Converging Interests and Shared Values: The U.S.-Japan Bilateral Alliance Enters the 21 st Century

In 2003, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) was established to begin the transformation of the bilateral alliance. Known as the “2+2 meetings,” the SCC is comprised of the US Secretaries of Defense and State and their Japanese counterparts. Three major meetings in the last two years have produced three joint statements that have laid the groundwork for articulating the common strategic objectives of the alliance, discussing roles, missions and capabilities of military personnel, and realigning US and Japanese military personnel to meet these ends.

At the first SCC of February 2005, the two countries reiterated their commitment to working together within the “new security environment,” where threats from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have become common challenges. The SCC stressed the bilateral commitment to peacefully resolve issues relating to the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan straits. Furthermore, the two countries called on China to improve its military transparency. Also of note, the first of the “global common strategic objectives” mentioned by the two countries was the promotion of “fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.”³¹ This proclamation came only several weeks after President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address in which he proclaimed that “[t]he survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”³² Japan’s commitment to and embrace of the promotion of liberal values is a major realignment in its foreign policy. Not only has Japan chosen to pursue a principle-led foreign policy for altruistic reasons, but it has also chosen to stand by the US in equating its well being with the spread of universal liberal values

The second SCC of October 2005, titled Transformation and Realignment for the Future, reiterated the objectives of the February agreement and provided a detailed approach to help implement them.  First, Washington and Tokyo agreed to take steps to help improve military coordination and cooperation. The US decided to transform its base at Camp Zama into a “joint task force-capable operational headquarters,” that will operate in conjunction with Japan’s Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command.³³ This major step follows Japan’s recent  decision to reorient its defensive chain of command along lines similar to those used by the US  military. The US Yakota Air Base, already the home of the US 5^th Air Force, will also become a point of joint security cooperation as it moves to host Japan’s Air Defense Command and a bilateral joint operations command coordination structure. The reorganized command structure at the Yakota Base will also take control of the bilateral missile defense system.

Another major move concerns the realignment of US military forces in the Pacific theatre. In November 2003 the Pentagon announced the Global Force Posture Review – an extension of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of a “transformed” military capable of meeting the challenges of a post-Cold War world. In the words of then Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, “[e]verything is going to move everywhere.”34 The major realignment of US forces agreed upon by the US and Japan at the October 2005 SCC called for the relocation of 7,000 personnel from the 3^rd Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) from Okinawa to Guam. The remaining Marines in Okinawa were to be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The decision to move the 3^rd MEF to Guam was largely made to reduce the pressures of the US military presence on Okinawa and, more specifically, the Japanese government. The move, according to a US Congressional Research Report, “seeks to quell the political controversy that has surrounded the presence of US forces on the island for years.”35 For the US, the decision came with little cost – in May 2006 Japan agreed to pay 59% (over $6 billion) of the estimated cost for the relocation – and ensured the tense political situation surrounding the Okinawa base was cleared up so as not to place any undo burden on the Japanese government that may impede future bilateral decisions.