Intelligence failures: Lessons for Taiwan

Hamas’s surprise war against Israel is horrific and a stark warning for Taiwan. The nature of the intelligence failure of Israel and the United States—how they failed to receive or, if received, to identify and heed the warning of the attack—will be debated for decades to come.

Much like previous instances of U.S. setbacks, such as Pearl Harbor, the Tet Offensive, the ascent of communist China, and 9/11, as well as Israeli experiences like the 1973 war and the intifada, these events have been extensively examined through numerous investigations, analyses, and interpretations aimed at understanding the potential failures of their respective intelligence agencies.

The simple fact is that intelligence communities can always fail and do so for many reasons—from the enemy’s actions to their own biases and preconceptions of what the enemy will do. An acute danger now is the bandwidth of the U.S. intelligence community, tasked with monitoring Russia’s war in Ukraine and now Israel’s war with Hamas, which is likely soon to include horizontal escalation to other parts of the Middle East and Southwest Asia as Israel with U.S. support attacks Hamas and its state sponsors, most notably Iran. A regional war in Europe and one in the Middle East will tax the U.S. intelligence community as it has not been for a generation. The danger is that the Chinese regime uses the opportunity presented by the demands on the U.S. intelligence to aggress against Taiwan, the Philippines, or other targets.

Taiwan is a special danger because the Chinese regime is routinizing air and maritime violations of Taiwan’s sovereignty while exercising each of the major components of an amphibious invasion of the island. The regime is gradually preparing for an attack on Taiwan.

Five salient issues are compelled by the example of Hamas’s attack.

First, what are Beijing’s war aims and expectations regarding duration and the risk of escalation? The Israeli intelligence community seems to have missed these assessments regarding Hamas, so it is a key warning. If the aim of the Chinese regime is solely to conquer Taiwan and it expects it to be a quick and decisive victory, then a conflict will be very difficult to deter. Beijing’s expectation that it would be a swift and decisive victory would have to assume the United States and its allies would be slow to respond or unable or unwilling to do so because of the risk of nuclear escalation. U.S. decision-makers must press U.S. intelligence on the Chinese regime’s war aims and expectations regarding the conflict.

Second, the boldness of the Hamas attack should compel an examination that the war aims may be bolder and broader than is anticipated and involve more states. An assumption is that the Chinese regime will invade Taiwan—and only Taiwan. There is sound logic to this, as Taiwan is a significant step for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, the United States and its allies may underestimate the ambitions of the CCP. There is the risk of attacks against other countries, including Japan, the Philippines, and the United States, which might be struck to hinder support and reinforcement for Taiwan. But an attack may also entail Beijing’s desire, like Japan in 1941, to deliver a great blow to the United States and its allies in the expectation that they will be deterred from a response in support of Taipei. Attaque à outrance may offer Beijing hope that Washington avoids conflict, particularly if the island is seized rapidly.

Third, there is the risk that the Chinese regime takes advantage of the distraction of the U.S. intelligence community. The PLA is an expert in deception, what the Soviets termed “maskirovka,” which heavily influenced the Red Army during the Chinese Civil War and the PLA today. The PLA has a long history of that practice in the Korean War and during the PLA’s involvement in the Vietnam War in support of North Vietnam. What cannot be concealed from your enemy may be hidden in plain sight by inuring the enemy to large-scale exercises, airspace violations, and bountiful maritime traffic. Hence, an invasion appears to be routine and standard operating procedure on any given day for the Chinese military.

Fourth, North Korea is likely to be involved at the Chinese regime’s behest to complicate further the ability of the United States to handle another crisis and to occupy what bandwidth is left in the U.S. intelligence community. A crisis on the Korean peninsula will draw in U.S. and allied military forces to the peninsula and the surrounding waters and airspace. Coordination with Russia is also possible, as a new offensive in Ukraine would be certain to occupy considerable attention and additional resources.

Fifth, surprise works. Hamas surprised Israel and the world, and that was a tremendous force multiplier for them. A surprise attack on Taiwan, employing the fifth column certain to be present on the island, would likewise be a force multiplier for the Chinese military.

The CCP is certain to be calculating that the risk of a failed invasion attempt would be disastrous for Mr. Xi’s regime. As the United States faces considerable and growing demands on its attention, an attack on Taiwan increases in probability. Hamas’s war has many lessons for those seeking to deter an attack on Taiwan as well as for those planning one.