J.C.S. REJECTION OF KOREA COMMANDER’S APPEAL FOR MISSILE DEFENSES IS IRRESPONSIBLE, PROOF OF CLINTON MISMANAGEMENT

(Washington, D.C.): On 11 December 1995, General
Gary Luck, the four-star commander of the 37,000 U.S.
forces in Korea, took strong exception to a decision by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) that
would have the effect of imposing significant delays in
the deployment of modern theater missile defenses. Gen.
Luck noted that the threat posed by North Korea’s
ballistic missile capabilities to his forces — and the
American allies they are charged with defending — is
growing. He urged that two Theater High-Altitude Area
Defense batteries (THAAD) with a total of 18 launchers be
deployed as soon as possible.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
John Shalikashvili, reportedly responded negatively to
this urgent appeal in a cable dated 19 January 1996.
According to an article in the 15 February 1995 edition
of the Washington Times, General Shalikashvili
told Gen. Luck “I understand your concern” but
“the primary objective is to free up dollars for
critically underfunded areas of recapitalization.”
As a result, “the JROC is recommending THAAD funding
at a minimum level necessary to continue development
toward a shoot-off with the Navy theater-wide ballistic
missile defense system in 2002-2003.” The Times
reports that “The proposed competition in 2002 or
2003 between THAAD and Navy upper tier could delay
production of the wide-area defense system by three to
five years, Gen. Shalikashvili said.”

‘What, Me Worry?’

Today’s Washington Times reports that Gen.
Shalikashvili clarified his position during a breakfast
yesterday with defense reporters. The Times
reports that “Gen. Shalikashvili said the decision
to delay THAAD is part of efforts within the Pentagon to
find $60 billion annually in funds to buy new arms
and equipment, including aircraft, tanks, trucks and
tents.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, the General
contended, “We need the most capable system we can
produce now, and that’s the [Patriot] PAC-3 and Navy
Lower Tier and the associated command and control.”

While the PAC-3 and Navy Lower Tier may be the most
immediately available systems, they are capable of
protecting only relatively small areas. Putting off, as
the Times put it, “deployment of THAAD and a
wide-area missile defense system known as Navy Upper Tier
until ‘early in the next century’ when the capabilities
of both systems will be assessed” is a formula for
leaving theater requirements unmet for years to come.

Interestingly, even as Gen. Shalikashvili endorsed
such a dubious strategy, saying “I am comfortable
that we are addressing the issues in the right sequence,
and what we’re talking about is a balance” he
expressed frustration that “five years after Desert
Storm” there is no fielded anti-missile defense. The
effect of the approach he is now endorsing, however, will
be largely to extend that vulnerability for the
foreseeable future.

What is Wrong With This Picture?

The exchange between Generals Luck and Shalikashvili
is alarming for several reasons:

• The Clinton Administration is clearly not
  responding appropriately to an existing and
  worsening threat of ballistic missile attack.
  The Administration has long claimed that it
  accorded the utmost priority to protecting U.S.
  forward-deployed forces and allies against
  short-range ballistic missiles already in hostile
  hands. This point was stressed, in part, to
  justify Mr. Clinton’s refusal to take steps to
  protect the United States itself against
  longer-range missile threats that his
  subordinates claimed had not yet materialized. It
  is now obvious that, the Administration’s
  rhetoric notwithstanding, neither the evidence of
  an extant danger nor the prospect of a developing
  one will move Clinton and Company to provide
  effective anti-missile defenses.
• The grounds for concern about these threats
  continue to mount. Two weeks ago, the New York
  Times reported what amounted to a Communist
  Chinese ballistic missile-delivered nuclear
  threat to Los Angeles. This morning’s Washington
  Times reveals that U.N. inspectors believe
  that Saddam Hussein is continuing to pursue the
  development of missiles with ranges of at least
  1,200 miles and perhaps as much as 2,000 miles. The
  latter would be capable of attacking every
  capital in Europe.
• The last time a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
  of Staff turned down a commander’s request for
  additional armaments, American personnel lost
  their lives to hostile fire. The Senate Armed
  Services Committee has determined that then-JCS
  Chairman Colin Powell personally rejected
  requests for armored equipment from the
  commanding officer of the ill-fated U.S. mission
  in Somalia. According to the Committee, such
  equipment might have enabled 18 servicemen to
  survive a fire-fight with Somali gunmen. Needless
  to say, the losses likely to arise should
  undefended American troops in South Korea come
  under attack from ballistic missiles loaded with
  chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
  weapons would be vastly greater than those
  experienced in Somalia.
• The JROC plan would violate the law. As
  noted in the Washington Times:

“The [Fiscal Year 1996 Defense]
authorization law orders the Defense
secretary to restructure regional missile
defense programs to make Patriot PAC-3, THAAD
and two Navy systems, known as Lower and
Upper Tier, top priority programs. The law
sets specific dates — all by 1999 — for
deploying the first models of the systems.
Full-scale deployment must begin by 2000 for
THAAD and by 2001 for Upper Tier.”

• While Gen. Shalikashvili wrote Gen. Luck that
  “a final decision has not been made” on
  the JROC-directed restructuring of the theater
  missile defense program, the THAAD and Navy Upper
  Tier programs are now being restructured as part
  of the FY1997 budget process. THAAD would be
  essentially level-funded over the next few years
  at roughly the $500 million level per year. Upper
  Tier would be budgeted at very low levels (e.g.,
  about $60 million in FY97), evidently in the
  expectation that the Congress will continue to
  add funds needed to bring this promising program
  to fruition. Such steps are clearly inconsistent
  with statutory direction signed into law by
  President Clinton last week.
• The Defense Department budget is indisputably
  vastly underfunded. President Clinton,
  Secretary of Defense William Perry and other
  senior Administration officials have been at
  pains in recent months to complain about
  congressional efforts to increase the defense
  budget. Democratic critics of such initiatives on
  Capitol Hill have gleefully pointed to the fact
  that the Pentagon insisted it did not need or
  want such additional funds (remarkably, this line
  was even heard from those like Rep. Ron Dellums
  who have made a career of disregarding Defense
  Department advice).
• The fact is, as the JROC decision
  demonstrates, the Clinton Administration is not
  providing the levels of funding required if the
  Pentagon is to maintain a competent and ready
  military into the future. In particular
  jeopardy are the “recapitalization”
  accounts — namely, those that will provide for
  the development and procurement of advanced
  weapon systems critical to defense preparedness
  down the road.

The Bottom Line

The cable traffic between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and one of America’s most vulnerable military commands
should serve as a wake-up call: Immediate steps must
be taken to ensure that effective anti-missile defenses
are fielded at the earliest possible moment. These
should be designed to offer both the sort of
theater-wide protection sought by Gen. Luck against
extant threats and to protect against those that are
emerging to the American people and their homeland.

These twin objectives can be best accomplished by
rapidly completing development and beginning expedited
deployment of the THAAD and the Navy Upper Tier systems.
The former will provide dedicated theater coverage. If
properly designed, the latter can enhance THAAD’s
effectiveness by adding another layer of protection
against shorter-range missiles while providing flexible
platforms and missiles capable of intercepting long-range
ballistic missiles launched at the United States. href=”96-D17.html#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

The Congress must also give priority to the following
actions:

• Carefully reviewing the assumptions and threat
  assessments that ostensibly guide Clinton
  Administration policy in the missile defense
  area;
• ensuring that the Pentagon’s plans for the
  theater missile defense program in fact conform
  to the law of the land;
• assessing the opportunities simultaneously to
  provide the sorts of effective theater defenses
  Gen. Luck seeks and the sort of national missile
  protection the United States clearly requires;
  and
• more generally scrutinizing the Administration’s
  resource allocation decisions in the national
  security arena so as to allow the legislative
  branch to continue to take corrective actions on
  the defense budget — the need can no longer be
  denied.

(1) For more on this promising
approach, see the findings of the Team B study described
in the Center’s Decision Brief entitled The
Rising ‘Crimson Tide’ Lifts the Case for Missile Defense
(No. 95-D 35, 19 May
1995).