How to Get the Most Out of Your Targeted Killings

“America, do you think that victory comes by killing a commander or more? We will not be deterred by your campaigns and you will not be victorious.” — Abu Mohammad al-Adnani in That They Live by Proof

For the U.S government, a drone strike eliminating a key Islamic State military leader constitutes a success. This accomplished feeling stems from the US assertion that IS is a massive terrorist organization. However, the Islamic State is significantly more than a jihadi network obsessed with the destruction of the West.

Islamic State has an executive structure under the caliph, Abu al-Baghdadi. He has a Shura Council that advises the caliphate’s direction. Separate from the Council, Baghdadi has a Delegated Committee that oversees administration (the Wilayat), legislation (the Offices and Committees), and enforcement (the Dawaween). There is overlap among the different branches.

The Wilayat governs the provinces of Iraq and Syria. There are two governors – one for the Syrian territories and one for the Iraqi territories – each with several sub-governors (wali). IS’s derives ascendancy structure from the Wilayat; Iraq’s governor is second-in-command and Syria’s governor is third-in-command.

The U.S eliminated IS’ governor for Iraq, Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, in a drone strike near Mosul on August 18, 2015. Turkmani served as an Iraqi Army Colonel under Saddam Hussein. He also operated as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Ishtikhbarht – Iraq’s Directorate of General Military Intelligence.

After imprisonment in US Camp Bucca, al-Turkmani pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, then known as Islamic State of Iraq. He oversaw IS-designated governors in Iraq and reported directly to al-Baghdadi. Turkmani’s extensive military resume qualified him to lead IS’s military council which is responsible for any major IS military operation.

Abu Muslim al-Turkmani’s elimination marked a success in the US’s counterterrorism journal. However, within months, Abu Fatima al-Jaheishi succeeded Turkmani. IS operations in Syria went through with little obstruction.

On April 29, 2016, U.S Special Forces eliminated Abu Ali al-Anbari after an altercation near the Syrian-Iraqi border. Anbari was a teacher and preacher for many years before joining the jihadi cause. In 1998, he travelled to Afghanistan to train with Al-Qaeda. Five years later, Anbari founded Saraya Al-Jihad – an Al-Qaeda offshoot 63 km west of Mosul.

In 2004, Anbari pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda’s leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Until the formation of the Islamic State, he coordinated daily military operations in Syria. He served as IS’s governor for the Syrian territories. Before his timely death, Abu Ali al-Anbari contended for ascension to the caliph. Within months, Abdul Qadr al-Najdi succeeded Anbari as Wali of Syria. IS operations continued, relatively unimpeded.

The US theory of leadership decapitation portrays IS as a bigger version of al-Qaeda. Yet, the self-proclaimed caliphate is a state governed by Shariah law with a jihadi branch. In reality, the jihadi military comprises, at most, a third of IS’s entirety.

In regards to targeted killings, the US ought to pursue other leaders such as Abu Mohammad al-Adnani. Until the US eliminated him in a drone strike on August 29 2016, Adnani was IS’s official spokesman. He served as a senior leader in the caliphate’s organization, was a member of Baghdadi’s Shura Council, and acted as chief of IS’s foreign intelligence apparatus. His speeches encouraged IS sponsored terror across the globe.

Abu Mohammad Furqan, IS’s chief of media, died in an Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF) operation on September 7, 2016. He promulgated and authorized jihadi propaganda across the Islamic State. Furqan served on board for Amaq News Agency – IS’s premier news source – and the Naba. In addition, he was director of Al-Furqah Media.

The US should look to the ISOF’s operation against Furqan as an example of target acquisition for operations against the Islamic State. Furqan answered to the Diwan of Media – a civilian branch of government separated from the Wilayat.

Traditionally, the US tends to see terrorist organizations as small, self-contained extremist groups. In an assessment of U.S Defense Strategy, the Council on Foreign relation notes that U.S operations against terrorists should directly strike the most dangerous groups and individuals “when necessary”.

In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism uses ambiguous wording. Phrases such as “prosecution of known/suspected terrorists”, “decisive military power and specialized intelligence”, and “elimination of terrorist funding” comprise the US’s three pillars in combatting terrorism. It hopes to eliminate terrorism’s lifeblood: territory access, funding, equipment, training, technology, and unimpeded transit.

The US believes that portraying terrorism as illegitimate, diminishing underlying economic conditions, and promoting hope for freedom will be enough to combat the radical Islamic extremism. Yet this ambiguous strategy will not be enough to address a nation-state operating directly from Shariah law.

IS is the manifestation of the caliphate sought after by the Muslim Brotherhood and many jihadi groups like al-Qaeda. As a state, IS has a functional foreign intelligence apparatus. The US should implement counterintelligence strategies (i.e denial and deception) and information operations.

Take for instance, the incident outside Mosul on September 14. 2016. Supposedly, a group of unnamed gunman ambushed Abu Isaac – IS spokesman for Mosul. However, none of the major actors in the region have acknowlegded the incident. Only two news agencies reported the incident – Aranews and Alalam. Alalam is the Iranian state-owned agency. Aranews got the information from Alalam.

Abu Isaac’s incident demonstrates similar characteristics to an information operation. US intelligence agencies could use this operation as an example for future targeted killings – ambiguity regarding operators and untraceable execution methods (i.e not Reaper drone strikes).

The U.S could combine information operations with targeted killing operations in order to sow seeds of dissent among IS’s ranks. ISIS wants the world to think it can stand up against a major world superpower. The US could simply let them continue to think “We will not be deterred by your [U.S] campaigns.”