Chinese Information Warfare: A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?

More specifically, the main objective of information war is to attack the adversary’s information systems while protecting the information infrastructure of one’s own forces. Based on a large collection of Chinese primary sources, James Mulvenon argues that, “the aim of IW in the Chinese literature is information dominance [zhixinxiquan].”²⁷ Similar to the American concept of “information superiority,”²⁸ Chinese IW seeks to disrupt the enemy’s decisionmaking process by interfering with the adversary’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use information. The paralysis of the opponent’s information system and decisionmaking cycle would, in turn, destroy the adversary’s will to resist or fight on. For instance, IW would attack the enemy’s command and control systems in order to confuse or blind enemy forces. This notion of attacking the adversary’s command and control systems mirrors the strategies employed during the Gulf War and the Kosovo air campaign. In both conflicts, American forces launched an intensive effort to destroy and bring down the enemy’s “nervous system” in order to weaken the ability of the enemy’s kinetic weapons force to respond or fight. However, Chinese discussions broaden IW further. Some analysts argue that an effective information attack could completely disrupt an adversary’s military operations and therefore preclude the need for a direct military confrontation. The author examines at length whether the Chinese have mistakenly lost sight of the need to field a kinetic weapons force in tandem with command and control warfare.

This IW concept of attacking and destroying the enemy’s command and control capabilities has received great attention among Chinese commentators. One analyst argues that IW combat is a struggle between the command and control systems of the opposing forces. He asserts, “A winning force enters the battle after already winning the battle . . . The goal that confrontation of command pursues is to ‘win in strategy,’ because only by doing so can one win a war or even stop a war.”²⁹ In other words, the side that wins in the struggle for battlefield command determines the outcome of wars. He observes that the multinational forces in the Gulf War defeated Iraq by first destroying its ability to command its forces. “Without the power to ‘win in strategy,’ they [the Iraqis] also lost the power to ‘win in battle’.”³⁰  The author argues that the duel over command must precede combat on the ground. More intriguing, the analyst’s approach to warfare suggests that information dominance offers the potential to overawe the enemy into surrendering, hence negating the need for actual physical engagement. This type of psychological intimidation through IW—essentially aimed at scaring the enemy into dropping their swords—is deeply embedded in Sun Tzu’s philosophy. Strategic advantage (shih), a central feature of the Art of War, connotes the release of latent energy, both physical and psychological, in order to ride the forces of circumstances to victory. Whether the Chinese genuinely believe that command warfare has eclipsed kinetic force combat remains to be seen.

According to one author, “In waging IW, ‘the best combat method is to attack by strategy’ . . . to obstruct or upset the enemy’s decisionmaking procedure, so as to make the enemy unable to adopt coordinated actions. To be more precise, the main objective of IW is to hit the enemy’s cognitive system as well as information system.”³¹ In terms of the actual application of force, the writer conjures the notion of hitting the enemy’s vital points. “The salient feature of IW is that high-precision, high-speed, over-the-horizon attacks become its basic fire application pattern and that the nonstylized ‘vital point’-styled structural destruction will replace the traditional-stylized battles.”³² The author equates the enemy’s main vulnerabilities to its ability to process information and make decisions. Identifying, locating, and then attacking such centers of gravity (cognitive and information systems) are central to this concept of IW.

According to the Liberation Army Daily, “an attacker can go around the enemy’s solid works he has long labored for and, by way of ‘surgical removal’ and ‘digital acupoint pressure’ (selective attacks), launch precision raids to destroy the enemy’s war resources and shatter his will to resist.”33 Similar to U.S. military thinking, this focus on targeting the opponent’s will hints at a very broad conception of IW, including psychological operations.  Another writer describes the ability of IW to seek out and destroy the enemy’s vital points in much more vivid terms. “Information intensified combat methods are like a Chinese boxer with a knowledge of vital body points who can bring an opponent to his knees with a minimum of movement.”34 A Chinese Defense University publication issued a similar prescription on IW. “Paralyze the enemy by attacking the weak link of his C3I as if hitting his acupuncture point in kungfu combat.” The foregoing analyses again suggest that the Chinese believe a successful attack against vital points would cripple the adversary and negate the need to engage in further combat.35 The notion that centers of gravity, a traditional concept in warfare, might be informationrelated is a major driving force behind the current debates on the new RMA worldwide. The Chinese have clearly grasped the significance of the relationship between information and center of gravity.