In Monday’s hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. David Petraeus testified that the US efforts in Syria are floundering due to lack of commitment to a clear and defined goal.  In his view, we should increase our involvement in Syria beyond aerial strikes on IS positions.  Petraeus advocated establishing “enclaves” similar to safe zones within Syria where refugees could be resettled and rebels trained to fight against IS.  However, details on where exactly these enclaves would be positioned and how were not forthcoming.

Even more surprising, Gen. Petraeus stated that American policy should shift from one of simply calling for Bashar al-Assad’s ouster to actively opposing the Assad Airforce, in particular its use of “barrel bombs”, primitive fuel-aired explosives that human rights groups say are frequently aimed at civilians in rebel-held areas. In his opening statement, he said “We could, for example, tell Assad that the use of barrel bombs must end — and that if they continue, we will stop the Syrian air force from flying. We have that capability.”  No doubt such a tactic would draw the ire of Russia and the other members of the so-called “P4+1” alliance- Iran, Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah. Nor is it clear how Petraeus would expect the U.S. to respond if Russian pilots began carrying out sorties against Syrian rebels on Assad’s behalf, or how Iran and Iranian backed Iraqi militias would respond against U.S. interests in Iraq in the event of such an act.

Petraeus’ call for enclaves in which to train Syrian rebels raises the continued question of which rebels will be trained. Not long ago, Gen. Petraeus called for the recruitment of “reconcilable” elements from al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra to join the fight against IS.  No one needs to be told what al-Qaeda stands for, yet here was the architect of the successful Iraqi surge strategy, which defeated al-Qaeda in Iraq, advocating an alliance with AQ members. The U.S. effort to arm and train even “vetted” Syrian rebels has met with substantial setbacks, as rebels are either attacked and arrested by Al Qaeda and other Islamist forces, or actively surrender weapons and equipment to Al Qaeda immediately upon re-entering Syria.

Unfortunately with the rehashed calls for enclaves protected by American air cover and troops in an advisory role and the thinly veiled threat to destroy Assad’s air force, there was little original proposed by General Petraeus.

In the larger context of our presence in the Middle East, this latest episode once again shines light on the glaring fact that the US does not have a defined strategy and end goal in Syria, while all the other actors in the civil war do.

Admittedly, it can get confusing. Should we back the Kurds and risk angering NATO ally Turkey? Eliminate Assad even though no reasonable alternative candidate exists to replace him? Choices seem to be limited to calling for Assad’s ouster even if that means backing rebels aligned with Al Qaeda, and facing down against Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, or implicitly backing Assad in the fight against Al Qaeda and Islamic State, essentially allying with Iranian and Russian interests.

This raises the question of how was the U.S. backed into such a strategically undesirable position, and how best to avoid being forced into choosing between two undesirable outcomes. Unfortunately there was certainly nothing in Petraeus’ testimony that provided a new way forward.

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