North Korea deal stumbles. Surprised?

When the U.S. inked a nuclear deal last month with Kim Jong-Il’s regime in Pyongyang, many critics and strategists were flabbergasted.  The accord marked a stunning climb-down from the Bush Administration’s earlier, principled position of multilateral pressure on the hermit tyranny.

The terms of the February deal were absurdly generous.  In return for shutting down its Yongbyon plutonium reactor with 60 days (the deadline is April 13th, less than three weeks away) and agreeing to "talks" on the status of its as-yet undocumented uranium enrichment program, the North is to receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil, the release of illicit funds from Chinese banks, promises for future aid contingent upon good behavior.

Yesterday however, the North walked away from the 4-day-old talks.  Their envoy, Kim Kye-Gwan, left Beijing for Pyongyang without such much as a word to reporters, who had to content themselves with a few waves from the man as he boarded his plane.

Responding to the new development, news outlets like the Washington Post reported that negotiations "broke down abruptly," implying a degree of surprise at the latest turn of events.

How could this have come as a surprise to anyone?  Given the history of the North’s nuclear perfidy, it was almost a given that the talks would "break down."   Indeed, as the Center reported last month, the new deal was a loser from the start.

Going nowhere, fast

The North’s provocative, seemingly incongruous behavior is actually part and parcel of its negotiating strategy.  They blackmail gullible Westerners into a deal, encourage them to believe that "progress" is possible, and then, once negotiations are underway, threaten to leave the talks unless fresh concessions are made.  It works like a charm.

In this case, the "concession" at issue is the final release of $25 million in funds from Banco Delta Asia in Macao, China.  The North demands the return of its money – earned during the course of its dealings in international crime – before it will sit down again at the table.  

In fact, the U.S. has already ended its investigation into Banco Delta Asia (BDA), the Macao bank which harbors the North Korean accounts.  It is actually the Chinese who are holding up the transfer, not Washington.  North Korea’s demand could not be more flippant.

Reports on the Chinese fund seizure differ wildly – some indicate that BDA and the Chinese government are having technical problems with the transfer, others state that Beijing is hesitant to release such large amounts of dirty money to Pyongyang.  

This is not to mention those, like the Russian envoy Alexander Losyukov, who brazenly (and falsely) stated that "the whole problem came from the American side."  His rationale was that the Chinese are afraid of a "negative response" from the U.S.  He seems to forget that the U.S. has already signed off on the deal.

None of this really matters, though.  Diplomatic "sturm und drang" over North’s Korea’s tantrums is old news.  What really matters is that the U.S use Pyongyang’s dramatic exit as an excuse to do the same.

A U.S. departure from the six-party talks would be a firm signal this country is still committed to countering Pyongyang’s aggressive behavior, not rewarding it.  In so doing, we would send a firm signal to our Japanese allies that we won’t abandon our mutual strategic interests in favor of chasing a hopeless dream.  

Because, let’s face it, the North is not going to disarm.

This point was made bluntly and effectively by former UN Ambassador John Bolton, who labeled our involvement with Pyongyang (and their Chinese facilitators) "a mistake," stating "It’s a terrible signal to Iran and other would-be proliferators, and it’s a further example of letting North Korea out of the corner that they put themselves in through the nuclear test in October."

What to do

In place of appeasement, the U.S. has several options with which to counter Pyongyang-Beijing axis of aggression.  

First, encourage divestment the North Korean regime.   This would mean re-freezing the accounts in Macao and discouraging other businesses and financial institutions from doing business with Kim.  The Center has long been advocating an effort called Divest Terror, which encourages divestment from companies that do business with state sponsors of terror, like North Korea.  Doing so would in short order deprive the North of the resources it needs to intimidate and harass its neighbors.

Second, maintain our position in South Korea.   The U.S. commitment to Seoul is one of the cornerstones of our strategy in Asia, and needs to be secured so as to maintain the safety of the region.  By re-stigmatizing North Korea, we encourage Seoul to cease its "sunshine policy" of appeasement, which only encourages Pyongyang’s intransigence

Third, fight the War of Ideas.  Chinese and North Korean propaganda has for years alleged that U.S. is to blame for all that is wrong in East Asia.  Nothing could be further from the truth.   Washington should work with and through its allies to make sure the world knows that Pyongyang’s nuclear malfeasance is decades-old and unprovoked, and that Chinese support for it is a cold, ruthless calculation that endangers the lives of millions, if not billions of people.

All of these strategies bound together amount to regime change.  It is the only way to permanently fix the North Korean problem.  U.S. leaders need to have the vision, patience, and strength to make it happen.