First, Clinton Mutates NATO; Now, The G-7: Why Denver Should Be The First — And Last — ‘Summit Of The Eight

(Washington, D.C.): President
Clinton’s decision to transform the Group
of Seven (G-7) meeting in Denver on 20-22
June into a “Summit of the
Eight” comes on the heels of, and
parallels, his evisceration of another,
vital Western inter-governmental
institution: The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).

Unfortunately, just as Clinton’s
“Founding Act” which grants
Russia both a “voice”
and a de facto “veto”
over the West’s premier security
arrangement, (1)
his decision to make Russia what amounts
to a full-fledged member of the G-7 will
likely mutate this important economic and
geostrategic coordinating mechanism. Such
a step promises, at best, to condemn the
Group of Seven to irrelevance.
More likely, it will turn this conclave
into yet another vehicle for abetting Moscow’s
agenda — at the expense of the U.S. and
its allies.

Dumbing Down the Discussion

Such a prognosis is borne out by what
is — even by G-7 standards (2)
— an extraordinarily anodyne set of
discussion items for the Summit of the
Eight. According to Deputy Secretary of
the Treasury Lawrence Summers, (3)
the topics will be:

  • “…ways to address the
    profound economic and social
    effects caused by the aging
    of our societies
    .”
  • “…provid[ing] the degree
    of flexibility necessary for
    companies to adapt [to structural
    changes in the
    economy]…produced by technological
    change and economic integration.
  • “…how to cope with the
    risks to global financial
    stability that have accompanied
    the benefits of financial
    integration
    .”
  • “endorsement of a concerted
    international strategy to assist emerging
    economies
    in
    strengthening their financial
    systems, including a new,
    universally applicable set of
    core principles for banking
    supervision.”
  • “…a broad international
    effort to strengthen growth and
    development in Africa.”
  • “…[urge] nations by the
    year’s end to participate in an
    international convention to criminalize
    bribery.

In addition, Secretary Summers
declared that the G-7 want to aid Russia
in its bid to penetrate every other major
international economic organization by
“…see[ing] Russia join the Paris
Club in 1997
, the World
Trade Organization in 1998

and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development at an appropriate
time
in the future
.”

A Real Agenda

Unfortunately, there are far more
pressing economic and geostrategic
developments that should be on the
Western industrialized democracies’
agenda — but cannot be, lest Moscow’s
direct and problematic involvement in
each of them prove inconvenient, if not a
show-stopper. These include:

  • Assuring the West’s
    Access to the Vast Hydrocarbon
    Resources of the Caspian Basin:

    The huge oil and natural gas
    deposits of the Caspian Sea
    region — by some estimates
    second only to those of the
    Persian Gulf in terms of
    exportable surpluses for the 21st
    Century — would enable Western
    nations, including the United
    States, to reduce their reliance
    on Mideast sources. (4)
    Russia, however, appears
    determined to: monopolize
    transportation routes; challenge
    the current demarcation of
    sovereign control over the
    central deposits of the Caspian
    Sea; and destabilize the
    government of Azerbaijan — the
    one Western-oriented, secular
    Muslim state of the region that
    is anxious to do business and
    enhance security cooperation with
    the United States and its allies. (5)
  • The G-7 should make clear
    in the Denver Summit’s political
    declaration that any effort to
    destabilize Azerbaijan or
    otherwise restrict the free flow
    of Caspian oil to world markets
    will be met with a unified
    Western response aimed at
    countering such strategically
    threatening actions.

  • Reconstituting an
    Effective, Multilateral Export
    Control Regime:

    President Clinton has repeatedly
    issued Executive Orders declaring
    the proliferation of weapons to
    be an “extraordinary threat
    to the national security” of
    the United States. He has also
    proclaimed himself
    “personally committed to
    developing a more intelligent
    export control policy, one that
    prevents dangerous technologies
    from falling into the wrong
    hands….” What he has
    determinedly refused to
    acknowledge, however, is that the
    “wrong hands”
    includes Russia
    — a
    preeminent diverter of militarily
    relevant technology and
    proliferator of dangerous weapon
    systems. (6)
  • What is more, as Dr. Peter
    Leitner — a Senior Strategic
    Trade Analyst in the Clinton
    Defense Department — told the
    Joint Economic Committee on 17
    June 1997, thanks to a deliberate
    Clinton Administration policy
    aimed at eviscerating the
    “national security export
    controls that we came to know and
    rely upon” during the Cold
    War, all there is to show for
    this Mr. Clinton’s “more
    intelligent export control
    policy” is:

    “…a handful of
    weak, ineffectual regimes
    which are little more
    than cardboard cut-outs
    designed to maintain the facade
    of an international
    technology security
    system, but [that] offer
    virtually no protection
    from nations seeking to
    develop advanced
    conventional weapons or
    weapons of mass
    destruction.” (7)

    The G-7 must recognize the
    urgent need to reconstitute an
    effective multilateral export
    control regime on the model of
    the Coordinating Committee on
    Export Controls — an arrangement
    that maintains, and enforces,
    controls on strategic technology
    exports to Russia and China so
    long as these nations engage in
    the diversion of such technology
    to their respective militaries or
    to the West’s other potential or
    avowed adversaries.

  • Addressing the Abuse of
    the U.S. and International
    Securities Markets:
    Both
    Russia and China are increasingly
    issuing dollar-denominated and
    other bonds as a means of
    attracting large sums of
    inexpensive, undisciplined and
    largely non-transparent cash. In
    addition, Moscow and Beijing
    appreciate that this greatly
    expanded borrowing base has the
    further virtue of penetrating key
    constituencies in Western
    economies and their societies
    that have, heretofore been
    largely beyond the reach of
    communist recruiters, national
    military establishments and
    intelligence services (i.e.,
    securities firms, pension funds,
    insurance companies, corporations
    and individuals). Over time,
    arguably hundreds of firms and
    many thousands — if not millions
    — of people in the West will
    have a vested financial interest
    in opposing the imposition of
    meaningful economic sanctions,
    containment strategies and other
    penalties that might be
    appropriate responses to Russian
    and/or Chinese misdeeds. (8)
  • As Roger W. Robinson, Jr., the
    first occupant of the Casey
    Institute’s William J. Casey
    Chair, has documented, (9)
    in recent years China has issued
    over $6 billion in
    dollar-denominated bonds —
    financial instruments that have
    been offered by enterprises which
    are, in at least a number of
    cases, “… closely
    connected to the People’s
    Liberation Army (PLA) and the
    Chinese military industrial
    complex.” These bonds are
    facilitating the PLA’s efforts to
    raise funds to underwrite its
    offensive military build-up,
    conduct espionage, technology
    theft and influence operations in
    the United States, suppress human
    rights and pursue other
    activities inimical to Western
    interests.

    The G-7 nations should
    create forthwith a multilateral,
    security-minded screening
    mechanism that would interact
    with their respective
    intelligence services, the NATO
    economic secretariat and the
    OECD, to review prospective
    foreign borrowers (particularly
    Chinese and Russian state-owned
    enterprises and banks). The
    purpose of such reviews would be
    to ensure that these entities are
    not engaged in — or in some way
    advancing — activities harmful
    to Western security interests,
    principles and values.

  • Preserving — and
    Broadening — Economic Sanctions
    as a Western Policy Tool:

    Western allies, and their
    respective business communities,
    have increasingly sought to
    undermine and delegitimate the
    use of economic sanctions — the
    only middle ground between empty
    rhetoric (read, diplomatic
    protests) and military action.
    The West cannot afford to ignore
    the fact that trade, as well as
    financial, sanctions may be the
    most effective and certainly
    the most proportionate

    response to the predations of
    ever more sophisticated
    proliferators, terrorists, drug
    cartels, money launderers,
    criminal syndicates, technology
    thieves — and the hostile
    military establishments that
    often are behind or collaborating
    with these subversive elements.
  • The G-7 must bear in mind
    Benjamin Franklin’s admonition
    that “We will hang together
    or hang separately.” The
    West must cooperate in the
    promulgation and enforcement of
    economic sanctions — even in
    instances where some perceived
    short-term losses will accrue to
    their national or business
    interests (e.g., in terms of
    export opportunities, job
    creation, etc.). In addition,
    greater use must be made of
    financial sanctions, particularly
    in relation to Western bond
    markets, as such sanctions more
    often than not involve no
    underlying trade transactions,
    projects, jobs or
    people-to-people contacts. Hence,
    they entail less economic damage
    to Western economies and risk
    less political blow-back than
    other types of economic
    sanctions.

The Bottom Line

Unless and until such items are
considered on the G-7 agenda, this
organization will fail to serve the sort
of catalytic and coordinating function
for common Western interests to which it
has, on occasion at least, contributed in
the past (notably, the Williamsburg
economic summit of May 1983 where a joint
strategy was implemented on a
security-minded East-West trade, energy
and financial regime and the decision to
deploy Pershing II and Ground-Launched
Cruise Missiles in Europe was affirmed).

Since the inclusion of Russia in these
talks will virtually ensure that no such
deliberations can occur in Denver, it can
only be hoped that the next economic
summit will again be a Group of Seven
meeting, one in which the West’s critical
economic and geostrategic interests can
be candidly addressed.

– 30 –

1. See the Center
for Security Policy’s Decision
Brief
entitled Founding
Act or Final Act for NATO?
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_69″>No. 97-D 69, 19
May 1997).

2. For example, see
the Casey Institute’s Perspective
entitled Stealth Summit: The
Incredible Shrinking G-7
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_66″>No. 96-C 66,
1 July 1996).

3. Remarks by
Secretary Summers before a World Trade
Conference in Denver, 10 June 1997.

4. See in this
connection the Center’s Caspian
Watch
Series: Caspian
Watch #6: Weinberger Issues Timely Alert
Against Interest Group’s Hijacking of
U.S. Caspian Policy
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_66″>No. 97-D 66, 12
May 1997); Caspian Watch #5:
Senator Byrd Takes the Lead in Securing
US Access to 200 Billions of Barrels of
Oil in the Caspian Sea
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-D_32″>No. 97-D 32, 25
February 1997); Caspian Watch
#4: House-Senate Conference Must Strike
Proper Balance for American Interests

(No. 96-D
85
, 17 September 1996); Caspian
Watch #3: Center, Washington Post Agree
— Congress Must Do The Right Thing By
U.S. Interests in the Caspian Basin

(No. 96-D
76
, 1 August 1996);
Caspian Watch #2: The Great Game Is On —
Will the Republicans in Congress Play?

(No. 95-D
87
, 1 November 1997); and Caspian
Watch #1: Russian Power-Plays on ‘Early
Oil’ Hallmark of Kremlin Expansionist
Past — And Future?
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=95-D_71″>No. 95-D 71,
2 October 1995).

5. It is worth
noting that, toward this end, Russia has
been increasing its military presence in
the region, arming neighboring rival and
territory-seeking Armenia, and conspiring
with radical Islamic Iran.

6. Russia has,
according to former Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer,
provided the Iranians with
“nuclear-related technologies,
missile components and other advanced
equipment” with the stated purpose,
per a June 1996 joint statement,
“…of preventing the presence of
[Western] power in the Caspian Sea.”
What is more, Russia has expressed an
intent to transfer supersonic SS-N-22
missiles (a missile designed to attack
U.S. AEGIS ships and aircraft carriers)
to China. If past practice is any guide,
China will be willing, in due course, to
transfer the SS-N-22 to Iran — enabling
that nation further to threaten the free
flow of oil through the Straits of
Hormuz.

7. See the Center’s
Press Release entitled Profile
in Courage: Peter Leitner Blows the
Whistle on Clinton’s Dangerous Export
Decontrol Policies
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-P_82″>No. 97-P 82, 19
June 1997).

8. For more
information on the implications of
Russian bonds on Western markets, see the
following Casey Institute Perspectives
entitled: If You Like the
Rigging of the Lebed Dismissal, You’ll
Love the Rigging of the Global Credit and
Securities Market
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_100″>No. 96-C 100,
17 December 1996), The Debate
Over Russia’s Financial
“Break-out”; Where Will It End
for U.S. Taxpayers, Interests?

(No. 96-C
110
, 4 November 1996) and Russian
‘Bondage’: Moscow’s Financial Breakout
Gets Underway with Wildly Oversubscribed
Eurobond Sale
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=96-C_119″>No. 96-C 119,
26 November 1996).

9. For more
information concerning Chinese
penetration of Western bond markets see
the following Casey Institute products: Dangerous
Upshot of Clinton-Gore’s China ‘Bonding’:
Strategic Penetration of U.S. Investment
Portfolios
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-C_47″>No. 97-C 47, 1
April 1997), USA Today
Illuminates Case for Urgent Action To
Halt Chinese ‘Bondage’
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-R_68″>No. 97-R 68, 16
May 1997) and Non-Renewal of
MFN for China: A Proportionate Response
to Beijing’s Emerging, Trade-Subsidized
Strategic Threat
( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-C_76″>No. 97-C 76, 9
June 1997).

Center for Security Policy

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