MESSAGE TO CONGRESS — DO OR DIE IN BOSNIA: DEBATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. GROUND FORCES IN BOSNIA BEFORE IT HAPPENS

(Washington, D.C.): While the current line out of the
self-styled “Contact Group” is that the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia is going to be reinforced,
redeployed and otherwise upgraded, the reality is probably quite
different: At any time, the U.N. could decide to implement the
planned extraction of its peacekeepers and their equipment.
Should that happen, President Clinton has promised to send up to
25,000 U.S. troops, heavy armor and other materiel to Bosnia to
help out. Such a deployment is likely to prove an unmitigated
disaster for the American personnel involved, for the
long-suffering non-Serb Bosnians and for NATO solidarity, in
whose name this reckless venture will be conducted.

How Did We Get Into This Jam?

When Mr. Clinton blithely committed the United States last
year to supply such a vast military force for this purpose, the
idea received scant congressional attention. For one thing, as
with other dubious Clinton foreign policy initiatives (for
example, the idea of deploying U.S. forces on the Golan Heights
as part of an Israeli-Syrian deal), action did not seem imminent.
Members of Congress persuaded themselves that they could always
consider the idea later. For another, they took comfort
from the fact that the Administration immediately set about
trying to shore up the peacekeeping operation so as to minimize
the chances that its “put” would be called. Finally,
Congress reckoned that President Clinton would in this instance,
as in so many others before it, simply change his policy as its
execution simply became “too hard” politically.

What this analysis overlooked was the inexorability of
military planning. In the intervening months, NATO military
commanders have taken President Clinton at his word, drawing up
detailed operational plans for inserting into Bosnia as many as
50,000 heavily armed alliance troops, half of whom would be
Americans. According to this plan, U.S. units would be relied
upon to provide logistical support to the extraction operation
and the firepower needed to deter or suppress local threats to
it.

In addition, two key NATO allies — Britain and France —
that have long wanted to see U.S. personnel on the ground in
Bosnia (along with or in lieu of their own) have seized upon such
planning: They warn in the most ominous tones that the NATO
alliance will be utterly finished if the United States now
welches on Mr. Clinton’s brash commitment.

Hold Everything!

But, time-out. There are a number of aspects of this proposal
that demand critical examination. First of all, there has
never been any evident support either among the American
people or in the Congress for placing U.S. forces on the ground
in Bosnia. The armed forces and its civilian leaders have
stressed in recent years the imperative of building and
maintaining popular backing for potentially costly military
operations. The absence of such backing to date is nothing,
however, compared to what will emerge as U.S. forces begin to
take casualties in the course of this operation. Imagine the
popular outcry if its net effect is seen to be to substitute
American hostages for British and French ones!

Second, the damage to alliance solidarity and perhaps to
NATO, itself, will be greatly magnified as the principal
justification for inserting such a substantial military force
into Bosnia becomes clear: The size of this operation is being
driven primarily by the desire to extricate not only the
peacekeepers but also their light tanks, armored personnel
carriers (APCs) and other materiel. To be sure, the
remoteness of some of the so-called “U.N. safe-haven”
enclaves and the desire to deter Serb malevolence by a massive
show of force are also considerations in defining the NATO rescue
operation. But, in the final analysis, it is likely that the
American public will be inflamed if they become persuaded that
their troops have been put in harm’s way for the dubious purpose
of recovering British APCs and French trucks.

Third, there is the question of cost. It is estimated —
almost certainly a conservative estimate — that this rescue
operation will entail an outlay of some $1.5 billion. The
U.S. Defense Department will probably be asked to assume at least
half that amount. Where will these funds come from? Will they be
taken out of already overtaxed readiness and modernization
accounts or will these (and any additional) funds be pried from
non-defense areas or simply added to the federal deficit? Will
our allies, including the Germans, who got themselves into this
mess pay their fair share?

What’s To Be Done?

Clearly, these and other questions associated with a massive
peacekeeper extraction effort demand congressional deliberation before
U.S. military personnel are deployed to Bosnia. As with the
notion of deploying American forces on the Golan Heights, if
Congress is not going to go along, President Clinton and his
foreign interlocutors are better off knowing it now,
rather than later.

The Center for Security Policy believes that an informed
congressional debate would establish that the prompt removal of
U.N. peacekeepers is both inevitable and desirable. Such a
withdrawal will not end the tremendous suffering that has been
experienced by the non-Serb Bosnian population; indeed, it may
even compound it in the short-run if the populations of
indefensible enclaves are compelled by force (or the threat of
it) to flee eastern Bosnia. On the other hand, it may set the
stage for corrective action that creates the basis for a just and
durable peace.

Toward this end, the Center recommends that the withdrawal
of U.N. peacekeepers should be accomplished at the earliest
possible moment. Limited U.S. personnel should be made
available — primarily for logistical purposes — with the
legislative branch’s approval. The difficult task of withdrawing
UNPROFOR’s equipment, however, should not be undertaken.
Such equipment should, instead, be turned over to Bosnian
government forces or those the U.N. has supposedly been
safeguarding. At the very least, it must be scuttled so as to
render it unusable by Serb forces.

The Bottom Line

Once U.N. personnel have been removed, the United States
should take the lead in facilitating the arming of the Bosnian
government so as to allow it effectively to defend its people and
territory. The U.S. should also consider, in conjunction with
other, like-minded nations providing air support needed to help
neutralize the Bosnian Serbs’ military advantage. The
organizational model for such an action would be along the lines
of Desert Storm — an informal coalition of nations who share a
common commitment to prevent and punish naked acts of
totalitarian aggression — rather than one subject to either the
incoherence or the paralyses that have come to afflict U.N. and
NATO operations in Bosnia.

The self-styled Bosnian Serb ruling clique should be held
accountable for the safety of U.N. personnel currently
incarcerated by the Serbs. Should any harm come to them while in
captivity, there should be no doubt that the consequences will be
swift and severe. To eliminate any possible Serb temptation to
mete out the same fate — or worse (e.g., terrorist attacks) to U.S.
peacekeepers currently assigned to U.N. duty in Macedonia, these
troops should be immediately withdrawn.

Unfortunately, it is clear that the Clinton Administration is
taking the opposite tack — supporting U.N. and NATO efforts to
keep the peacekeepers in Bosnia in place indefinitely. It even
seems to be supporting British initiatives that are adding to the
number of peacekeeping units that will have to be extracted!
Worse yet, the Administration is abetting Russian efforts to
parlay the Bosnia crisis into a quadruple-play: re-establishing
the Kremlin’s reliability as a patron (after its credibility was
shattered when Iraq was temporarily abandoned during Desert
Storm); asserting that it has returned to the world stage as a
superpower fully rivaling the United States; weakening the NATO
alliance; and diverting world attention from Moscow’s festering
public relations sores (notably, Chechnya, the Iranian nuclear
deal and ongoing arms control violations). Congress must
disavow such ill-advised policies just as firmly as it repudiates
the Clinton idea of putting 25,000 American ground troops in
harm’s way in Bosnia.