Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy

by Robert R. Monroe 

The nuclear weapons ambitions of North Korea  and Iran have made front-page news of the related U.S. issues of nonproliferation, deterrence, and nuclear strategy.  Both the Administration and Congress are scrambling to play catch-up ball  in recovering these vital elements of U.S.  foreign policy and national security, which have  been unaddressed since the end of the Cold War.  This paper interconnects these three critical issues, and illustrates how far we must go to have them serve America’s interests today.

Enforcing Nonproliferation

America is at a critical moment in history.  We face a momentous decision about nonproliferation, a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy since the nuclear age began.  Our decision will shape the world’s future.  Proliferation of nuclear weapons  is a threat like no other; and  America has led the effort to harness it from the start.  The Baruch Plan of 1946 was followed by Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace of 1953, and these led to a decade’s work forging the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970.  This 37-year-old treaty is arguably the most remarkable and effective arms control instrument ever conceived.  It is distinguished by two characteristics.  First, the NPT is a vastly unequal treaty.  It approves five nuclear-weapons states (U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France…the five permanent members of the UN  Security Council); and  it requires all other signatories to remain non-nuclear-weapons states.  Second, 188 of the world’s 193 states have signed the NPT, voluntarily accepting this inequality.

During the Cold War—the first two decades of the NPT’s life—nonproliferation was greatly aided by the awesome presence of thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear warheads, poised for instant launch.  During those years, eighteen nations started developing nuclear weapons, and all subsequently terminated their programs.

Since this Cold War restraint was lifted, however, nonproliferation has been failing.  First India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons.  Now North Korea and Iran seem determined to go nuclear.  This should be a real wake-up  call!  North Korea and Iran are  rogue states, belligerent and irresponsible.  If either or both acquire nuclear weapons it will mark a global watershed point of the highest order, ushering in the full-fledged era of nuclear terrorism.  Clearly, nonproliferation will die if it does not evolve.  The choice is ours; and in making it we should consider the two alternative futures.

• If we continue as in the past, we’re gambling that North Korea will end their decades-long pattern of deception.  If they do not, they’ll probably conduct a second nuclear test, and—once they get the design right—they’ll proceed into production of nuclear weapons, selling them to anyone desiring to buy.  This could easily cause Japan, South Korea, and possibly Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons in self-protection.  Once the pattern has been set by North Korea, it will be difficult to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program; possibly leading to transfer of nuclear weapons to proxy organizations (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas, al Qaeda).  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and  other Mideast states will likely acquire balancing nuclear arsenals in response.  The cascade then goes global: Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, Argentina, Algeria, etc.  With so many nuclear-armed states, and with nuclear weapons and nuclear material so widely available to terrorists and criminals, frequent nuclear weapon use will surely follow.

• But it doesn’t have to be this way.  We can vastly improve our future world if we finally open our eyes to the truth about nonproliferation.  It requires enforcement!  And surely the stark inequality of the NPT—voluntarily agreed to by every one of the 188 signatories—shows that the policing organization must be one or more of the treaty’s five nuclear-weapons states.  Ideally all five (which have exhibited reasonably responsible stewardship over a half-century) would act together, forcibly if necessary, to prevent any hint of proliferation.  Our world will probably  evolve to this, years in the future, after entire cities and millions of people are lost.  But at present it’s unrealistic to expect this degree of international cooperation.  Thus it’s up to America to take the lead, informing North Korea and Iran that, in support of nonproliferation, we will use military force, if necessary, to deny them a nuclear weapons production capability.  If use of force became necessary, there would surely be a number of immediate adverse effects; but long-term world prospects would be immensely better.