High-Level Roundtable Discussion Reveals U.S. Nuclear Deterrent’s Credibility, Reliability Imperilled

(Washington, D.C.): The Center for
Security Policy today released href=”index.jsp?section=papers&code=97-P_117at”>a ten-page summary
of its High-Level Roundtable Discussion
on “The Future of U.S. Nuclear
Deterrence.” This half-day event,
which took place on 15 July 1997 at the
ANA Hotel in Washington, involved over 70
former and present government officials,
businessmen, diplomats and public policy
analysts including such preeminent
policy-practitioners as: Senator
Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a member of the
Senate Intelligence, Judiciary and Energy
and Natural Resources Committees; Hon.
Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary
of Defense under the Reagan
Administration; Dr. Robert B.
Barker, former Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy;
and Hon. James R. Schlesinger,
former Director of the Atomic Energy
Commission, Director of Central
Intelligence, and Secretary of the
Departments of Defense and Energy.

The High-Level Roundtable occurred
against the backdrop of a recent National
Academy of Science’s report which
recommended the
“delegitimizing” and ultimate
“abolition” of all nuclear
weapons. This report is notable due to
the fact that it was co-authored by Rose
Gottemoeller who reportedly is
President Clinton’s choice to serve as
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy — the top
Pentagon position responsible for nuclear
weapons policy.

Highlights of the discussion detailed
in the summary released today include the
following:

• The need for nuclear
  deterrence has not disappeared
  with the collapse of the Soviet
  Union. Russia continues
  to build and deploy new nuclear
  weapons while constructing deeply
  buried command posts compatible
  with a nuclear war-fighting
  strategy. China has embarked on a
  concerted nuclear build-up
  involving at least two ballistic
  missile systems capable of
  striking the United States. And
  several dangerous rogue nations,
  including North Korea, Iran and
  Iraq are aggressively pursuing
  both weapons of mass destruction
  and ballistic and cruise missile
  technology suitable for
  delivering them.
• To be effective, a
  deterrent must be credible.
  Unfortunately, a number of
  factors are combining to call
  into question the credibility of
  the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
  These include incoherent
  declaratory policies concerning
  the use of American nuclear
  weapons and ill-advised arms
  control initiatives (notably, the
  Comprehensive Test Ban).
• The U.S. capability to
  produce and maintain nuclear
  weapons is in a dangerous state
  of decline. American
  weapons are aging rapidly, and
  bans on underground testing will
  make it difficult — if not
  impossible — to assure the
  future safety, reliability and
  robustness of the U.S. deterrent.
  In particular, real questions
  exist concerning the
  executability and efficacy of the
  Administration’s expensive
  Stockpile Stewardship and
  Management Program (SSMP). Even
  more problematic will be the
  Department of Energy
  laboratories’ duty to certify the
  safety and reliability of
  existing weapons until such time
  as the SSMP’s diagnostic
  facilities come on-line.