Excerpts From Nuclear Testing Negotiations: What Is The Bush Administration's Agenda?

(No. 89-34, 26 June 1989)

Introduction

Under the charter for the NTT negotiations agreed to in September, 1987 by then-Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, completion of these protocols were understood to be but the initial goal of the NTT. The ministers announced that "The sides will as the first step agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the TTBT and PNET, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process."

Incredible as it might seem, the Reagan Administration came to understand that the commitment to a step-by-step negotiation on further testing limitations may well be utterly inconsistent with U.S. national security requirements. In a major report to the Congress submitted in September 1988, President Reagan illuminated numerous problems that additional constraints on nuclear testing would entail for America’s deterrent capabilities.

President Reagan left office before he was obliged to deal with the inherent inconsistency between the findings reported to Congress and his earlier commitment to the Soviet Union. It now falls to President Bush to grasp the nettle.

Are Further Testing Limitations in the U.S. Interest?

In response to a request from the Senate Armed Services Committee and on the basis of intensive interagency study, President Reagan on 8 September 1988 supplied the Congress with a report concerning "The Relationship between Progress in Other Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations on Nuclear Testing." This report, together with detailed companion analyses produced by the Departments of Energy and Defense, clearly and authoritatively describes U.S. nuclear testing requirements. It discusses the problems caused even by existing arms control limitations on nuclear testing. The Reagan report also provides a withering critique of the idea of imposing additional limitations on the U.S. nuclear testing program. Its main points (in excerpt form with emphasis added) are:

The Requirement for Testing

"Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years."

"Thus we do not regard nuclear testing as an evil to be curtailed, but as a tool to be employed responsibly in pursuit of national security."

"The U.S. tests neither more often nor at higher yields than is required for our security."

"As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our fundamental security, nuclear testing will be necessary."

Why the United States Tests Nuclear Weapons

"First, we do so to ensure the reliability of our nuclear deterrent."

"Second, we conduct nuclear tests in order to improve the safety, security, survivability, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Testing has allowed the introduction of modern safety and security features on our weapons. It has permitted a reduction by nearly one-third in the total number of weapons in the stockpile since 1960, as well as a reduction in the total megatonnage in that stockpile to approximately one-quarter of its 1960 value."

"Third, the U.S. tests to ensure we understand the effects of a nuclear environment on military systems."

"Finally, by continuing to advance our understanding of nuclear weapons design, nuclear testing serves to avoid technological surprise and to allow us to respond to the evolving threat."

— "These four purposes are vital national security goals. As companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy indicate, they cannot currently be met without nuclear testing."

Reductions in Nuclear and/or Conventional Arms
May Actually Increase U.S. Testing Requirements

"…It is important to recognize that there is no direct technical linkage between the size of the nuclear stockpile and the requirements for nuclear testing."

"The first two reasons — to ensure the reliability of our deterrent and to improve the safety and security of our nuclear arsenal — are related in part to the number of different designs in the U.S. stockpile."

— "Major reductions in the numbers of warheads, such as the U.S. seeks in START, would not alter our requirements for a number of different types of weapons to meet the Soviet threat, and hence would not alter the requirement for testing them…."

— "Indeed, under [an agreement providing for] deep reductions in strategic offensive arms the reliability of our remaining U.S. strategic weapons could be even more important and the need for testing even greater, particularly if the Soviets continue their current trends toward improved survivability."
"Similarly, neither reductions in strategic offensive arms themselves nor success in conventional arms reductions will eliminate the third reason for U.S. nuclear testing, the requirement to ensure we understand, from both an offensive and defensive standpoint, the effects of the environment produced by nuclear explosions on military systems….Even in a world with reduced strategic arms and an improved balance in conventional forces, nuclear weapons will exist. In such a world, understanding nuclear effects would be no less important."

"As the number of nuclear and conventional forces decrease, the potential relative advantage the Soviets could gain from an unforeseen technological breakthrough increases. To avoid being surprised by such a breakthrough, we must maintain and improve our understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons."

Future Arms Control and U.S. and Soviet Differences

"…There is no direct technical linkage between progress in other areas of arms control and the acceptability of progressively more stringent limitations on nuclear testing. It is important to recognize the asymmetries between the United States and the Soviet Union in this regard."

— "Because of inherent differences in the two nations’ approaches to their security requirements, stringent limitations on nuclear testing, or even its complete cessation, would have less impact on Soviet security than our own."

— "The Soviet advantage in conventional forces, the less sophisticated designs of their strategic weapons, the ability of a controlled society to maintain design teams intact even without testing…all may allow the Soviets to be more willing to accept restrictions…."

Further Policy Caveats

"…the U.S. recognizes that neither nuclear testing nor arms control per se are ends in themselves. They are tools to be employed in the interests of enhancing national security."

"As a matter of policy, the U.S. has made no decisions regarding any specific limitations which might be considered following TTBT and PNET ratification. Such decisions cannot be prudently made without an analysis of the specific details of arms reductions agreements in other areas."

"…It is clear that limitations as stringent as a complete ban on tests above either 1 kiloton- or 10 kilotons-yield pose serious risks and will almost certainly not prove to be compatible with our overall security interests. As the companion reports by the Departments of Defense and Energy make clear, such limitations have exceptionally severe effects on U.S. programs. In addition, we do not know how to verify such yield limitations."

"A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term objective of the United States. We believe such a ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and effectively verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces."

The Challenge for President Bush

It is incumbent on the Bush Administration…to clarify how — if at all — its assessment of U.S. national security interests and requirements differs from that of President Reagan, described above. Should President Bush not establish forthwith his view of the inadvisability of negotiating additional limitations on nuclear testing, he may find his options for preserving vital American flexibility sharply constrained as work on the TTBT is completed and the pressure inexorably builds to reach agreement on new, intermediate constraints.

Recommended Actions

The following steps must be taken if President Bush is to avoid the serious pitfalls associated with the commitment to further limitations on nuclear testing he inherited from Ronald Reagan.

The Bush Administration should expressly reject the idea of further constraints upon nuclear testing. The previous administration was unable to identify any limits beyond the TTBT consistent with U.S. security interests, and President Reagan clearly — albeit belatedly — warned, before leaving office, that there well may never be any.

Even the best case outcome of such negotiations, i.e., that they will give rise to modest restrictions (such as a quota permitting a sizeable number of tests or reductions in the yield threshold of underground tests), would be unacceptable.

— Such limits will, by definition, impose additional limitations on the flexibility vital to an effective testing program.

— What is more, it is illusory to believe that test ban proponents will be either satisfied with — or permit themselves to be coopted by such modest constraints. The reality is that those who propose draconian limits on testing do so because they wish to cripple the U.S. nuclear program; they will not be satisfied with half-measures.
Instead, the Bush Administration should build upon President Reagan’s forthright explanation of the reasons for U.S. nuclear testing and for caution on considering new limits. As President Reagan made clear, quite aside from very serious verification problems, the United States has fundamental requirements for continued testing at approximately current levels — and should make no apologies for maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and conducting the tests necessary to do so.

President Bush should offer decisive leadership to those in Congress willing to resist legislative initiatives that would — by precluding a flexible test program — cripple America’s ability to safeguard the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. An important element of such a presidential effort must be an express willingness on the part of the Administration to veto any congressional efforts to impose further restrictions on U.S. testing.