Nuclear Testing Negotiations: What is the Bush Administration’s Agenda?

Introduction

Today, the United States and the
Soviet Union resume negotiations at the
Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) in Geneva.
The NTT negotiations have as their
immediate objective development of
improved verification arrangements for
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET). The two treaties were signed in
1974 and 1976, respectively, but have not
yet been ratified due, in part, to
concerns about the adequacy of their
existing verification regimes. The
parties have reached ad referendum
agreement on a verification protocol for
the PNET; it is now under review in
Washington and Moscow. Work is proceeding
more slowly on a counterpart protocol for
the TTBT.

Under the charter for the NTT
negotiations agreed to in September, 1987
by then-Secretary of State George Shultz
and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, completion of these
protocols were understood to be but
the initial goal of the NTT. The
ministers announced that “The sides
will as the first step agree upon
effective verification measures which
will make it possible to ratify the TTBT
and PNET, and proceed to
negotiating further intermediate
limitations on testing leading
to the ultimate objective of the complete
cessation of nuclear testing as part of
an effective disarmament process.” href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

Incredible as it might seem, the
Reagan Administration came to understand
that the commitment to a step-by-step
negotiation on further testing
limitations may well be utterly
inconsistent with U.S. national security
requirements. In a major report to the
Congress submitted in September 1988,
President Reagan illuminated numerous
problems that additional constraints on
nuclear testing would entail for
America’s deterrent capabilities.

President Reagan left office before he
was obliged to deal with the inherent
inconsistency between the findings
reported to Congress and his earlier
commitment to the Soviet Union. It now
falls to President Bush to grasp the
nettle. This paper discusses why the
United States should decline to negotiate
further constraints on nuclear testing —
and why it should do so at the outset of
the resumption of the NNT negotiations.

Are Further Testing
Limitations in the U.S. Interest?

In response to a request from the
Senate Armed Services Committee and on
the basis of intensive interagency study,
President Reagan on 8 September 1988
supplied the Congress with a report
concerning “The Relationship
between Progress in Other Areas of Arms
Control and More Stringent Limitations on
Nuclear Testing.” This
report, together with detailed companion
analyses produced by the Departments of
Energy and Defense, clearly and
authoritatively describes U.S. nuclear
testing requirements. It discusses the
problems caused even by existing arms
control limitations on nuclear testing.
The Reagan report also provides a
withering critique of the idea of
imposing additional limitations on the
U.S. nuclear testing program. Its main
points (in excerpt form) are:

The Requirement
for Testing

• “Nuclear testing is
  indispensable to maintaining the
  credible nuclear deterrent which
  has kept the peace for over 40
  years.”
• “Thus we do not
  regard nuclear testing as an evil
  to be curtailed, but as a tool to
  be employed responsibly in
  pursuit of national security.”
• “The U.S. tests neither more
  often nor at higher yields than
  is required for our
  security.”
• “As long as we must
  depend on nuclear weapons for our
  fundamental security, nuclear
  testing will be necessary.”

Why the United
States Tests Nuclear Weapons

• “First, we do so to ensure
  the reliability
  of our nuclear deterrent.”
• “Second, we conduct nuclear
  tests in order to improve the safety,
  security, survivability, and
  effectiveness of our
  nuclear arsenal. Testing has
  allowed the introduction of
  modern safety and security
  features on our weapons. It has
  permitted a reduction by
  nearly one-third in the total
  number of weapons in the
  stockpile since 1960, as well as
  a reduction in the total
  megatonnage in that stockpile to
  approximately one-quarter of its
  1960 value.”
• “Third, the U.S. tests to
  ensure we understand the effects
  of a nuclear environment
  on military systems.”
• “Finally, by continuing to
  advance our understanding of
  nuclear weapons design, nuclear
  testing serves to avoid
  technological surprise
  and to allow us to respond to the
  evolving threat.”
• “These four purposes are
  vital national security goals. As
  companion reports by the
  Departments of Defense and Energy
  indicate, they cannot
  currently be met without nuclear
  testing.”

Reductions in
Nuclear and/or Conventional Arms
May Actually Increase U.S. Testing
Requirements

• “…It is important to
  recognize that there is
  no direct technical linkage
  between the size of the nuclear
  stockpile and the requirements
  for nuclear testing.”
• “The first two reasons — to
  ensure the reliability of our
  deterrent and to improve the
  safety and security of our
  nuclear arsenal — are related in
  part to the number of
  different designs in the
  U.S. stockpile.”
• “Major reductions in
  the numbers of
  warheads, such
  as the U.S. seeks in
  START, would not alter
  our requirements for a
  number of different types
  of weapons to meet the
  Soviet threat, and hence
  would not alter the
  requirement for testing
  them….”
• “Indeed,
  under [an agreement
  providing for] deep
  reductions in strategic
  offensive arms the
  reliability of our
  remaining U.S. strategic
  weapons could be even
  more important and the
  need for testing even
  greater, particularly
  if the Soviets continue
  their current trends
  toward improved
  survivability.”
• “Similarly, neither
  reductions in strategic offensive
  arms themselves nor success in
  conventional arms reductions will
  eliminate the third reason for
  U.S. nuclear testing, the
  requirement to ensure we
  understand, from both an
  offensive and defensive
  standpoint, the effects of the
  environment produced by nuclear
  explosions on military
  systems….Even in a
  world with reduced strategic arms
  and an improved balance in
  conventional forces, nuclear
  weapons will exist. In such a
  world, understanding nuclear
  effects would be no less
  important.”
• “As the number of
  nuclear and conventional forces
  decrease, the potential relative
  advantage the Soviets could gain
  from an unforeseen technological
  breakthrough increases.
  To avoid being surprised by such
  a breakthrough, we must maintain
  and improve our understanding of
  the physics of nuclear
  weapons.”

Future Arms
Control and U.S. and Soviet Differences

• “…There is no
  direct technical linkage between
  progress in other areas of arms
  control and the acceptability of
  progressively more stringent
  limitations on nuclear testing.
  It is important to recognize the
  asymmetries between the United
  States and the Soviet Union in
  this regard.”

“Because of inherent
differences in the two nations’
approaches to their security
requirements, stringent
limitations on nuclear testing,
or even its complete cessation,
would have less
impact on Soviet security than
our own.”

“The Soviet advantage in
conventional forces, the less
sophisticated designs of their
strategic weapons, the ability of
a controlled society to maintain
design teams intact even without
testing…all may allow the
Soviets to be more willing to
accept restrictions….”

Further Policy
Caveats

• “…the U.S. recognizes that
  neither nuclear testing nor arms
  control per se
  are ends in themselves. They are
  tools to be employed in the
  interests of enhancing national
  security.”
• “As a matter of policy, the
  U.S. has made no decisions
  regarding any specific
  limitations which might be
  considered following TTBT and
  PNET ratification. Such
  decisions cannot be prudently
  made without an analysis of the
  specific details of arms
  reductions agreements in other
  areas.”
• “…It is clear that
  limitations as stringent as a
  complete ban on tests above
  either 1 kiloton- or 10
  kilotons-yield pose
  serious risks and will
  almost certainly not prove to be
  compatible with our overall
  security interests. As
  the companion reports by the
  Departments of Defense and Energy
  make clear, such limitations have
  exceptionally severe
  effects on U.S. programs.
  In addition, we do not
  know how to verify such yield
  limitations.”
• “A comprehensive test ban
  remains a long-term
  objective of the United States.
  We believe such a ban must be
  viewed in the context of a time when
  we do not need to depend on
  nuclear deterrence to
  ensure international security and
  stability, and when
  we have achieved broad, deep, and
  effectively verifiable arms
  reductions, substantially
  improved verification
  capabilities, expanded
  confidence-building measures, and
  greater balance in conventional
  forces.”

The Challenge for President
Bush

It is incumbent on the Bush
Administration, as its stewardship of the
Nuclear Testing Talks begins, to clarify
how — if at all — its assessment of
U.S. national security interests and
requirements differs from that of
President Reagan, described above. Should
President Bush not establish forthwith
his view of the inadvisability of
negotiating additional limitations on
nuclear testing, he may find his options
for preserving vital American flexibility
sharply constrained as work on the TTBT
is completed and the pressure inexorably
builds to reach agreement on new,
intermediate constraints.

Recommended Actions

The following steps must be taken if
President Bush is to avoid the serious
pitfalls associated with the commitment
to further limitations on nuclear testing
he inherited from Ronald Reagan.

• The Bush Administration
  should expressly reject the idea
  of further constraints upon
  nuclear testing. The
  previous administration was
  unable to identify any
  limits beyond the TTBT consistent
  with U.S. security interests, and
  President Reagan clearly —
  albeit belatedly — warned,
  before leaving office, that there
  well may never be any.
• National security will be
  disserved and President
  Bush’s credibility
  jeopardized if the United
  States now explicitly or
  implicitly affirms the
  earlier, ill-advised
  decision to pursue
  step-by-step limitations
  on testing once the
  present treaties have
  been renegotiated.
• Even the best
  case outcome of
  such negotiations, i.e.,
  that they will give rise
  to modest restrictions
  (such as a quota
  permitting a sizeable
  number of tests or
  reductions in the yield
  threshold of underground
  tests), would be
  unacceptable.
• Such limits will, by
  definition, impose
  additional limitations on
  the flexibility vital to
  an effective testing
  program.
• What is more, it is
  illusory to believe that
  test ban proponents will
  be either satisfied with
  — or permit themselves
  to be coopted by such
  modest constraints. The
  reality is that those who
  propose draconian limits
  on testing do so because
  they wish to cripple the
  U.S. nuclear program;
  they will not be
  satisfied with
  half-measures.
• Instead, the Bush
  Administration should build upon
  President Reagan’s forthright
  explanation of the reasons for
  U.S. nuclear testing and for
  caution on considering new
  limits. As President
  Reagan made clear, quite aside
  from very serious verification
  problems, the United States has
  fundamental requirements for
  continued testing at
  approximately current levels —
  and should make no apologies for
  maintaining a credible nuclear
  deterrent and conducting the
  tests necessary to do so.
• President Bush should
  offer decisive leadership to
  those in Congress willing to
  resist legislative initiatives
  that would — by precluding a
  flexible test program —
  cripple America’s ability
  to safeguard the reliability,
  safety and effectiveness of the
  U.S. nuclear deterrent.
  An important element of such a
  presidential effort must be an
  express willingness on the part
  of the Administration to veto any
  congressional efforts to impose
  further restrictions on U.S.
  testing.
• The Administration should
  also maintain the high standard
  for effective verification of the
  TTBT and PNET set by President
  Bush’s predecessor, and insist on
  strict Soviet compliance. If
  experience is any guide, the
  President will soon be beset by
  those encouraging a less
  demanding standard of
  verification (e.g., that seismic
  monitoring methods are “good
  enough” and that the
  alternative hydrodynamic
  measurement system demanded by
  the Reagan Administration —
  known as CORRTEX — is “too
  expensive” and unnecessary).
• On-site CORRTEX
  measurements remain the
  most accurate means for
  verifying Soviet
  compliance with
  commitments under the
  PNET and TTBT.

1. Emphasis
throughout not in original.