GETTING SADDAM: THE MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE IN THE ‘STATE OF THE UNION’ ADDRESS?
(Washington, D.C.): In the transparent
White House effort to manipulate and
inflate public expectations about
President Bush’s State of the Union
address Tuesday night, there has been
scarcely any mention made of a foreign
policy agenda. Presumably, this is merely
a matter of political handling and spin
control. It appears to be an entirely
predictable response by an Administration
consumed with its standing in the polls
— polls that show, at the moment, a
public angry with what it perceives as
the President’s preoccupation with
foreign affairs and his neglect of
domestic issues.
In fact, of course, this speech will
have to deal at some length with the
State of the World, and Mr.
Bush’s view of the U.S. role in it. At a
minimum, this is so because he must
explain how it is that he can safely
undertake the radical reductions his
Administration now proposes (according to
officially sanctioned, so-called
“structured leaks” to the
press) to make in defense spending,
nuclear forces and military-industrial
production. Such an explanation will
require more than a footnote about
dramatic events in the former Soviet
Union — events which offer considerable
hope of a dramatically reduced threat
from that quarter but which, ironically,
he did everything imaginable to impede
through his open-ended support for
Mikhail Gorbachev.
The Saddam Question
Both the national interest and Mr.
Bush’s personal political fortunes will
oblige him to speak as well to the great
unfinished foreign policy business of the
last year — the incomplete victory over
Saddam Hussein. The Nation needs to know
just what are the security implications
of the President’s decision to stop the
war short of removing the Butcher of
Baghdad and his ruling clique from power.
And the campaign to date has made clear
that what was supposed to be the
President’s ticket to a virtual free ride
to a second term has disappeared in the
face of Saddam’s continued, malevolent
rule in Iraq.
There is considerable evidence that
the Bush Administration is currently
seized with the problem posed by Saddam
Hussein — the man it frequently, and
correctly, characterized as a
Hitleresque figure — remaining in
tyrannical control in Baghdad. For
example, there have been renewed calls
from presidential press spokesman Marlin
Fitzwater for a popular uprising against
Saddam. In the absence of any evidence of
a greater American willingness to render
critical logistical and military support
to so risky a business in a police state
like Saddam Hussein’s, however, these
statements merely serve as an appalling
reminder of Mr. Bush’s earlier
encouragement to, and then abandonment
of, the Kurds and Shiites at war’s end.
Accordingly, there have also been a
number of apparently “structured
leaks” from the Bush Administration
suggesting that the United States is
undertaking to organize, facilitate or
otherwise support a coup against the
ruling Iraqi regime. New York Times
Columnist William Safire recently hinted
that the White House is working on an
“April surprise,” aimed at
removing Saddam from power far enough in
advance of the November election to
obtain positive political benefits
without laying the President open to
charges of doing it for purely
political reasons.
Administration sources also revealed
to the Times on 19 January 1992
that they were responding favorably to
pressure from Saudi Arabia for “a
large covert action campaign in Iraq
aimed at dividing [its] army and toppling
Saddam Hussein.” The paper reported
that the Deputies Committee, the senior
subcabinet interagency decision-making
body, has been working actively
“since mid-December to consider and
refine military and covert action options
for Iraq.” National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft is said to have
“argued that the use of American air
power to support rebel Iraqi military
units could have the decisive effect of
breaking the back of Mr. Hussein’s core
security force in Baghdad.”
It’s About Time
If such reports are true, they would
be most welcome. Indeed, the Center for
Security Policy has, from the moment of
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, insisted
that the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power was absolutely essential. The
following are illustrative examples of
the Center’s reasoning:
- 2 August 1990:
“The Center believes that
the West has now been put on
notice: Returning to the
status quo ante is not enough;
the vital Persian Gulf region and
indeed the larger international
peace will not be safe as long as
Saddam Hussein remains in power.
Accordingly, U.S. policy — and
that of all civilized nations —
should be aimed at securing the
downfall of the present Iraqi
regime using the full array of
diplomatic, economic and, if
necessary, military measures at
the West’s disposal.” (Signal
Allied Willingness to Release Oil
Stocks Now!: Buy Time to Forge
Punitive Response Against Iraq,
No.
90-P 72) - 1 December 1990:
“The Center for Security
Policy believes that a negotiated
settlement that left Saddam
Hussein in power, in absolute
control of his country and with
an immense arsenal — including
weapons of mass destruction — at
his disposal would be a disaster
for U.S. vital interests in the
region and for friends
and allies there. - 27 February 1991:
“The reality is that brute
force has kept Saddam Hussein and
his ruling clique in power for
over almost two decades. Even if
humiliated, even if clearly
disgraced, what will likely
determine Saddam’s future ability
to threaten Western allies and
interests in the region will be
his ability to continue to
exercise brute force. - 25 March 1991:
“The Center believes that
perpetuating the present
situation runs a far
greater danger for long-term U.S.
interests, however: If
the United States continues by
its actions to appear largely
indifferent to Saddam Hussein’s
persistent reign of terror — yet
partly responsible for stymieing
Iraq’s physical rehabilitation,
the political and strategic
benefits that should accrue from
the American role in liberating
Kuwait could be seriously
jeopardized. - 12 June 1991:
“It is past time that the
West recognized the facts of
life: Only by removing Saddam
Hussein and his ruling clique
from power can there be any hope
for lasting peace either within
Iraq itself or between Iraq and
its neighbors….Wishful
thinking must give way to concrete
steps to accomplish this;
indirect measures like sanctions
must be augmented by direct
action.
“While the possibility
cannot be precluded that such a
settlement might even result in a
temporary Iraqi retreat from
Kuwait, not even a restoration of
the status quo ante will ‘solve’
the present problem. Instead, it
will simply postpone the day when
American forces will have to be
committed to resist Saddam
Hussein’s aggression — and, as a
result, increase the costs of
doing so.” (‘Fatal
Attraction’: U.S. Interests in
Gulf, Beyond Jeopardized by Bush
Personal Diplomacy Obsession,
No.
90-P 113)
“The Center believes that —
as positive as the wholesale
destruction of Iraq’s offensive
military potential is — if
Saddam’s police state apparatus
is not similarly destroyed, the
Iraqi people will be denied an
opportunity for self-governance
too long denied them.
For Iraq, this would be a
tragically lost opportunity; for
the other nations of the region,
it would probably represent a
precursor to a future
conflict.” (On To
Baghdad!: Liberate Iraq,
91-P 16)
“Accordingly, the Center
urges the Bush Administration to
issue an ultimatum to Saddam
Hussein and his ruling clique: Surrender
power within forty-eight hours or
face the prospect of being
removed by coalition forces.
Either way, an interim
government, ideally representing
all Iraqi factions, must be
swiftly installed. Its principal
tasks should be to organize and
conduct within six months under
UN auspices free and fair
elections to determine a
successor regime and to begin the
process of rehabilitating that
devastated nation. (On To
Baghdad!: Liberate Iraq (Take
Two),
91-P 23)
“…Under present
circumstances, the imperative of
halting the depredations of a
murderous outlaw like Saddam
Hussein argues for taking a page
from the history of American
frontier justice: A
bounty should be placed on Saddam
Hussein — a sizeable
cash reward for anyone who can
end the reign of terror he and
his ruling clique are evidently
determined to perpetuate
indefinitely. In addition, all
appropriate resources of the
United States government should
be devoted to removing him from
power.” (Wanted: Saddam
Hussein, Dead or Alive,
91-P 49)
Time Is Not on Bush’s Side
Whatever the state of the Bush
Administration’s internal deliberations,
its public stance remains
defensive about the decision not to
prosecute the war to the point where
Saddam was toppled. Its spokesmen
continue to describe narrowly the purpose
of the conflict — and the U.N. mandate
and congressional resolutions authorizing
it.
Events on the ground, however, are
bearing out the Center’s warnings. They
are making increasingly untenable the
posture President Bush has maintained
since the cease-fire was announced — one
of wishing Saddam would go away but
declining to enunciate a policy designed
to bring that about, let alone
implementing such a policy. Consider just
a few of these developments:
- The war with Iraq did
not, as President Bush once said,
“put Saddam out of the
nuclear-bomb-building business
for a long time to come.”
To the contrary, numerous IAEA
inspections have revealed a far
more comprehensive, ambitious and
far-advanced program than the
United States believed was in
place in Iraq at the time of
hostilities. As a result, some
facilities sheltering scientists
and equipment involved in
developing Iraq’s nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons
capabilities and ballistic
missile-related activities were
unscathed by coalition attacks.
To the extent that the U.N. has
not yet uncovered all aspects of
this hydra-headed undertaking,
there may even be some that are still
in business. - International sanctions
are not preventing Saddam from
pursuing his weapons of mass
destruction programs.
The London Sunday Times
of 5 January 1992 reported that
Western intelligence now believes
that the Iraqis and the Algerians
may have formed a nuclear axis to
build a nuclear weapon — the
“Islamic bomb.” Algeria
is thought to have enough
plutonium to build a weapon by
1995; its Chinese-supplied
reactor is scheduled to begin
production next year. - If sanctions are relaxed
or removed, Saddam will shortly
reacquire weapons of mass
destruction capabilities.
Director of Central Intelligence
Robert Gates recently testified
that, because Iraq had hidden
critical equipment for making biological
weapons, it could begin new
production “in a matter of
weeks” once sanctions were
lifted. Iraq could produce
“modest quantities of chemical
agents” almost
immediately and “could
recover its pre-war capability in
a year or more.” - The prospects are not
good for retaining international
sanctions much longer.
Thanks to Saddam’s continuing
absolute and tyrannical control,
the devastating effect of the
present international sanctions
has fallen disproportionately on
innocent Iraqi citizens.
Documentary evidence is mounting
daily that he has diverted such
resources and commodities as are
available for the purpose of
cushioning the impact on his base
of support — the army, the
ruling Takriti clique and the
Ba’ath party. Even so, elements
within these groups are said to
be experiencing some hardship and
may be becoming restive. But the
effect they feel is nothing like
that being felt by the Kurdish
and Shiite populations (most
especially their women, children
and elderly) and other vulnerable
groups. It seems unlikely that
Western nations will be able to
stomach for much longer a
sanctions regime with these
results.
According to Whitehall sources
quoted by the Times,
Hussein has sent a team of
scientists to Algeria that could
enable the two countries to
“produce two Nagasaki size
bombs a year every three
years.” In addition, Iraqi
communications describing how ten
tons of natural uranium were sent
by truck through Jordan and then
by ship to Algeria were
reportedly intercepted by Western
intelligence.
Gates summarized by saying:
“In our opinion Iraq will
remain a primary proliferation
threat at least as long as Saddam
Hussein remains in power.”
He added that “the cadre of
scientists and engineers trained
for these programs will be able
to reconstitute any dormant
program rapidly….”
Conclusion and
Recommendation
Under these and foreseeable
circumstances, it is incumbent upon
President Bush to enunciate a clear and
resolute policy toward ending Saddam
Hussein’s reign of terror. It is
commendable if, as has been reported,
notwithstanding the Administration’s
public stance, he is pressing forward
with a covert operation to accomplish
this goal.
Were Mr. Bush to persist in denying
publicly that bringing about Saddam’s
downfall has become his express
purpose, however, he would abdicate
the leadership role that is required if
such a policy is to enjoy the support of
the American people and their elected
representatives. What is more, further
duplicity — if that is what it is — on
this point will not provide
“plausible deniability” in the
event a U.S.-backed initiative against
Saddam Hussein fails. To the contrary, in
such an event, it is likely that the
costs of failure for Mr. Bush and his
Administration would simply be that
much higher should it be established
that he was telling the public one thing
while doing the opposite.
For these reasons, the Center for
Security Policy strongly encourages
President Bush to use the “bully
pulpit” of his State of the Union
address to explain his true
intentions with respect to Saddam Hussein
and to build the base of popular support
that can, and must, be energized on
behalf of doing the right thing.
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