‘De-alerting’ Nukes Would Imperil U.S. Security

By Dr. Kathleen Bailey
Wall Street Journal, 20 January 1998

Do you believe the U.S. should maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as long as we face the
threat
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons? If so, here’s a major cause for worry: The Clinton
administration is considering “de-alerting” our nuclear arsenal.

The idea is that the U.S. would make our nuclear-tipped missiles all but unusable through
such
measures as removing their nuclear warheads or guidance systems. This would erode the U.S.
nuclear deterrent and increase the risk of an early nuclear strike against the U.S. Before taking
such a step, the dangers should be debated widely and openly, not just behind the closed doors of
the executive branch.

The primary reason that U.S. nuclear missiles are on alert–that is, ready to be fired quickly–is
that Russia retains as many as 10 times more tactical nuclear weapons than we do, an arsenal
capable of destroying the U.S. Although Moscow presently shows no intention of using its
nuclear arsenal, this could change quickly given Russia’s volatile politics. It is Moscow’s nuclear
capability–not just its intentions–that must concern us.

There are clear signs that Russia is enhancing these capabilities and that its leadership intends
to
rely increasingly on nuclear weapons. It is modernizing its nuclear weapons and delivery systems
at high cost, despite its financial woes. Moscow’s refusal to ratify the Start II treaty and its
abandonment of its nuclear no-first-use pledge also introduce uncertainty.

Moreover, the U.S. nuclear deterrent protects us not just from Russia but also from other
nations’
nuclear arsenals, as well as from the chemical and biological weapons proliferating around the
world. President Clinton’s recent revision of the nuclear-use doctrine recognizes the growing need
to rely on nuclear retaliation to deter attacks with other types of weapons of mass destruction.
The speed with which nuclear retaliation can be executed can mean the difference between the
U.S. or its allies suffering one chemical or biological weapons attack or many.

Proponents of de-alerting argue that even after its weapons were de-alerted, the U.S. could
reconstitute its nuclear missiles and bombs quickly enough to retaliate against an aggressor. This
is patently false, even if other powers also agreed to de-alert, because they could cheat on such a
deal with virtually no risk of detection. If Russia agreed to disable one set of mobile missile
launchers, for instance, it could clandestinely manufacture another set. If it removed one set of
warheads, it could secretly produce and upload a second set. Alternatively, Moscow might not
declare all of its existing warheads or delivery vehicles. Iraq has already taught us the lesson that
mobile missiles are difficult to locate; we can expect that Russian missiles would be equally hard
to find. Also, the U.S. currently has no technologies to locate undeclared, hidden stockpiles of
nuclear weapons or weapons materials.

In addition to being unverifiable, de-alerting would be extremely destabilizing. If warheads
were
removed to storage, for example, they would be consolidated targets, inviting pre-emptive attack.
Also, if the U.S. were to begin to reconstitute its nuclear forces in a period of insecurity–by
reinstalling warheads, for example–it would be observable by the enemy and thus could cause
crisis escalation.

Why would the Clinton administration consider making U.S. nuclear weapons all but
unusable?
There are at least three reasons. First, de-alerting is touted as a way to avoid a nuclear exchange
begun by an unauthorized or accidental launch from Russia. The idea is that Russia would follow
our lead in making nuclear arms more difficult to use.

But the danger of accidental use may be overstated. Air Force Gen. Eugene Habiger,
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, visited Russia in November and observed
that “any one of [Russia’s nuclear] command centers, from the national level down to the unit
level, can inhibit the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.” If indeed the threat of
unauthorized or accidental launch is real, the better way to address it is through enhancing
command and control and by building U.S. missile defenses, not hobbling our deterrent.

Second, de-alerting seems attractive because it would skirt treaty negotiation and ratification
processes–both of which are likely to slow the pace of nuclear disarmament. Disarmament
advocates have seen the difficulties of getting Russia to ratify Start II and are worried about the
lengthy, arduous road ahead for Start III. De-alerting would denuclearize–for those nations that
choose to comply–without lengthy treaty talks or confirmation proceedings by a cautious Senate
or Duma.

Third, proponents of de-alerting see it as a step toward nuclear disarmament. Having failed to
ban
the gun, they want to have the bullets removed.

While disarmament is a noble goal, the U.S. should retain its nuclear deterrent in a highly
usable,
alert status for as long as necessary to preserve our national security, which is of course an even
more important goal. De-alerting would not only erode the deterrent value of our weapons, but
would also invite pre-emptive attack.

Ms. Bailey, a senior fellow at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, was assistant
director
for proliferation at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Reagan
administration.