The Financial Times recently reported that when US President Joseph Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meet in April they will announce a plan to restructure the relationship between US and Japanese forces in Japan.

The objective is to make for more effective operational planning and exercises – with an eye to better handle the threat from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Such articles produce a flurry of excitement, if not hope, as the basic idea is a good one and decades overdue.

Despite a six-decade-old defense relationship, US and Japanese forces (except for the two navies and also in the area of missile defense) still can’t work together very well and would be hard-pressed to fight a joint war, including in the event Taiwan is attacked by China.

Together, US and Japanese forces are less than the sum of their parts.

So, talk of a restructuring conjures up images of finally having a joint headquarters in Japan where American and Japanese officers get on with the business of defending Japan. Such an HQ could coordinate training, exercises and patrols as well as plan and do what’s necessary for peacetime and wartime operations.

You mean there isn’t such a headquarters? No, there isn’t. And this really is a prerequisite for any sort of serious Japan-US defense strategy. Otherwise, everything is done on a haphazard ad hoc basis.

Is this about to be solved? Read the Financial Times article a few times and the excitement wears off.

It seems the idea is to rejigger US Forces Japan by installing a four-star general in command (currently it’s a three-star) and letting it plan some exercises and share more information with the new Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) joint operational headquarters set to come on-line next year.

But, for the foreseeable future, the ultimate “command” of all US forces in Japan will remain in Hawaii at US Indo-Pacific Command headquarters.

The article does suggest that some thought will be given to a more effective operational tie-up with the JSDF sometime in the future.

But, for now, nothing reported in the Financial Times piece will do much, if anythingto improve the ability of US and Japanese forces to operate together – and, if push comes to shove, to fight together.

First, assigning a four-star general to USFJ isn’t exactly salvation on the wings. Four-star generals ran the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for over 20 years. How did they do? Winning wars does not appear to be a requirement for generals who get promoted to the top rank.

There are exceptions to everything, of course. If they were to recall retired Admiral Robert Willard and his team which from 2009 to 2012 ran the US Pacific Command (as it was called before the 2018 name change) and send them to Japan with proper marching orders and authority, I’d change my mind.

Second, without any operational control over anything, USFJ looks likely to continue its principal role as the “designated apologists” (said only half tongue-in-cheek) when Japan complains about something the American military has done.

A four-star commander’s apologies might have more clout but USFJ will still seem irrelevant when it comes to Japanese and US forces doing actual operations and fighting.

Japanese forces now coordinate with USINDOPACOM in Hawaii, an arrangement that is inefficient to say the least. It would be better to set up a headquarters (or something serving that function) in Japan to handle the bilateral relationship and emplace a commander with real operational authority, as in able to conduct a war.

This requires a mindset and a structure entirely different from what currently exists. And, of course, the Japanese would also have to be fully invested, devoting the necessary attention and resources.

It is not apparent this is in the works on either side. Several have pointed out these shortcomings over the years, and there have been some good ideas. But there has never been interest at levels – either civilian or military – where it matters.

Indeed, US alliance managers told us for decades: “The relationship has never been stronger,” adding that every exercise held with the Japanese was a “great success” that “strengthened interoperability.”

And the commanders in Hawaii since, say, early 2012 onwards could not be bothered to push for bringing Japan and the US closer together in a meaningful, spelled operational, way. Not that the Japanese ever really pushed for it either.

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