Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?

The Chinese may have fallen prey to the intellectual “noise” generated within the United States. In an environment where the free flow of ideas, both good and bad, is encouraged and valued at a premium, the American system often produces an over abundance of information. As Greg Rattray illustrates, the entire array of conceivable institutions on national security, ranging from the military services to think tanks to commissions mandated by the president, have all chimed in on IW.⁵⁴ Each of these bodies has also prescribed a dizzying set of responses and policies in conducting IW. ⁵⁵ As one American columnist recently commented on the Bush administration’s mixed signals on U.S. policy toward Taiwan, “Cacophony in the form of conflicting statements is America’s most effective form of disinformation.”⁵⁶ The Chinese may have convinced themselves that the euphoric descriptions of “full spectrum dominance,” “information superiority,” or “system of systems” are genuinely accepted in the United States as truisms or have been achieved. ⁵⁷ For example, an analyst at the Chinese National Defense University examining the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Vision 2020 believes that the United States will achieve “all-round information superiority” as touted by the document and warns that China should maintain vigilance to counter such a hegemonic trend. ⁵⁸ Accepting America’s apparent ability to achieve such ambitious (if not questionable) military capabilities at face value risks under-rating China’s own potential.

Another more ominous explanation of China’s apparent acceptance of American IW discourse at face value is that the effort is deliberately intended to mislead the audience in the United States. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that the Chinese government may be releasing some of the current IW discussions in an extensive deception campaign. China may believe that by actively fostering a burgeoning literature on IW, the outside world would be convinced that the PLA is vigorously pursuing the formidable potential of IW. Such a calculated strategy could be intended to unnerve potential adversaries, disguise China’s actual intentions and growing capabilities to maximize the element of surprise, or to hide Chinese weaknesses and vulnerabilities in IW. Beijing’s successes in whipping up nationalistic fervor among the public through the state-controlled media in the aftermath of the accidental Belgrade embassy bombing and the April 2001 reconnaissance plane accident highlight China’s ability to centrally orchestrate and manage domestic and foreign perceptions. Turning the previous point on its head, the Chinese may be generating their own set of intellectual “noise” to confuse and to keep American defense planners off-balance. The diplomatic maneuvers and the public relations contest between the United States and the Soviet Union in the early years of the space race provide a vivid historical example of mutual noise making. Khrushchev repeatedly exaggerated the capabilities of the Soviet space program to boost the Soviet Union’s (and his own) image.⁵⁹ The Soviets also deliberately overstated the advances in strategic arms in order to disguise the actual inferiority of their forces.⁶⁰

This deception effort is only possible given the authoritarian nature of the regime and the relative insularity of Chinese society. However, China is undergoing rapid social and economic change that has gradually undermined the capacity of the authorities to control the flow of ideas. For example, while heavily monitored by Chinese authorities, the proliferation of Internet access has opened a potential new avenue for bypassing government control over information. The flourishing publishing businesses not under direct government control have also produced many controversial works that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. For example, the release of Unrestricted Warfare⁶¹(through a semi-independent publishing house) caused a major sensation in Washington. ⁶² The authors, two PLA senior colonels, advocated the indiscriminate use of military and nonmilitary means to attack the United States during conflict. The publisher’s affiliation with the PLA suggested that at least some elements of the military leadership endorsed the radical ideas contained in the book. Interestingly, the publication also spurred an intense and often divisive debate in China’s military circles. There were fears that the authors may have divulged too much information on Chinese thinking to the outside world.⁶³ In short, China’s gradual internal opening will curtail the government’s ability to influence the media. However, as China’s blatant news manipulation in the aftermath of the April 2001 spy plane incident revealed, the state-controlled media’s impact will still be felt in Chinese society for some time to come.

Falling in Love with the “Information Edge.” The IW writings clearly demonstrate the powerful conviction among Chinese analysts about the power of information. The literature tightly fuses the accumulation of knowledge with military success. Indeed, some authors describe the relationship between information aided by advanced technologies and victory almost in absolute terms. Many writers declare that the accretion of knowledge and early preparations would make victory inevitable. In other words, information power determines the outcomes of wars. The recurring references to the dictum that proper knowledge would obviate the need to engage in actual combat demonstrate the profound influence of Sun Tzu’s philosophy. Moreover, there is an implicit and prevalent assumption in the analyses that such knowledge is attainable both prior to and during war. In short, the ability to gather and process information appears to have become a panacea in warfare for many Chinese IW strategists. This belief in knowledge follows closely with Admiral William Owen’s concept of a system of systems. He declares, “when technology is correctly applied to the traditional military functions—to see, to tell, and to act—a powerful synergy is created, producing an effect much greater than the sum of the components.” ⁶⁴ Premised on the power of information technologies, he argues that “dominant battlespace knowledge,” “near-perfect mission assignment,” and “immediate/complete battlespace assessment” would create the requisite  conditions for victory.