Information Warfare: An Emerging and Preferred Tool of the People’s Republic of China

China’s information warfare doctrine has evolved to contain a blend of American IW doctrine with unique Chinese cultural components such as the gold standard of fighting a “People’s War”, deceptively killing with a borrowed sword and attacking weakness rather than strength.

The Chinese seek to conduct a “local” or limited war under conditions of “informationalization”.  The modern Chinese view of information warfare has departed from one with an exclusive ideological base to that of being a process of on-going innovation that is worthy of continuous study and adaptation.  The Chinese appear to have incorporated much of U.S. information warfare strategy.  Two key IW doctrinal publications, JP 3-13.1 and FM-100-6, have been translated into the Chinese language.

According to a paper written by Austin Williams for Georgetown University China’s information warfare strategy is now based upon viewing information as a weapon of war or combat and something that is sought after by the warring parties.  That is a broad umbrella.

Yoshihara’s paper quotes the father of Chinese Information Warfare as stating:

IW is combat operations in a high-tech battlefield environment in which both sides use information-technology means, equipment, or systems in  a rivalry over the power to obtain, control and use information.  IW is a combat aimed at seizing the battlefield initiative; with digitized units as its essential combat force; the seizure, the control, and use of information as its main substance, and all sorts of information weaponry [smart weapons] and systems as its major means.¹¹

China intends to conduct information warfare with non-attributable asymmetric techniques that focus upon information suppression, destruction and alteration.   This doctrine fits well with exploiting the inherent vulnerabilities of information systems.  Even Chairman Mao acknowledged the value of ‘making the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears and to drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.’

China’s IW doctrine is based upon maintaining technical parity with its enemies while still being able to overwhelm the enemy with huge numbers of its own civilian population who have been prepared to conduct IW operations.  Highly trained civilian computer experts are expected to become the soldiers in an information war rather than committing human wave after human wave of PLA troops to overrun the enemy’s position on a battlefield.  Sun Tzu’s teachings of winning the battle without engaging a fortified structure also dovetail quite well with seeking out and attacking the weak points of an information system rather than committing the army and navy.

Chinese Information Warfare doctrine is chillingly captured in Williams’ paper by citing a quote attributed to a Chinese IW theorist, Wei Jincheng.  The quote is best read within the context of China’s long-term desire to re-claim Taiwan:

Information-based confrontations will aim at reaching tangible peace through intangible war, maintaining the peace of hardware through software confrontations, and deterring and blackmailing the enemy with dominance in the possession of information.¹²

China is transparently planning to conduct a limited war to regain Taiwan and to deter Western interests by attacking the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) as well as our economic system.  If a third party (a terrorist state or organization?) can be enticed to detonate an electromagnetic pulse weapon above the U.S. task of taking Taiwan would be relatively easy.