Nuclear Testing Negotiations: What is the Bush Administration's Agenda?

Introduction

Today, the United States and the
Soviet Union resume negotiations at the
Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) in Geneva.
The NTT negotiations have as their
immediate objective development of
improved verification arrangements for
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and
the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
(PNET). The two treaties were signed in
1974 and 1976, respectively, but have not
yet been ratified due, in part, to
concerns about the adequacy of their
existing verification regimes. The
parties have reached ad referendum
agreement on a verification protocol for
the PNET; it is now under review in
Washington and Moscow. Work is proceeding
more slowly on a counterpart protocol for
the TTBT.

Under the charter for the NTT
negotiations agreed to in September, 1987
by then-Secretary of State George Shultz
and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, completion of these
protocols were understood to be but
the initial goal of the NTT. The
ministers announced that “The sides
will as the first step agree upon
effective verification measures which
will make it possible to ratify the TTBT
and PNET, and proceed to
negotiating further intermediate
limitations on testing leading
to the ultimate objective of the complete
cessation of nuclear testing as part of
an effective disarmament process.” href=”#N_1_”>⁽¹⁾

Incredible as it might seem, the
Reagan Administration came to understand
that the commitment to a step-by-step
negotiation on further testing
limitations may well be utterly
inconsistent with U.S. national security
requirements. In a major report to the
Congress submitted in September 1988,
President Reagan illuminated numerous
problems that additional constraints on
nuclear testing would entail for
America’s deterrent capabilities.

President Reagan left office before he
was obliged to deal with the inherent
inconsistency between the findings
reported to Congress and his earlier
commitment to the Soviet Union. It now
falls to President Bush to grasp the
nettle. This paper discusses why the
United States should decline to negotiate
further constraints on nuclear testing —
and why it should do so at the outset of
the resumption of the NNT negotiations.

Are Further Testing
Limitations in the U.S. Interest?

In response to a request from the
Senate Armed Services Committee and on
the basis of intensive interagency study,
President Reagan on 8 September 1988
supplied the Congress with a report
concerning “The Relationship
between Progress in Other Areas of Arms
Control and More Stringent Limitations on
Nuclear Testing.” This
report, together with detailed companion
analyses produced by the Departments of
Energy and Defense, clearly and
authoritatively describes U.S. nuclear
testing requirements. It discusses the
problems caused even by existing arms
control limitations on nuclear testing.
The Reagan report also provides a
withering critique of the idea of
imposing additional limitations on the
U.S. nuclear testing program. Its main
points (in excerpt form) are:

The Requirement
for Testing

“Nuclear testing is
indispensable to maintaining the
credible nuclear deterrent which
has kept the peace for over 40
years.”

“Thus we do not
regard nuclear testing as an evil
to be curtailed, but as a tool to
be employed responsibly in
pursuit of national security.”

“The U.S. tests neither more
often nor at higher yields than
is required for our
security.”

“As long as we must
depend on nuclear weapons for our
fundamental security, nuclear
testing will be necessary.”

Why the United
States Tests Nuclear Weapons

“First, we do so to ensure
the reliability
of our nuclear deterrent.”

“Second, we conduct nuclear
tests in order to improve the safety,
security, survivability, and
effectiveness of our
nuclear arsenal. Testing has
allowed the introduction of
modern safety and security
features on our weapons. It has
permitted a reduction by
nearly one-third in the total
number of weapons in the
stockpile since 1960, as well as
a reduction in the total
megatonnage in that stockpile to
approximately one-quarter of its
1960 value.”

“Third, the U.S. tests to
ensure we understand the effects
of a nuclear environment
on military systems.”

“Finally, by continuing to
advance our understanding of
nuclear weapons design, nuclear
testing serves to avoid
technological surprise
and to allow us to respond to the
evolving threat.”

“These four purposes are
vital national security goals. As
companion reports by the
Departments of Defense and Energy
indicate, they cannot
currently be met without nuclear
testing.”

Reductions in
Nuclear and/or Conventional Arms
May Actually Increase U.S. Testing
Requirements

“…It is important to
recognize that there is
no direct technical linkage
between the size of the nuclear
stockpile and the requirements
for nuclear testing.”

“The first two reasons — to
ensure the reliability of our
deterrent and to improve the
safety and security of our
nuclear arsenal — are related in
part to the number of
different designs in the
U.S. stockpile.”

“Major reductions in
the numbers of
warheads, such
as the U.S. seeks in
START, would not alter
our requirements for a
number of different types
of weapons to meet the
Soviet threat, and hence
would not alter the
requirement for testing
them….”

“Indeed,
under [an agreement
providing for] deep
reductions in strategic
offensive arms the
reliability of our
remaining U.S. strategic
weapons could be even
more important and the
need for testing even
greater, particularly
if the Soviets continue
their current trends
toward improved
survivability.”

“Similarly, neither
reductions in strategic offensive
arms themselves nor success in
conventional arms reductions will
eliminate the third reason for
U.S. nuclear testing, the
requirement to ensure we
understand, from both an
offensive and defensive
standpoint, the effects of the
environment produced by nuclear
explosions on military
systems….Even in a
world with reduced strategic arms
and an improved balance in
conventional forces, nuclear
weapons will exist. In such a
world, understanding nuclear
effects would be no less
important.”

“As the number of
nuclear and conventional forces
decrease, the potential relative
advantage the Soviets could gain
from an unforeseen technological
breakthrough increases.
To avoid being surprised by such
a breakthrough, we must maintain
and improve our understanding of
the physics of nuclear
weapons.”

Future Arms
Control and U.S. and Soviet Differences

“…There is no
direct technical linkage between
progress in other areas of arms
control and the acceptability of
progressively more stringent
limitations on nuclear testing.
It is important to recognize the
asymmetries between the United
States and the Soviet Union in
this regard.”

“Because of inherent
differences in the two nations’
approaches to their security
requirements, stringent
limitations on nuclear testing,
or even its complete cessation,
would have less
impact on Soviet security than
our own.”

“The Soviet advantage in
conventional forces, the less
sophisticated designs of their
strategic weapons, the ability of
a controlled society to maintain
design teams intact even without
testing…all may allow the
Soviets to be more willing to
accept restrictions….”

Further Policy
Caveats

“…the U.S. recognizes that
neither nuclear testing nor arms
control per se
are ends in themselves. They are
tools to be employed in the
interests of enhancing national
security.”

“As a matter of policy, the
U.S. has made no decisions
regarding any specific
limitations which might be
considered following TTBT and
PNET ratification. Such
decisions cannot be prudently
made without an analysis of the
specific details of arms
reductions agreements in other
areas.”

“…It is clear that
limitations as stringent as a
complete ban on tests above
either 1 kiloton- or 10
kilotons-yield pose
serious risks and will
almost certainly not prove to be
compatible with our overall
security interests. As
the companion reports by the
Departments of Defense and Energy
make clear, such limitations have
exceptionally severe
effects on U.S. programs.
In addition, we do not
know how to verify such yield
limitations.”

“A comprehensive test ban
remains a long-term
objective of the United States.
We believe such a ban must be
viewed in the context of a time when
we do not need to depend on
nuclear deterrence to
ensure international security and
stability, and when
we have achieved broad, deep, and
effectively verifiable arms
reductions, substantially
improved verification
capabilities, expanded
confidence-building measures, and
greater balance in conventional
forces.”

The Challenge for President
Bush

It is incumbent on the Bush
Administration, as its stewardship of the
Nuclear Testing Talks begins, to clarify
how — if at all — its assessment of
U.S. national security interests and
requirements differs from that of
President Reagan, described above. Should
President Bush not establish forthwith
his view of the inadvisability of
negotiating additional limitations on
nuclear testing, he may find his options
for preserving vital American flexibility
sharply constrained as work on the TTBT
is completed and the pressure inexorably
builds to reach agreement on new,
intermediate constraints.

Recommended Actions

The following steps must be taken if
President Bush is to avoid the serious
pitfalls associated with the commitment
to further limitations on nuclear testing
he inherited from Ronald Reagan.

The Bush Administration
should expressly reject the idea
of further constraints upon
nuclear testing. The
previous administration was
unable to identify any
limits beyond the TTBT consistent
with U.S. security interests, and
President Reagan clearly —
albeit belatedly — warned,
before leaving office, that there
well may never be any.

National security will be
disserved and President
Bush’s credibility
jeopardized if the United
States now explicitly or
implicitly affirms the
earlier, ill-advised
decision to pursue
step-by-step limitations
on testing once the
present treaties have
been renegotiated.

Even the best
case outcome of
such negotiations, i.e.,
that they will give rise
to modest restrictions
(such as a quota
permitting a sizeable
number of tests or
reductions in the yield
threshold of underground
tests), would be
unacceptable.

Such limits will, by
definition, impose
additional limitations on
the flexibility vital to
an effective testing
program.

What is more, it is
illusory to believe that
test ban proponents will
be either satisfied with
— or permit themselves
to be coopted by such
modest constraints. The
reality is that those who
propose draconian limits
on testing do so because
they wish to cripple the
U.S. nuclear program;
they will not be
satisfied with
half-measures.

Instead, the Bush
Administration should build upon
President Reagan’s forthright
explanation of the reasons for
U.S. nuclear testing and for
caution on considering new
limits. As President
Reagan made clear, quite aside
from very serious verification
problems, the United States has
fundamental requirements for
continued testing at
approximately current levels —
and should make no apologies for
maintaining a credible nuclear
deterrent and conducting the
tests necessary to do so.

President Bush should
offer decisive leadership to
those in Congress willing to
resist legislative initiatives
that would — by precluding a
flexible test program —
cripple America’s ability
to safeguard the reliability,
safety and effectiveness of the
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
An important element of such a
presidential effort must be an
express willingness on the part
of the Administration to veto any
congressional efforts to impose
further restrictions on U.S.
testing.

The Administration should
also maintain the high standard
for effective verification of the
TTBT and PNET set by President
Bush’s predecessor, and insist on
strict Soviet compliance. If
experience is any guide, the
President will soon be beset by
those encouraging a less
demanding standard of
verification (e.g., that seismic
monitoring methods are “good
enough” and that the
alternative hydrodynamic
measurement system demanded by
the Reagan Administration —
known as CORRTEX — is “too
expensive” and unnecessary).