Counterpropaganda: An Important Capability for Joint Forces

Countering Propaganda

Counterpropaganda is a difficult and complex challenge.  To mitigate or nullify the effects of the propaganda, the IO staff must determine the appropriate countermeasures, as well as anticipate the effects of those countermeasures and the opponent’s response.  This is more than a matter of merely coordinating the assets and competing requirements of the core, supporting, and related capabilities.  Success rests with the IO staff’s ability to correctly direct the Joint forces’ capabilities at affecting specific information content and flow to the target audience.  An effective counterpropaganda effort selects the appropriate assets, both IO and non-IO, and determines how these assets can be employed to match or overmatch the effects of opponent propaganda.

Efforts to counter propaganda will most likely become a long-term operation.  For this reason, counterpropaganda can easily take the form of an IO objective.  When developing an objective for counterpropaganda, particular attention should be paid to the effects of the propaganda on the target audience.   An essential component of this process is PSYOP pre-testing because it provides the opportunity to capture the social dimension of propaganda’s impact on the target audience.⁹ However, complete knowledge of the attitudinal or behavioral effects resulting from a particular set of countermeasures is unlikely.  Therefore it may be necessary to identify a series of likely outcomes stemming from the countermeasures.¹⁰

Chances are slim that any one set of countermeasures will apply a silver bullet solution.  The effects of the opponent propaganda and friendly countermeasures will likely develop in a non-linear fashion, hence a constant process of analysis and application is necessary.  To do this, the IO staff must monitor any effects produced by the countermeasures, changes to the operating and information environments, adversary responses to the countermeasures, and then if applicable, reengage the target audiences with new countermeasures.  Furthermore, because countering propaganda will unlikely be a simple matter of churning out more PSYOP posters and handbills, extensive coordination for operational or strategic assets, or even the use of civilian media may be necessary.

Conclusion

This paper provides little more than a starting place for the application of a supporting, albeit critical, IO capability.  Unfortunately, the absence of a methodology to determine the effects of opponent propaganda and predict the effectiveness of friendly countermeasures remains a major gap in the IO staff’s TTP.  Aside from the pre-testing techniques typically used by PSYOP forces, little is available for the IO staff to predict whether the selected countermeasures are appropriate.  Therefore, three worthwhile future efforts are the development of procedures for identifying, dissecting, and cataloguing opponent propaganda; techniques for quantifying the effects of opponent lines of persuasion, and tactics to employ friendly countermeasures.

Endnotes:

¹ The definition of counterpropaganda operations is from Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.  The authors of this article prefer the Army definition:

“Programs of products and actions designed to nullify propaganda or mitigate its effects” (FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).

² Misinformation is unintentionally incorrect information emanating from virtually anyone for reasons unknown, or to solicit a response or interest that is not political or military in origin.  Disinformation is information disseminated primarily by intelligence organizations or other covert agencies designed to distort information and deceive or influence U.S. decision makers, U.S. forces, coalition allies, and key actors or individuals via indirect or unconventional means (FM 3-05.301).

³ Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

⁴ FM 3-05.301, Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, p.  11-3.

⁵ Jowett, G. & V. O’Donnell.  Propaganda and Persuasion.  Sage Publication, London, United Kingdom, 1992, p. 212.

⁶ Jowett, G. & V. O’Donnell.  Propaganda and Persuasion.  Sage Publication, London, United Kingdom, 1992, p. 153.

⁷ For an in-depth depiction of the SCAME technique see pp. 11-10 to 11-16 of FM 3.05.301.

⁸ Ibid, p. 11-5.

⁹ In a sound summary of effects research, Jowett and O’Donnell argue: “It is also important to pay attention to the historical and cultural contexts in which propaganda and persuasion occur, and especially to recognize that people construct different meanings according to their social experiences.”

¹⁰ Smith, Edward E.  Effects Based Operations.  CCRP, November 2002, p. xvii.