Critical Mass # 2: Senator Lott, Rumsfeld Commission Add Fresh Impetus to Case for Beginning Deployment of Missile Defenses
(Washington, D.C.): In the past twenty-four hours, the Nation has been given not one but
two
timely wake-up calls: During this period, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott
(R-MS) and a
congressionally mandated commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld
have issued devastating critiques of the Clinton Administration’s stewardship of key national
security policies. The former provided an indicting interim report on the effects of Clinton
technology transfer policies on the military threat — and, in particular, the ballistic missile threat —
posed by China. The latter blew away intelligence estimates that the Administration had
politicized to justify its opposition to deploying missile defenses.
Senator Lott Continues to ‘Grow’ in Office
As the Center has recently noted with pleasure,(1)
the Majority Leader has increasingly of late
demonstrated a fresh and energetic determination to challenge Clinton-Gore policies inimical to
U.S. security interests. Yesterday, he offered his most impressive performance in this regard to
date: He offered preliminary conclusions derived from thirteen recent hearings exploring
allegations that dangerous transfers of satellite, space-launch and other dual-use technology have
occurred. With the caveat that much work is left to be done — in part because, as Sen. Lott put
it, “a lack of cooperation from the Administration has hampered our efforts”
offered, among others, the following important findings:
- “First, the Clinton administration’s export controls for satellites are simply
inadequate.
There has not been adequate protection of sensitive U.S. technology. National security
concerns are regularly downplayed and even ignored. Hearings before several
committees
have detailed the shortcomings in the development and implementation of export controls of
satellites. - “Second, sensitive technology related to satellite exports has been transferred to
China.
In at least two cases, U.S. companies analyzed Chinese launch failures and communicated with
Chinese officials. In 1995, Hughes analyzed the APSTAR 2 launch failure. Commerce now
concedes that this analysis should have been subject to State and Defense Department reviews
before a Commerce official gave it to the Chinese. Commerce only provided the report,
concluded in 1995, 2 hours before a Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International
Proliferation hearing on July 8 of this year.” - “Third, China has received military benefit from U.S. satellite exports.
There is a division
within the executive branch agencies over how much China has benefitted. But there
seems to
be agreement that certainly some benefit was derived. - “[Fourth,] the Administration has ignored overwhelming information regarding
Chinese
proliferation and has embarked on what appears to be a de facto policy to protect
China
and U.S. satellite companies from sanctions under our U.S. proliferation law. For
instance, on 11 June 1998, the Committee on Foreign Relations heard testimony from the
former director of the Non-proliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency[, Gordon
Oehler.(3)He revealed that] the Clinton Administration has used ‘almost any measure’ to block
intelligence judgments that China had transferred missiles to Pakistan — a clear violation of
U.S. law that requires the imposition of sanctions. [Mr. Oehler also testified that] Intelligence
analyses ‘were summarily dismissed by the policy community.’ - “Finally, new information has come to light about China’s efforts to influence the
American political process. This new information should remove any doubt about the
need
for an independent counsel in this area.
“For example, a senior official of the Defense Trade and Security
Administration
(DTSA) testified before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on June 25, 1998,
that ‘over the past six years, the formal process to control dual-use items has
failed in its stated mission — to safeguard the national security of the United
States.’
“Transferring the control of satellite exports from the State Department to
the Commerce Department in 1996 really resulted in dramatic changes …. It
eliminated congressional notification. It exempted satellite exports from certain
sanctions. Technical information is not as clearly controlled, leading to uncertainty
on the part of aerospace companies and to more technology transfer than
previously allowed.
“Testimony…has established that Department of Defense monitors are not
required to be present at satellite launches. This is directly contrary to
previous administration claims. No statute, policy, or regulation requires U.S.
Government monitors. At least three U.S. satellites have been launched in
China with no U.S. monitors present.
“Today’s satellite export control system relies on the good will of the
Commerce Department, a department which has repeatedly demonstrated
its willingness to ignore national security concerns on satellite exports.“
“The New York Times has reported that U.S. satellites are being used by the
Chinese
military for its internal coded communications. Administration officials concede that
China is using American-made and exported satellites for their military
communications. This is a clear and uncontested military benefit for China.”
“According to the testimony, the intelligence community is ‘virtually certain that this
transfer had taken place…’ …Why has that been the case, and why hasn’t the
Administration been willing to take actions providing sanctions where clearly that
information has been provided?
“It has already been reported that FBI Director Freeh has indicated his view that an
independent counsel should be appointed. It is time to renew attention on the Attorney
General. It is time for an outside, impartial investigation by an independent counsel into
the serious and credible charges of direct Chinese Government financing or
involvement in the 1996 elections.”
The Rumsfeld Commission
The unanimous report of the blue-ribbon Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to
the
United States(4)
makes clear that the Clinton-Gore assessment of the ballistic missile threat is no
sounder from a national security point of view than the Administration’s practice of “engaging
China” on Beijing’s terms dissected so ably by Sen. Lott. Particularly noteworthy is the Rumsfeld
Commission’s conclusion that: “Ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction
payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States.”
This stands in stark contrast to the pollyannish judgment rendered by the Clinton
Administration’s
1995 National Intelligence Estimate on the ballistic missile threat. Incredibly, that NIE found that
there would be no threat from long-range ballistic missiles for at least fifteen
years. (Of course,
in order to reach this preposterously sanguine conclusion, the Intelligence Community had to
make three heroic assumptions: 1) neither Russia nor China — which have such long range
missiles in place today — would pose a danger; 2) neither of these nations would help any other
state to accelerate the acquisition of ballistic missile technology; and 3) only the continental
United States would be considered as targets, since Alaska and Hawaii would be within range of
medium-range missiles from Korea.)(5)
An unclassified executive summary released today simultaneously with the Rumsfeld
Commission’s highly classified report being submitted to Congress states that Commission
members “unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend
on
expectations of extended warning and deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised
to reflect the reality of an environment in which they have little or no warning.“
The unanimous findings of the commission included the following:
- “Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire
ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United
States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies …. [The newer ballistic
missile-equipped
nations’ capabilities] would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five
years of a decision to acquire such a capability …. During several of those years, the U.S.
might not be aware that such a decision had been made.” - “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more
mature
and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the
intelligence community.” - “The Intelligence Community’s ability to provide timely and accurate estimates of
ballistic missile threats to the U.S. is eroding. This erosion has roots both within and
beyond the intelligence process itself. The Community’s capabilities in this area need to be
strengthened in terms of both resources and technology.” - “The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile
deployments
are being reduced. Under some plausible scenarios — including re-basing or transfer of
operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, shortened development programs that might
include testing in a third country, or some combination of these — the U.S. might well
have
little or no warning before operational deployment.”
The significance of these findings was underscored today by Speaker of the
House Newt
Gingrich (R-GA) who said: “[The Rumsfeld Commission’s conclusion] is the
most
important warning about our national security since the end of the Cold War.” He
added
that, “During the Cold War we had a core assumption about the nature of the Soviet Union…it
was susceptible to deterrence. [Now,] there are three or four regimes that will not be
deterred.”
The Bottom Line
In the wake of Senator Lott’s conclusions and those of the Rumsfeld Commission, it is all the
more urgent for the Congress to act on two near-term and highly relevant agenda items:
- First, halt the dismantling of the Defense Technology Security Administration
(DTSA).
Pursuant to a reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense unveiled late last year,
this organization, which once was — and must again be made — an invaluable, national
security-minded watchdog on technology transfers, is to be functionally eliminated on 1
October 1998. Congress must prevent the implementation of this plan by blocking
DTSA’s physical relocation to the vicinity of Dulles airport and its subordination to
additional layers of bureaucracy sure to keep its warnings from reaching senior
decision-makers.(6) - Second, get started on deploying anti-missile defenses. Now that it is
clear there may be no
lead time concerning the emergence of undeterrable missile threats, the earliest possible
deployment of effective anti-missile defenses — namely, modified Navy ships equipped with the
AEGIS fleet air defense system(7)
— must become a top priority for both the executive and
legislative branches. The place to start would be by enacting legislation first offered in
May by Senators Thad Cochran (R-MS) and Daniel Inouye (D-HI) (and, by a one-vote
margin, filibustered by forty-one Democratic Senators), that would make deployment of
effective national missile defenses as soon as technologically possible the formal policy of the
U.S. government.(8)
– 30 –
1. See the Center’s Decision Briefs entitled
Senator Lott ‘Grows’ in Office (No.
98-D 108 15
June 1998) and Needed: A ‘Loyal Opposition’ to Clinton’s Anti-Nuclear
Policy (No. 98-D 96,
1 June 1998).
2. Sen. Lott offered a long and astounding litany to document this
claim. The following are some
of the impediments to the Senate’s investigation that he cited: “…Virtually no information has
been provided concerning the transfer of export controls from State to Commerce — from the
White House or any other agency. And virtually no information has been provided on Chinese
membership in the MTCR, or on Chinese proliferation activities in violation of U.S. law”; “Until
Friday of last week, the Department of Commerce only provided an initial limited set of
documents. More has been promised, but the response has again been glacial and incomplete.
The documents they have provided contain redactions that limit their utility, quite frankly”; “The
Department of State has provided also virtually nothing”; and “The White House has not
responded to the Intelligence Committee. Neither has ACDA, Customs, or State. Defense and
Commerce have only provided limited information.” Sen. Lott expressed the view that:
- “After a review of the Clinton administration’s compliance with our requests for
information, it is hard to escape the conclusion that delay has become the standard
operating procedure. Once again, it is going to make it difficult for us to get the
information we need so we can make a clear determination about the damage that has
been done with this technology transfer. After an initial show of good faith by the
administration, we have not had a lot more cooperation since then.”
3. For information on this testimony see the Center’s
Decision Brief entitled ‘See No Evil’:
China’s Proliferation Continues Apace; Clinton Dissembles/Ignores This Reality, Seeks to
Reward the PRC (No. 98-D 115, 19 June 1998).
4. The fact that the Rumsfeld Commission was able to achieve such
robust consensus is
especially remarkable — and a real tribute to its Chairman’s leadership — given that a transparent
effort was made to populate its membership with some expected to oppose this outcome. In
addition to Secretary Rumsfeld, the commissioners were: Dr. Barry M. Blechman; General Lee
Butler, USAF (Ret.), Dr. Richard L. Garwin; Dr. William R. Graham; Dr. William Schneider, Jr.;
General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Ret.); Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz; and R. James Woolsey, Esq.
5. See the Center’s Transition Brief entitled
It Walks Like A Duck: Questions Persist that
Clinton CIA’s Missile Threat Was Politically Motivated (
6. See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
Broadening the Lens: Peter Leitner’s Revelations
on ’60 Minutes,’ Capitol Hill Indict Clinton Technology Insecurity (
1998).
7. See Irate Senate Supporters of the ‘AEGIS Option’
for Missile Defense Demand Release of
Favorable Pentagon Study (No. 98-D 119, 25 June
1998), Words to Live By: Speaker Gingrich
Asks Clinton to Use Speech to the Nation to Begin Protecting It From Missile
Attack (No. 98-D 15, 23 January 1998) and
Validation of the Aegis Option: Successful Test Is First Step From
Promising Concept to Global Anti-Missile Capability (
8. See Shame, Shame: By One Vote, Minority of
Senators Perpetuate America’s
Vulnerability to Missile Attack (No. 98-D 84, 14
May 1998) and Senate Should Vote to Defend
America ‘As Soon As Technologically Possible’ (No.
98-D 79, 6 May 1998).
- Frank Gaffney departs CSP after 36 years - September 27, 2024
- LIVE NOW – Weaponization of US Government Symposium - April 9, 2024
- CSP author of “Big Intel” is American Thought Leaders guest on Epoch TV - February 23, 2024