Hard Questions For A Controlled Press About The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

The Center for Security Policy is concerned that the Soviet government’s decision to deny Western press and diplomats access to the republic of Azerbaijan is greatly complicating the task of accurately monitoring the conflict. While under present circumstances, such access would entail some personal risk, the absence of an opportunity for reaching informed, independent judgments could compound the implications of this conflict for U.S. and allied policy.

The Center believes the following are among the tough questions that demand honest answers:

• What does the protagonists’ apparently ready access to a variety of sophisticated military hardware (e.g., helicopters, armored personnel carriers, mortars, rocket launchers and automated weapons) signal about the discipline of Soviet forces in the region from whom such weapons are presumably being obtained? Does this suggest that still more dangerous weapons, for example Soviet nuclear weapons stored in Transcaucasus depots, may also be insecure?

 

• What does the decision to mobilize reserves in some of the littoral republics — an action now reversed in light of the predictable outcry it provoked — suggest about the unhappiness of the Soviet military with the Gorbachev regime? A further sign of trouble on this front may be found in Defense Minister Dmitri Yatzov’s claim that this step was necessitated by Gorbachev’s cutbacks in the size of the Soviet military.

 

• Is the Soviet Union, in the course of intervening to prevent ethnic violence, cracking down on nationalist groups like the Popular Front and Azerbaijan Social Democratic Group? Reports of arrests of leaders of such organizations, despite the fact that they have been advocates of peaceful change, smack of political repression.

 

• Is the root of the problem in this troubled region, the continued pursuit by Moscow of a seventy-year old policy toward nationalities, that of divide and rule? Has the unwillingness of Gorbachev to accommodate genuine structural change both locally and nationally simply provided an essential spark that has brought on the explosion made inevitable by the Soviet strategy of encouraging ethnic enmities as a means of shoring up — and justifying — its control?

The Center for Security Policy believes that questions like these require urgent and informed answers. In their absence, the following, possibly inaccurate and certainly undesirable conclusions might be drawn from these events:

First, the Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Moldavians, Georgians, Ukrainians and others seeking independence from Moscow might interpret the action against the Azerbaijani political opposition as proof that the central authorities will not hesitate to use force to maintain control. Unfortunately, Washington’s hasty and virtually unconditional endorsement of the Soviet military intervention in the Caucasus will surely not be lost on these other audiences.

Of special concern is the possibility that the West will be seen to be indifferent to the conduct of Soviet forces where they are deployed in the name of restoring order; this would contrast starkly with the readiness of the United States and other Western nations to criticize friendly states for military actions that are judged to impinge on political freedoms and human rights in places like El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Israel and Turkey.

Second, domestic and foreign observers may conclude wrongly that the alternative to preserving the Soviet Union in its present form is chaos, anarchy and bloodshed. The ethnic mayhem in Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku and elsewhere in the region may be especially useful in supporting Gorbachev’s unjustified contention that the various nationalities of the USSR cannot be afforded independence without calamitous results.

Third, the incipient failure of perestroika may be laid on the shoulders of those who seek more radical change. Gorbachev has taken to blaming "extremists," "criminals," and "blackmarketeers" for the ethnic crisis. By promoting the notion that the "civil war" is jeopardizing his reform program, Gorbachev may try to shore up his position resisting needed, wholesale and genuine reform; he may even seek to use it to justify backing away from even the modest liberalization envisioned under perestroika.

Finally, and especially worrisome, is the possibility that entirely inappropriate lessons might be drawn about the certitude the West can have concerning Gorbachev’s hold on power and his control over the Soviet military. The sort of precipitous arms control concessions, hastily made, deep cuts in Western defense budgets and radical relaxation of controls on the sale of militarily relevant Western technology now in the offing seem utterly inappropriate under present circumstances.

The Center calls upon the Soviets and the press and governments of the West to create the most favorable conditions possible for securing reliable assessments can be of the news out of Azerbaijan. It also urges that — given the significant stakes involved — early, informed and independent assessments of these issues become a priority for both the media and responsible officials.