GARBAGE IN, GARBAGE OUT: UNWARRANTED ASSUMPTIONS SKEW I.D.A. STUDY’S FINDINGS; U.S. STILL NEEDS MORE BOMBERS

(Washington, D.C.): Today, the House Appropriations National
Security Subcommittee holds important hearings that may determine
whether the United States retains the option to build more
long-range manned bombers. The focus of today’s sessions will be
a recently released and highly controversial “Heavy Bomber
Force Study” performed by the Institute for Defense Analysis
(IDA). This study was mandated last year by Congress to help
determine whether there is a military requirement for more than
the 20 B-2 “Stealth” bombers currently programmed.

Unfortunately, the utility of this analysis as a guide for
congressional deliberations has been greatly diminished, thanks
to the debatable assumptions it was apparently directed to use by
the Pentagon. Indeed, the analytical phenomenon known as
“garbage in, garbage out” has rarely been more in
evidence. By merely replacing the planning factors used to
justify the conclusion that no more than 20 B-2 bombers are
required with more realistic assumptions, the same analysis would
produce a result that squares with strategic reality: The
United States urgently requires a larger, more flexible and more
stealthy manned bomber force than even the Bottom-Up Review
envisioned, to say nothing of the far smaller force supported by
the Clinton Administration’s budgets.

Taking IDA’s Findings With A Grain of Salt

The good news is that a number of leading Members of Congress
— including House National Security Committee Chairman Floyd
Spence (R-SC), Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Rep. Ike Skelton
(D-MO) — have indicated that they would regard the IDA study and
its findings with considerable skepticism. These are among the
reason why they, and their colleagues, should do so:

• Unrealistic Assumptions About Warning: The IDA
  “Baseline Scenario” assumes that, even if two
  major regional conflicts (MRC) were to happen nearly
  simultaneously, the United States will have fourteen
  days of warning before the initiation of hostilities
  by the aggressor in the first MRC. In theory, this would
  afford the United States two weeks to move tactical
  aircraft and ground forces into the theater of battle.

In the real world, of course, it is imprudent to expect
that timely, unambiguous warning will be forthcoming.
Indeed, history is replete with examples in which such
warning, as was available, was accompanied by conflicting
signals. The mixed indicators tend to discourage steps
requiring the expensive, disruptive mobilization and
deployment of U.S. forces. This is doubly true when, as
is usually the case, concerns abound that such steps will
be seen as provocative — if not escalatory.

There are
also instances where, thanks to the readiness of opposing
forces, there may be far less than two weeks of warning
of an imminent attack. For example, if conflict were to
erupt on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has formidable
forces sufficiently close to its border with South Korea
that a lightning strike into the South could occur with
scarcely any notice prior to the outbreak of
hostilities. Two weeks after that first
“warning,” a second war on the Korean peninsula
could have substantially devastated South Korea. The
prompt, effective use of long-range B-2’s — when
tactical airpower either was not available or could not
be brought to bear effectively — might materially affect
the course of such a conflict.

• The Availability of TacAir:
  IDA’s “Baseline Scenario” relies heavily on
  shorter- range tactical aircraft such as the Air Force’s
  F-16s and F-15s to do much of the work that otherwise
  would be performed by a force of more than 20 B-2s. Of
  course, in order to make effective use of such aircraft,
  they would have to operate out of bases in proximity to
  the area of conflict. It seems likely, however, that
  potential aggressors will have learned an important
  lesson from the Gulf War: Deny the United States the
  infrastructure it needs to deploy its forces in theater.
  With the continued proliferation of advanced conventional
  military technologies as well as weapons of mass
  destruction, it is likely that a future aggressor will
  have the potential to deny — or at least severely
  constrain — U.S. use of key airfields, fuel depots, etc.
  required for such operations. A significant force of
  B-2 bombers, however, will assure that the means are
  available to accomplish critical, timely and precise air
  attacks even if the use of airfields in the theater is
  denied for sustained periods of time.
• Other Assumptions: The Heavy Bomber Study also
  anticipates that the United States will be able to deploy
  such tactical forces to the theater on a very aggressive
  schedule and that, once there and engaged, they will be
  able to maintain a very high sortie rate for tactical
  aircraft. The performance rates in both areas appear to
  exceed those experienced in Desert Storm — as favorable
  a scenario for the use of U.S. tactical airpower as can
  be imagined. If, as a practical matter, the United States
  could not commit and/or successfully deploy the large
  numbers of tactical aircraft contemplated by the IDA
  “Baseline Scenario,” or if its optimistic
  utilization rates prove unachievable in more realistic
  combat situations, then the need for additional B-2
  bombers would clearly be greater than suggested by this
  study.

More B-2s Are Required for Power Projection

Incredibly, the Heavy Bomber Study pays little attention to
the unique characteristics of the B-2 that make it such a
valuable asset to the nation’s security. These capabilities have
long prompted knowledgeable national security experts to urge
procurement of more than 20 B-2s. ⁽¹⁾
It is noteworthy that such experts include seven former
Secretaries of Defense — both Republican and Democrat — who
appreciate: that this aircraft represents a major breakthrough in
military technology; that significantly more B-2s are required by
current and foreseeable strategic conditions; and that to stop
production now would foreclose critical options and waste of
years and billions invested in successful research and
development of this aircraft.

The seven Secretaries (Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, Donald
Rumsfeld, Harold Brown, Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci and
Dick Cheney) noted in a letter sent to President Clinton on 4
January 1995: ⁽²⁾

“…[The B-2] remains the most cost-effective means
of rapidly projecting force over great distances. Its range
will enable it to reach any point on earth within hours after
launch while being deployed at only three secure bases around
the world. Its payload and array of munitions will permit it
to destroy numerous time-sensitive targets in a single
sortie. And perhaps most importantly, its low-observable
characteristics will allow it to reach intended targets
without fear of interception.”

Public Support

It is also notable that the American people are supportive of
the need to modernize the U.S. military with systems like the
B-2. A survey of 1,000 American voters conducted in February 1995
by the Luntz Research Company shows that, when informed of the
B-2’s capabilities, 61% of the American people expressed
support for the continued procurement of the B-2 bomber.

A failure by Congress to approve in FY1996 continued
production of the B-2 would eliminate the United States’ only
existing capability to replace its aging inventory of long- range
bombers. Such a step would be clearly both contrary to common
sense, the Nation’s strategic needs and the will of the American
people.

The Bottom Line

The Center for Security Policy urges Chairman Bill Young and
other members of the House National Security Appropriations
Subcommittee to follow the lead of Reps. Spence and Skelton and
Senator Nunn in challenging the conclusions of the Pentagon’s
Heavy Bomber Study. Should this and other relevant congressional
committees do so, the Center is confident that the correct
conclusion — the United States needs a far larger and more
capable manned bomber force, including additional B-2s — will
emerge from today’s hearings and be reflected in this year’s
defense spending bills.

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(1) See, for example the Center for
Security Policy’s Press Release entitled The Case
for Continued Production of the B-2 Bomber: Center Roundtable
Shows Why the U.S. Can’t Afford to Stop Now ( href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=94-P_64″>No. 94-P 64, 24 June 1994).

(2) For a more detailed analysis of this
letter, please see the Center’s Decision Brief entitled When
Seven SecDefs Speak, Will Congress Listen? New Voices Join
Center’s Call for More B-2 Bombers (No.
95-D 1, 6 January 1995).