Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Nuclear Strategy

Our reinforcing measures with conventional forces, all highly publicized, should include such activities as:  accelerated R&D of improved weapons specialized for this mission; visible weapons testing; rapid modification or procurement of these weapons; construction of mirrorimage North Korean and Iranian target arrays at our test ranges; intensive training against these ranges; focused counterproliferation exercises; announced deployments; increased readiness; elevated worldwide alert levels; etc.

Where do nuclear weapons come in?  Because they’re so all-powerful, so devastating, so unique, so “unable to be withstood,” nuclear weapons are the real power in our deterrence.  They provide a fearsome, credible backdrop for our conventional forces.  Our reinforcing measures with nuclear weapons should include: immediate resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing; accelerated design, testing, and production of nuclear weapons with very low yield, great accuracy, reduced collateral damage, and increased security and controllability.  Individual designs should be tailored for earth penetration, agent defeat, and reduced residual radiation.  All this with much publicity, visibility, training, exercises, etc.

Through this transformation of nuclear strategy and weapons, deterrence will work.  North Korea and Iran will abandon their nuclear weapons programs without a shot being fired; and the world will become a much better place overnight.  Also of great importance, this successful deterrence of proliferation would awaken the world to the reality that nonproliferation requires enforcement, thereby moving our dying nonproliferation regime to a new level of effectiveness.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Strategy

What is our U.S. nuclear strategy, and what are our requirements for  nuclear weapons?  This question is being asked with increasing frequency by Congress,  political leaders, government advisors, and others.  And not surprisingly.  Since the end of the Cold War no President of either party has outlined in detail why we need nuclear weapons in the future, what our future nuclear strategy is, and what types of  nuclear weapons are needed in  our stockpile.  Without this leadership, the national debate needed to shape this important issue has been non-existent; and the U.S. nuclear program has been marking time for sixteen years while the world around us, and the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have changed at an astonishing pace.  Our nuclear strategy is a relic of the past century, and our nuclear weapons are aged and increasingly irrelevant.  Here’s a brief outline of the essential transformation.

• Principles.  Our nuclear strategy should conform to widely accepted principles.  For example:  The principal purpose of our nuclear weapons should be deterrence; we should maintain the minimum number of nuclear weapons possible; their only roles should be those that cannot be met by conventional weapons (e.g., defeating severe WMD threats); our weapons should be uniquely tailored for effectiveness against the current evolving target base; they should be considered as weapons of last resort; in times of great crisis they should provide the President with viable options to protect the national interest, while meeting American humane sensitivities (e.g., fewest casualties, minimum collateral damage).

• Threats.  We should consider three:  The primary threat today and in the near future is nuclear proliferation, which will place nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states, failed or failing states, or powerful terrorist organizations in sanctuary states.  North Korea and Iran are prime examples.  A secondary threat, which is not imminent but might arise in a decade or two, would be  from near peers—a resurgent Russia or a militaristic China—with greatly increased nuclear arsenals.  The third threat arises from the absolutely unknowable nature of the future.  With startling speed friends could become enemies; supportive nuclear weapons states could be taken over by hostile forces; unexpected major U.S. vulnerabilities could occur; fourth-generation nuclear weapons may present us with totally new threats; unanticipated alliances may be formed among adversaries, greatly raising threat levels; etc.

• Nuclear Strategy.  For the primary threat (nuclear weapons in hands of rogue states, etc.), our strategy should be one of deterrence, but a totally new form of deterrence.  We should recognize that nonproliferation requires enforcement, and when dealing with irresponsible or belligerent states (e.g., North Korea or Iran), our strategy should be one of backing up our negotiations with a threat to use “military force” to prevent these states from acquiring or producing nuclear weapons.  We need never mention nuclear weapons, but our powerful reinforcing actions must involve both conventional and nuclear weapons readiness activities.  For the potential secondary threat (Russia/China), adaptations of Cold War deterrence strategy should be adequate.  For the third threat (unknowable future), the essentials of  our strategy are rapid response and great flexibility—modern equivalents of WWII’s “hot production base.”  For nuclear weapons, the key is to keep our PERSONNEL (scientists, engineers, technicians, testing experts, production managers and workers, and military operators) in maximum state of readiness and responsiveness in procedures, training, qualification, and experience.  This requires four activities: a robust advanced-concepts R&D program in all fields of nuclear weapons interest; nuclear weapons designers (who have had the humbling experience of seeing their designs tested underground) at work designing new weapons; an ongoing underground testing program for nuclear technology and weapons; and ongoing nuclear weapons production lines.  These four activities require modern facilities.

• Nuclear Weapons’ Characteristics.  For the  primary threat we must design, test, and produce new nuclear weapons with low yields, great accuracy, reduced collateral damage, and increased security.  Individual designs should be tailored for various counterproliferation missions (e.g., earth penetration, agent-defeat, reduced residual radiation).  Our adversaries have spent decades emplacing their WMD facilities underground, frequently locating them near deliberately  exposed civilian populations.  Any U.S. nuclear weapons that do not have the above characteristics simply will not be credible, and our deterrent strategy will fail.  The transformation is urgent because the threat is upon us today; and it will still take about two decades to effect major changes to the stockpile.  For the secondary threat, Cold War nuclear weapons which have received life extension or (preferably) Reliable  Replacement Warheads should suffice, with improved delivery systems.

• Contributions to Nonproliferation.  Nonproliferation is all-important to national (and world) security, and it is failing rapidly.  The deterrent effect of the above nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons is essential to preserving it.  By stopping North Korea and Iran by deterrence, rather than military force, we will raise nonproliferation to new high levels.  If we let these two states go nuclear, we can expect cascades of proliferation, including that by advanced states which previously relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  The nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons outlined herein are in full accord with our responsibilities under the NPT, including Article VI (reductions).

Most importantly, the national security actions summarized above must be carried out with strong popular support and bipartisan consensus.  This will require national leadership, public education, and national debate, similar to those which sustained  U.S. strategic deterrence for decades during the Cold War.  Surely America today can meet this challenge.