Fighting the Hydra: Decapitation and al Shabaab

by Phillip Kittock

Abdishakur “Tahliil” is the Latest in a Series of Recent Losses for al-Shabaab Leadership

An American aircraft armed with Hellfire missiles killed al-Shabaab commander Abdishakur, also known as “Tahliil” on Monday December 29^th, according to the Pentagon and Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency. Abdishakur was believed to be the head of the terrorist organization’s Amniyat network, an elite and clandestine division of al-Shabaab in charge of intelligence activities as well as suicide attacks and assassinations. According to the Pentagon statement, the loss of Abdishakur “will significantly impact al Shabaab’s ability to conduct attacks against the government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali people and U.S. allies and interests.”

Abdishakur is the latest in a series of losses for the Somalia-based affiliate of al-Qaeda. Ahmed Abdi Godane, the organization’s leader, was killed by an American airstrike in September of this year. Under his leadership, al-Shabaab was responsible for numerous attacks throughout East Africa and officially merged with al-Qaeda as a regional affiliate in 2012. Notable attacks include the 2010 double suicide bombing in Uganda and the attack on Nairobi, Kenya’s Westgate Mall in 2013, killing 70 and 67 people respectively. After several subordinates publically and privately questioned his leadership and tactics, a purge of dissidents within al-Shabaab consolidated Godane’s control over the organization in 2013.

Just days before Abdishakur was killed another former leader in the Amniyat network, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, surrendered to Somali authorities. In 2012 the State Department had offered a $3 million reward for information leading to the location of Hersi, then noted as the head of al-Shabaab’s intelligence. When asked whether intelligence gained from the detainment of Hersi contributed to the successful strike against Abdishakur, State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke declined to comment.

Looking forward, it remains to be seen whether these losses will be sufficient to significantly diminish al-Shabaab’s capacity to function as a terrorist organization. Although leadership targeting has remained a centerpiece of US counterterrorism policy, academic research on its effectiveness generally doesn’t indicate that the elimination of terrorist organizations’ leaders is sufficient to take down an organization.

Organizational structure has found to be an important factor in regards to a terrorist group’s resilience to leadership targeting. In general, research has found that centralized organizations are more susceptible to leadership decapitations. The concept of centralization is related to the network analysis subfield within international relations that analyzes groups based on the connections (linkages) between individuals (nodes). In theory, by mapping the members of a terrorist organization and their relationships to each other a counterterrorism operation can target the most important individuals. Centralized organizations place higher importance on a limited number of leaders and may have a strict hierarchy compared to decentralized organizations which are, at the extreme, characterized by small cells operating with minimal coordination.

In the case of al-Shabaab, it appears unlikely that these recent losses will result in organizational collapse. The organization has been fraught with internal discord since 2010 when Godane’s tactics against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) created divisions within the al-Shabaab’s leadership. Beginning in June 2013 with Ibrahim al-Afghani, Godane began a purge of dissidents that further destabilized al-Shabaab. Given that his replacement, Sheikh Ahmed Umar, was reportedly close to Godane and may have directly participated in Godane’s campaign against other al-Shabaab leaders it seems likely that these divisions will persist.

The US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also notes the division between al-Shabaab’s locally-minded members and its internationally motivated leadership. While many al-Shabaab soldiers are principally motivated by local interests (both inter-clan politics and anti-Somali government sentiments are factors), the leadership has affiliated itself with al-Qaeda and its global jihad. These internal divisions demonstrate that “al-Shabaab is not centralized or monolithic in its agenda or goals.”

The bottom line: The losses of Godane, Hersi and Abdishakur may be setbacks for al-Shabaab and may decrease the effectiveness of the organization in the short term. However, al-Shabaab’s organizational structure doesn’t indicate that organizational collapse is likely as a direct result of these events.