GETTING SADDAM: THE MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE IN THE ‘STATE OF THE UNION’ ADDRESS?

(Washington, D.C.): In the transparent
White House effort to manipulate and
inflate public expectations about
President Bush’s State of the Union
address Tuesday night, there has been
scarcely any mention made of a foreign
policy agenda. Presumably, this is merely
a matter of political handling and spin
control. It appears to be an entirely
predictable response by an Administration
consumed with its standing in the polls
— polls that show, at the moment, a
public angry with what it perceives as
the President’s preoccupation with
foreign affairs and his neglect of
domestic issues.

In fact, of course, this speech will
have to deal at some length with the
State of the World, and Mr.
Bush’s view of the U.S. role in it. At a
minimum, this is so because he must
explain how it is that he can safely
undertake the radical reductions his
Administration now proposes (according to
officially sanctioned, so-called
“structured leaks” to the
press) to make in defense spending,
nuclear forces and military-industrial
production. Such an explanation will
require more than a footnote about
dramatic events in the former Soviet
Union — events which offer considerable
hope of a dramatically reduced threat
from that quarter but which, ironically,
he did everything imaginable to impede
through his open-ended support for
Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Saddam Question

Both the national interest and Mr.
Bush’s personal political fortunes will
oblige him to speak as well to the great
unfinished foreign policy business of the
last year — the incomplete victory over
Saddam Hussein. The Nation needs to know
just what are the security implications
of the President’s decision to stop the
war short of removing the Butcher of
Baghdad and his ruling clique from power.
And the campaign to date has made clear
that what was supposed to be the
President’s ticket to a virtual free ride
to a second term has disappeared in the
face of Saddam’s continued, malevolent
rule in Iraq.

There is considerable evidence that
the Bush Administration is currently
seized with the problem posed by Saddam
Hussein — the man it frequently, and
correctly, characterized as a
Hitleresque figure — remaining in
tyrannical control in Baghdad. For
example, there have been renewed calls
from presidential press spokesman Marlin
Fitzwater for a popular uprising against
Saddam. In the absence of any evidence of
a greater American willingness to render
critical logistical and military support
to so risky a business in a police state
like Saddam Hussein’s, however, these
statements merely serve as an appalling
reminder of Mr. Bush’s earlier
encouragement to, and then abandonment
of, the Kurds and Shiites at war’s end.

Accordingly, there have also been a
number of apparently “structured
leaks” from the Bush Administration
suggesting that the United States is
undertaking to organize, facilitate or
otherwise support a coup against the
ruling Iraqi regime. New York Times
Columnist William Safire recently hinted
that the White House is working on an
“April surprise,” aimed at
removing Saddam from power far enough in
advance of the November election to
obtain positive political benefits
without laying the President open to
charges of doing it for purely
political reasons.

Administration sources also revealed
to the Times on 19 January 1992
that they were responding favorably to
pressure from Saudi Arabia for “a
large covert action campaign in Iraq
aimed at dividing [its] army and toppling
Saddam Hussein.” The paper reported
that the Deputies Committee, the senior
subcabinet interagency decision-making
body, has been working actively
“since mid-December to consider and
refine military and covert action options
for Iraq.” National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft is said to have
“argued that the use of American air
power to support rebel Iraqi military
units could have the decisive effect of
breaking the back of Mr. Hussein’s core
security force in Baghdad.”

It’s About Time

If such reports are true, they would
be most welcome. Indeed, the Center for
Security Policy has, from the moment of
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, insisted
that the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power was absolutely essential. The
following are illustrative examples of
the Center’s reasoning:

• 2 August 1990:
  “The Center believes that
  the West has now been put on
  notice: Returning to the
  status quo ante is not enough;
  the vital Persian Gulf region and
  indeed the larger international
  peace will not be safe as long as
  Saddam Hussein remains in power.
  Accordingly, U.S. policy — and
  that of all civilized nations —
  should be aimed at securing the
  downfall of the present Iraqi
  regime using the full array of
  diplomatic, economic and, if
  necessary, military measures at
  the West’s disposal.” (Signal
  Allied Willingness to Release Oil
  Stocks Now!: Buy Time to Forge
  Punitive Response Against Iraq,
  No.
  90-P 72)
• 1 December 1990:
  “The Center for Security
  Policy believes that a negotiated
  settlement that left Saddam
  Hussein in power, in absolute
  control of his country and with
  an immense arsenal — including
  weapons of mass destruction — at
  his disposal would be a disaster
  for U.S. vital interests in the
  region and for friends
  and allies there.

“While the possibility
cannot be precluded that such a
settlement might even result in a
temporary Iraqi retreat from
Kuwait, not even a restoration of
the status quo ante will ‘solve’
the present problem. Instead, it
will simply postpone the day when
American forces will have to be
committed to resist Saddam
Hussein’s aggression — and, as a
result, increase the costs of
doing so.” (‘Fatal
Attraction’: U.S. Interests in
Gulf, Beyond Jeopardized by Bush
Personal Diplomacy Obsession,
No.
90-P 113)

• 27 February 1991:
  “The reality is that brute
  force has kept Saddam Hussein and
  his ruling clique in power for
  over almost two decades. Even if
  humiliated, even if clearly
  disgraced, what will likely
  determine Saddam’s future ability
  to threaten Western allies and
  interests in the region will be
  his ability to continue to
  exercise brute force.

“The Center believes that —
as positive as the wholesale
destruction of Iraq’s offensive
military potential is — if
Saddam’s police state apparatus
is not similarly destroyed, the
Iraqi people will be denied an
opportunity for self-governance
too long denied them.
For Iraq, this would be a
tragically lost opportunity; for
the other nations of the region,
it would probably represent a
precursor to a future
conflict.” (On To
Baghdad!: Liberate Iraq, href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=91-P16″>No.
91-P 16)

• 25 March 1991:
  “The Center believes that
  perpetuating the present
  situation runs a far
  greater danger for long-term U.S.
  interests, however: If
  the United States continues by
  its actions to appear largely
  indifferent to Saddam Hussein’s
  persistent reign of terror — yet
  partly responsible for stymieing
  Iraq’s physical rehabilitation,
  the political and strategic
  benefits that should accrue from
  the American role in liberating
  Kuwait could be seriously
  jeopardized.

“Accordingly, the Center
urges the Bush Administration to
issue an ultimatum to Saddam
Hussein and his ruling clique: Surrender
power within forty-eight hours or
face the prospect of being
removed by coalition forces.
Either way, an interim
government, ideally representing
all Iraqi factions, must be
swiftly installed. Its principal
tasks should be to organize and
conduct within six months under
UN auspices free and fair
elections to determine a
successor regime and to begin the
process of rehabilitating that
devastated nation. (On To
Baghdad!: Liberate Iraq (Take
Two), href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=91-P23″>No.
91-P 23)

• 12 June 1991:
  “It is past time that the
  West recognized the facts of
  life: Only by removing Saddam
  Hussein and his ruling clique
  from power can there be any hope
  for lasting peace either within
  Iraq itself or between Iraq and
  its neighbors….Wishful
  thinking must give way to concrete
  steps to accomplish this;
  indirect measures like sanctions
  must be augmented by direct
  action.

“…Under present
circumstances, the imperative of
halting the depredations of a
murderous outlaw like Saddam
Hussein argues for taking a page
from the history of American
frontier justice: A
bounty should be placed on Saddam
Hussein — a sizeable
cash reward for anyone who can
end the reign of terror he and
his ruling clique are evidently
determined to perpetuate
indefinitely. In addition, all
appropriate resources of the
United States government should
be devoted to removing him from
power.” (Wanted: Saddam
Hussein, Dead or Alive, href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=91-P49″>No.
91-P 49)

Time Is Not on Bush’s Side

Whatever the state of the Bush
Administration’s internal deliberations,
its public stance remains
defensive about the decision not to
prosecute the war to the point where
Saddam was toppled. Its spokesmen
continue to describe narrowly the purpose
of the conflict — and the U.N. mandate
and congressional resolutions authorizing
it.

Events on the ground, however, are
bearing out the Center’s warnings. They
are making increasingly untenable the
posture President Bush has maintained
since the cease-fire was announced — one
of wishing Saddam would go away but
declining to enunciate a policy designed
to bring that about, let alone
implementing such a policy. Consider just
a few of these developments:

• The war with Iraq did
  not, as President Bush once said,
  “put Saddam out of the
  nuclear-bomb-building business
  for a long time to come.”
  To the contrary, numerous IAEA
  inspections have revealed a far
  more comprehensive, ambitious and
  far-advanced program than the
  United States believed was in
  place in Iraq at the time of
  hostilities. As a result, some
  facilities sheltering scientists
  and equipment involved in
  developing Iraq’s nuclear,
  chemical and biological weapons
  capabilities and ballistic
  missile-related activities were
  unscathed by coalition attacks.
  To the extent that the U.N. has
  not yet uncovered all aspects of
  this hydra-headed undertaking,
  there may even be some that are still
  in business.
• International sanctions
  are not preventing Saddam from
  pursuing his weapons of mass
  destruction programs.
  The London Sunday Times
  of 5 January 1992 reported that
  Western intelligence now believes
  that the Iraqis and the Algerians
  may have formed a nuclear axis to
  build a nuclear weapon — the
  “Islamic bomb.” Algeria
  is thought to have enough
  plutonium to build a weapon by
  1995; its Chinese-supplied
  reactor is scheduled to begin
  production next year.

According to Whitehall sources
quoted by the Times,
Hussein has sent a team of
scientists to Algeria that could
enable the two countries to
“produce two Nagasaki size
bombs a year every three
years.” In addition, Iraqi
communications describing how ten
tons of natural uranium were sent
by truck through Jordan and then
by ship to Algeria were
reportedly intercepted by Western
intelligence.

• If sanctions are relaxed
  or removed, Saddam will shortly
  reacquire weapons of mass
  destruction capabilities.
  Director of Central Intelligence
  Robert Gates recently testified
  that, because Iraq had hidden
  critical equipment for making biological
  weapons, it could begin new
  production “in a matter of
  weeks” once sanctions were
  lifted. Iraq could produce
  “modest quantities of chemical
  agents” almost
  immediately and “could
  recover its pre-war capability in
  a year or more.”

Gates summarized by saying:
“In our opinion Iraq will
remain a primary proliferation
threat at least as long as Saddam
Hussein remains in power.”
He added that “the cadre of
scientists and engineers trained
for these programs will be able
to reconstitute any dormant
program rapidly….”

• The prospects are not
  good for retaining international
  sanctions much longer.
  Thanks to Saddam’s continuing
  absolute and tyrannical control,
  the devastating effect of the
  present international sanctions
  has fallen disproportionately on
  innocent Iraqi citizens.
  Documentary evidence is mounting
  daily that he has diverted such
  resources and commodities as are
  available for the purpose of
  cushioning the impact on his base
  of support — the army, the
  ruling Takriti clique and the
  Ba’ath party. Even so, elements
  within these groups are said to
  be experiencing some hardship and
  may be becoming restive. But the
  effect they feel is nothing like
  that being felt by the Kurdish
  and Shiite populations (most
  especially their women, children
  and elderly) and other vulnerable
  groups. It seems unlikely that
  Western nations will be able to
  stomach for much longer a
  sanctions regime with these
  results.

Conclusion and
Recommendation

Under these and foreseeable
circumstances, it is incumbent upon
President Bush to enunciate a clear and
resolute policy toward ending Saddam
Hussein’s reign of terror. It is
commendable if, as has been reported,
notwithstanding the Administration’s
public stance, he is pressing forward
with a covert operation to accomplish
this goal.

Were Mr. Bush to persist in denying
publicly that bringing about Saddam’s
downfall has become his express
purpose, however, he would abdicate
the leadership role that is required if
such a policy is to enjoy the support of
the American people and their elected
representatives. What is more, further
duplicity — if that is what it is — on
this point will not provide
“plausible deniability” in the
event a U.S.-backed initiative against
Saddam Hussein fails. To the contrary, in
such an event, it is likely that the
costs of failure for Mr. Bush and his
Administration would simply be that
much higher should it be established
that he was telling the public one thing
while doing the opposite.

For these reasons, the Center for
Security Policy strongly encourages
President Bush to use the “bully
pulpit” of his State of the Union
address to explain his true
intentions with respect to Saddam Hussein
and to build the base of popular support
that can, and must, be energized on
behalf of doing the right thing.