Converging Interests and Shared Values: The U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance Enters the 21 st Century

A series of events during the late 1980s and early 1990s relating to the restraints associated with Article 9 of the Constitution helped to exacerbate problems within the bilateral alliance. First, in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq crisis, the US urged Japan to send minesweepers to the Gulf to ensure shipping lanes remained open. For a number of reasons, including the political discord within the Japanese Diet, Japan was only able to assist the US effort financially.³

Second, during the Gulf War the US sought to enlist Japan’s support in the coalition organized to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The US saw the situation as an opportunity for Japan to embrace its role as a major power and sought to pressure Japan to engage directly in the crisis by contributing both personnel and equipment to the mission. However, once again Japan was only able to offer financial assistance, totaling roughly $13 billion US dollars (about a quarter of the total cost of the war). Although not expressing its reservations publicly, Washington was again displeased with the limited role Japan was willing and able to play.⁴

Finally, during the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis the US again turned to Japan for assistance. With the Central Intelligence Agency estimating that there was a “better than ever” chance the DPRK already possessed one or two nuclear weapons, the situation on the Korean Peninsula began to spiral out of control.  It was at this point that Chief North Korean Delegate Park Yong-su threatened that the South Korean capitol of Seoul would be “turned into a sea of fire” using the DPRK arsenal. The Clinton administration, alarmed at the emerging crisis, deployed an additional 10,000 US troops to reinforce the already 37,000 military personnel in South Korea and a contingent of F-117 “Nighthawk” bombers. With 60,000 US forces also posted in Okinawa, Japan, the US asked Tokyo to provide intelligence and logistical support for the pending US buildup. Japan, however, once again refused to take part, fearing the potential repercussions from the DPRK.⁵ It was clear to US policymakers that the Constitutional limitations placed on Japan’s military prevented a “normal” alliance from emerging.

For its part, Japan also found many points of contentions within the relationship. Often taking an overbearing posture, the US was seen by many Japanese to be an arrogant nation, specifically with regards to trade issues in the early 1990s.⁶ The Japanese were further worried by their perception of the Clinton administration’s disinterest in foreign affairs and its desire to form a “strategic partnership” with China. The major cuts to defense spending the US made following the fall of the Soviet Union only added to this hesitancy.  The ongoing presence of US military bases in Okinawa was also of concern for Japan. With facilities occupying almost 20 percent of the island, citizens of Okinawa resented the physical, environmental, and social impact of the bases. Further exacerbating the problem was the September 1995 rape of a twelve-year old Okinawa schoolgirl by three US servicemen.⁷

For all the difficulties facing the alliance, the leaders of both countries continued to express its importance during the 1990s. President George H.W. Bush made calls for a “global partnership” with Japan. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Solomon, expanded on the vision of President Bush: “[a] restructured and reinvigorated US-Japan relationship […] will be one of the pillars of the international architecture of the 21^st century.”⁸ Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi also echoed his desires for the continuation of the relationship, calling the bilateral alliance “the political foundation on which the two counties cooperate in assuming their respective roles and responsibilities for securing world peace and stability.”⁹ Although both states continued to stress the benefits of the alliance during the 1990s, the relationship had been questioned to such an extent that official public rhetoric concerning the alliance no longer appeared to match the reality.