons no longer
matter. This thesis has been an essential rationalization for Mr. Clinton’s policy of what amounts
to unilateral U.S. disarmament, a policy that the President and his first Secretary of Energy, Hazel
O’Leary, have called “denuclearization.” 1

China Understands That Nuclear Weapons Still Matter

The delusion that nuclear weapons are relics of the past has been shattered,
however, by
last weekend’s revelations in the New York Times. In an extraordinary feat
of investigative
reporting, the Times‘ Jeff Gerth and James
Risen establish not only that, as the U.S. disarms,
Communist China is embarked upon a major nuclear arms build-up. They also provide for the
first time extensive evidence to back up earlier charges that the PRC’s modernization program has
been greatly assisted by the theft of U.S. nuclear weapons technology from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory — the same place Julius Rosenberg half a century ago went shopping for
atomic secrets for the Soviet Union.

In a way, even more ominous are the indicators that Messrs. Gerth and Risen disclose that
the
Clinton Administration has deliberately suppressed information it has had about the
Chinese nuclear espionage, withholding it not only from the public but from the relevant
committees of the Congress. As the Times reports:

The Real Motivation for the Clinton Cover-Up?

Evidence of this serious security breach was more than just inconvenient for a
Clinton
Administration bent on “engagement” and increased trade with China. Another consideration in
concealing the extent and implications of China’s espionage almost certainly was the fact that
revelations about the theft of the design for the United States’ most advanced nuclear
weapon — the W-88 warhead deployed aboard submarine-launched Trident II missile —
would put into a harsh light some of the basic principles of the Clinton Administration’s
current “denuclearization” policy.

After all, it was in connection with the Administration’s pursuit of Chinese support for the
Comprehensive Test Ban that the Clinton team allowed the PRC to purchase powerful
supercomputers — forty-nine of which are believed to have wound up at
China’s version of Los
Alamos. Delegations from the People’s Liberation Army have also been granted considerable
latitude in visiting the U.S. nuclear laboratories and interacting with their
scientists and
engineers. As a further inducement for China to join the CTBT regime, the Clinton team is said
to have actively explored sharing the extremely sensitive data derived from
decades of U.S.
nuclear tests. As with the W-88 design, these nuclear “codes” would help Beijing greatly to
shortcut and reduce the costs of its ambitious strategic modernization program.

Whatever the motivation, the Clinton Administration’s response to PRC nuclear espionage
may
have served to compound the damage done by Chinese intelligence operatives. According to the
New York Times, when confronted with the evidence that prompted the Department
of Energy’s
top intelligence officer, Notra Trulock, to conclude that the PRC had purloined
the W-88 design,
the Administration took the following steps under the personal leadership of the
President’s
National Security Advisor, Samuel Berger (a man who was a paid lobbyist for
China prior
to entering government service in 1993):

It secured a “second opinion” from the CIA, an organization whose
analyses have, by turns,
been shamelessly politicized and deep-sixed by the Clinton team. The White House
damage-control effort, led by Mr. Berger’s subordinate on the National Security Council staff,
Gary
Samore, seized upon the Agency’s much less dire analysis to downplay the significance
of the
Energy Department’s assessment of nuclear espionage by China.

It delayed tightening up security at the nuclear laboratories, including
background checks
for Chinese and other foreign nationals visiting these sensitive facilities. 2 It took four months
for Mr. Trulock to get on the calendar of Mrs. O’Leary’s successor, Federico
Pea, to discuss
his concerns. And it was not until late 1997 — a year-and-a-half after Mr. Berger was first
briefed about the Trulock findings in April 1996 — that the NSC began developing a new
counter-intelligence plan for the nuclear labs.

The prime suspect in the case, an Asian-American employee at Los
Alamos, was allowed to
keep his job and security clearance for more than a year after a summer 1997 meeting
concerning this affair that involved Secretary Pea, CIA Director George Tenet and FBI
Director Louis Freeh. In February 1999, he reportedly failed a polygraph test concerning his
alleged complicity in China’s nuclear espionage. He has refused to cooperate with
investigators and has yet to be arrested.

The Bottom Line

As it happens, the disconnect between the Administration’s denuclearization policy and the
Chinese renuclearization campaign is becoming obvious in other, even more
threatening ways. In
1996, a top PRC military officers intimated that Los Angeles would be destroyed if the United
States interfered with Beijing’s coercion of Taiwan. American forces in Asia have reportedly
been targeted by Chinese missiles in exercises last year. And, most recently, China has said that
U.S. efforts to provide missile defenses for Taiwan would be “the last straw” and that even
American research on such defenses with Japan would be dangerous. 3

Under these circumstances, it is apparent that the United States will need to retain a
credible,
effective and safe nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. If it is to do so, however, the
Nation must reverse the “denuclearization” policies embraced by the Clinton
Administration and already far advanced in terms of their implementation. The place to
begin is with a firm rejection by the Senate of Mr. Clinton’s wooly-headed
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, an accord that will not prevent China or others from building up their
nuclear
capabilities but will make it problematic for us to maintain ours.

1 See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Clinton Legacy Watch # 14: A Doctrine for
Denuclearization (No. 97-D 190, 8
December 1997), Unilateral Disarmament By Any Other
Name is Still Recklessly Irresponsible; Will Clinton Be Allowed to Do It? ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=98-D_6″>No. 98-D 6, 13
January 1998), and Third Time’s A Charm? Yet Another Blue-Ribbon Group
Warns Against
Clinton’s ‘Denuclearization’ Agenda (No. 98-D
195, 4 December 1998).

2 The matter of foreign nationals’ access is but one manifestation of
serious problems with the
security at U.S. nuclear weapons-related facilities. For more on the Clinton Administration’s
misfeasance in this area , see The Real Scandal at the O’Leary Energy Department:
The
Secretary’s Shakedown of the Nuclear Labs Over C.T.B. ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_121″>No. 97-D 121, 2 September 1997)
and Inviting Life to Imitate Art: Will A ‘Peacemaker’ Exploit Deficient Security At
U.S.
Nuclear Facilities? (No. 97-D 158, 24
October 1997).

3 Such statements powerfully argue for the earliest possible
deployment of U.S. missile defenses
aboard AEGIS fleet air defense ships — assets that are already deployed in proximity to Taiwan
and Japan and that could begin promptly defending these allied nations against Chinese (or North
Korean) missile threats — without exposing the Taiwanese and Japanese governments to Beijing’s
coercion. See Irate Senate Supporters of the ‘AEGIS Option’ for Missile Defense
Demand
Release of Favorable Pentagon Study (No.
98-D 119, 25 June 1998) and Mirabile Dictu: The
Washington Post Acknowledges The ‘AEGIS Option’s’ Promise for Missile
Defense (No. 98-D 193, 30 November
1998).