Delusions over North Korea

On June 11, North Korea took another major step toward the acquisition of nuclear arms. This action was not a function of a further advance in its longstanding effort to build reactors and reprocessing facilities for this purpose. Nor was it tied to the recent test of a medium-range missile, the No Dong, with which small nuclear weapons could be delivered against targets throughout South Korea and parts of Japan.

Instead, communist North Korea’s latest achievement on the nuclear front was a feat of diplomatic jujitsu: In talks with U.S. officials in New York, Pyongyang’s representatives agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT). That withdrawal was supposed to become official the next day, imparting an air of high drama to the North Korean announcement. President Clinton hailed it as a "first but vital step" in worldwide nonproliferation.

In fact, it represents no such thing. North Korea has not agreed to comply with the NPT – pursuant to whose terms it is supposed to remain a non-nuclear state. Neither has it agreed to permit intrusive inspections that would enable the international community to establish with a degree of precision just how close Pyongyang is to having operational nuclear weapons.

Instead, North Korea simply chose to stop the clock on its withdrawal from the treaty "for as long as it considers necessary." By so doing, the North’s communist despot, Kim Il-sung and his designated successor and son, Kim Jong-il, have not only preserved their option to bail out on the NPT whenever they chose.

They have also utterly finessed the international community and minimized whatever remote chance there might have been for coordinated retaliation against North Korea for being the first nation formally to abandon this accord (as opposed to covertly). This reality was evident in the reaction of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, the leader of the U.S. delegation, to his deal with the North Koreans: "We have all got more time . . . to settle this through dialogue." The North Koreans are no fools, however; they will recognize this statement for what it is: Evidence of the United States’ unwillingness to come to grips with Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

North Korea has surely been given "more time" in which to engage in more "dialogue." Unfortunately, what more time really is going to buy is more reprocessed nuclear fuel and, therefore, the makings for more nuclear weapons for North Korea. Worse yet, the concessions Mr. Gallucci lavished on North Korea — not the least of which was the highest level of diplomatic interaction since the end of the Korean War, security assurances "against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons" and promises of noninterference in Pyongyang’s "internal affairs" — have served to reinforce the Kims’ nuclear ambitions. They probably have also served to intensify those of despots elsewhere around the globe.

After all, the lesson is unmistakable: As Rodney Dangerfield would say, North Korea "got no respect" until it got nukes. Now the United States is treating this pariah state deferentially, even talking about a permanent end of military exercises with America’s South Korean ally and the establishment of improved political and economic relations with the North.

Interestingly, on the same day that North Korea was pulling off its diplomatic hat trick in New York, a very different approach was being mapped out in Washington by someone who really knows about covert nuclear weapons programs and what to do about them — David Kay. Mr. Kay gained international acclaim in 1991 for his courage and intrepidness in leading the first international inspections of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear facilities.

At a luncheon at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Kay strongly counseled against: trading away U.S. security commitments to South Korea, paying a price to China for any help Beijing might give in defusing this crisis, or believing that a few nuclear weapons in North Korean hands will not be of much consequence. These are formulas for greater instability in the region. Worse yet, given Pyongyang’s penchant for selling anything and everything to dangerous customers like Iran and Syria, an unchecked nuclear weapons program in North Korea will be the precursor to proliferation elsewhere.

The Kay approach would, instead, reinforce U.S. security guarantees to South Korea and Japan, including a doubling of American forces on the Korean Peninsula. It would impress upon China the fact that Beijing has at least as much at stake as we do if North Korea goes nuclear — not least the likelihood that Seoul and Tokyo will follow suit. Mr. Kay also would use economic and financial pressure points, especially suspending South Korean trade links with the North and Japan’s money flows to North Korea, to compel Pyongyang to accept aggressive, intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities. He also recommends covert operations if necessary to enforce an embargo, particularly by disrupting North Korean telecommunications.

Most importantly, David Kay warns that it would be the height of folly to believe that if only North Korea remains in the Nonproliferation Treaty, the crisis is ended. Unfortunately, that is precisely the perception being encouraged by the Clinton administration’s 11th-hour deal with Pyongyang. The real upshot, however, will be to leave the United States and the rest of the international community with still less attractive — and far more costly — options for contending with North Korea’s bomb in the future.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr. is the director of the Center for Security Policy, the host of public television’s "The World This Week" and a columnist for The Washington Times.