Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy

But actual use of force will probably not be necessary.  The deterrent effect of such declaratory statements, backed up by our continuing, relentless reinforcing measures, will likely cause the world’s long-duration negotiations with these two states to succeed without military action. Historically, effective diplomacy on major, contentious issues has always required a background threat of force.  Importantly, the first use of deterrence to stop determined proliferation will produce immense worldwide nonproliferation benefits.

We must decide which path to follow.  If negotiations continue to fail, the U.S. decision on whether to invoke firm use of deterrence to prevent North Korea and Iran from nuclear weapons production will shape the future world.  It will have far greater impact than Britain’s decision in 1936-38 not to disarm Hitler’s Germany—which subsequently cost six years of global war and over 60 million dead.

If proliferation is to be stopped, it must be here and now.  It’s late, but not too late.  Nuclear weapons exist, and they won’t go away, ever.  There are tens of thousands of them.  More states today possess nuclear weapons than ever before in history.   More than half the world’s population lives in states which have them.  But we can still prevent irresponsible and belligerent states from producing them, and this will make all the difference!

The NPT was designed for one vital purpose, to prevent proliferation.  However, over recent decades a “global nonproliferation regime” has attempted to transform the NPT to a false goal, nuclear disarmament; and in this reckless push it is destroying all hopes for nonproliferation. Even the objective of “a world without nuclear weapons” is false.   A world without nuclear weapons in the hands of responsible states would be a world of unbelievable nuclear horror and chaos.

America must have the wisdom to recognize that nonproliferation requires enforcement, and the courage to lead the evolution of nonproliferation to this essential higher level.  If we fail in these twin challenges, future generations  will not forgive America for allowing 9/11, Afghanistan, and Iraq to distract us from the central challenge of our era.

U.S. Nuclear Umbrella and Deterrence

Since the dawn of the nuclear era the U.S. has entered into mutual security assistance treaties with friendly states, such as members of NATO.  In many cases, we have pledged our nuclear deterrent forces to their protection, in effect bringing them under the “umbrella” of our strategic nuclear weapons.  These actions have been highly effective for over half a century in enhancing U.S. security, protecting threatened allies,  ending the Cold War, and greatly enhancing nonproliferation!

Most of these states are economically and technologically advanced, to the extent that they would have no difficulty in developing their own independent nuclear deterrent forces.  Yet they have staked their lives, their very existence as nations, on the U.S. guarantee to use our strategic nuclear forces to protect them.  Thus for many decades the U.S. nuclear umbrella has been the principal factor in preventing  proliferation by dozens of states.  It has been the dependable centerpiece of the world’s nonproliferation efforts.

Today some thirty states, such as Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia, live daily under our strategic umbrella.  But all is not well on these fronts.  Two factors of recent origin are causing growing anxiety within these allies and friends.

• The first is the imminent cascade of nuclear proliferation discussed in the above section.  North Korea and Iran are well along to developing and producing nuclear weapons.  They’ve both been at it for well over a decade, and to date neither the U.S. nor the world has been able to stop them.  North Korea’s nuclear weapon test last year was the first ever by a rogue state or terrorist organization.  If these states succeed in their goal, the probable ultimate result would be a global proliferation cascade, leading to frequent use of nuclear weapons.

• The second cause of concern among states which depend upon us is the credibility of our nuclear deterrent.  Can they continue to count on us when the chips are down?  We’ve let every aspect of our nuclear weapons program deteriorate for the past sixteen years.  We have not transformed our nuclear strategy from one of massive retaliation against the Soviets to the surgical needs of today’s distributed threats.  Our stockpile of high-yield, dirty nuclear weapons, designed for the Cold War, is aged and becoming more irrelevant by the day.  The nation’s nuclear infrastructure has seriously deteriorated.  Our advanced nuclear technology R&D effort is practically nonexistent.  We’ve designed no new nuclear weapons, tested no weapons, and produced no new weapons.  Our Defense Department has virtually “denuclearized” itself, disestablishing  one nuclear weapons center after another.  It has specified no requirements for new nuclear weapons, stopped conducting realistic nuclear exercises, and let nuclear weapons specialists wither away in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The Executive Branch of government has shown little support for nuclear weapons programs for almost two decades.  Members of Congress today have almost no nuclear weapons knowledge, and they’ve allowed a small number of anti-nuclear activists to kill the few tentative nuclear initiatives that have reached the Hill.  Individual U.S. political leaders have flatly stated that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons.  In sum, states under our nuclear umbrella may be worried over both our capability and our will to protect them.