Open the ‘Cold Spot’ files

BY: Al Santoli
The Washington Times, January 24, 1994

In the last battle of the Vietnam War, surviving American families and veterans are fighting to
learn the fate of missing servicemen. Similar to victims of secret nuclear tests, they are trying to
pry the truth from an entrenched bureaucracy that lacks adequate congressional or administrative
oversight.

Many veterans now look to the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. John Shalikashvili, to
resolve the MIA tragedy with integrity and honor.

In an orchestrated campaign, U.S. civilian and military officials — supported by business
consultants and publicists — praise Hanoi for “excellent cooperation” and “not holding anything
back.” Hundreds of live sightings of American prisoners by Vietnamese, Lao and even a Japanese
monk have been trivialized.

Pentagon analysts have debunked Soviet documents independently supported by testimony
from unrelated sources. A tepid State Department statement admits that prisoners could have
been held back in Laos under control of Hanoi. More poignantly, documents from still-secret
Defense and CIA archives point to a multi-agency coverup.

Example: “Cold Spot” was a joint CIA-Air Force program to intercept North Vietnamese and
Laotian Communist radio communications from 1971 to 1975. Americans flew electronic spy
planes, and indigenous soldiers with CIA advisors conducted land-based operations. Some
intercepts describe the movement and detention of U.S. prisoners — long after Operation
Homecoming.

An Oct. 8, 1973, communique from the governor of Nghia Lo to the Minister of Defense in
Hanoi confirmed the transfer of “112 USA pilots” from Lai Chau [near the Laotian border]. The
“USA prisoners” were taken to a prison that previously held “Thai [captured in Laos] and
Vietnamese” prisoners. And, “their snapshots were finished and I will send them to Hanoi to
register with the Ministry of Defense . . . and names and ages of all will be attached.”

On Nov. 11, 1973, the governor of Sontay Province reported to the Minister of Defense in
Hanoi: “112 USA prisoners in prison in Sontay Province.” He named a doctor who treated 10
prisoners with “pain in their hearts. . . . They are not in a good way. Therefore, I quickly send
this cable for you to decide what to do.”

There is no record of U.S. officials cross-referencing these and other “Cold Spot” records with
in-person interviews of Vietnamese officials, prison commanders and doctors named in the
communiques.

In the past, intelligence analysts have debunked such documents using a Murphy’s Law gambit
— that because the U.S. government had declared all prisoners returned, any contrary evidence
must be false.

This “unprofessional . . . mindset to debunk” was harshly criticized in 1985-86 DIA internal
evaluations. However, rather than replace the chastised analysts, the Clinton administration
refused to investigate detailed accusations, and the same entrenched bureaucrats have been
promoted to wrap up MIA investigations.

In the field, the most experienced U.S. expert, Garnett Bell — who has a near-photographic
memory of the Vietnamese prison and military systems — was replaced as chief of the Pentagon’s
Hanoi office by young infantry officers lacking intelligence backgrounds, historical knowledge or
language proficiency. These novices must deal with devious Vietnamese political officers, many of
whom had decades of experience playing a shell game with French MIAs.

Media junkets are taken to observe groups of American soldiers digging for crash sites. On the
other hand, dissenting intelligence officers state that during the war it was communist policy to
scavenge crash sites and warehouse hundreds of U.S. remains that are continuously doled out as
political chips.

Former investigators describe the Pentagon’s Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTFFA) as a
$100 million per year “boondoggle manipulated by Vietnamese security officers” who accompany
all JTFFA teams to interview villagers.

In 1992, the JTFFA chief, Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham, shredded 20 years worth of original
U.S. investigative files in Bangkok. And in a slick political maneuver, Sen. John Kerry had 120
boxes of potentially explosive National Security Agency files reclassified before Senate
investigators could study them.

Clinton State Department point-men Winston Lord and Ken Quinn are classic
conflict-of-interest cases. In 1970, Mr. Lord helped to create the coverup of U.S. casualties in
Laos. Henry Kissinger claims in “White House Years” (page 455) that Mr. Lord coordinated a
National Security Council study that purposely misled President Nixon on U.S. forces lost in
Laos.

CIA documents from 1967-68 show U.S. captives by name in specific Laotian prisons. In
1970 at CIA headquarters in Laos, Pat Mahoney, an Air Force expert in special operations,
discussed photos of American prisoners and a wall map of prison sites. The CIA station chief
said, “The politicians have tied our hands from launching rescues.”

The Vietnamese commander of the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of Laos who oversaw the
movement and detention of U.S. prisoners there between 1964-72 was Gen. Tran Van Quang
(quoted in the infamous Soviet document). Yet, neither Gen. John Vessey nor Winston Lord
raised the issue of prisoners in Laos when they met with Gen. Quang.

On Jan. 18, 1993, a delegation from the American Legion met with Pentagon and
administration officials and mentioned the “Cold Spot” archives. The officials gave no response.
The Legion has filed a Freedom of Information Act request to gain access to the records and to
prevent another shredding party by Gen. Needham or his inter-agency peers.

Before the administration rewards Hanoi’s duplicity with any more political or economic
concessions, Gen. Shalikashvili should make sure that all POW/MIA files — such as “Cold Spot” –
are made public. He should meet with Mr. Smith and representatives of the major veterans and
family organizations to review charges of malfeasance and coverup.

To conclude the Vietnam War with honor, a new team of experienced investigators of
unimpeachable integrity must be appointed.

Al Santoli is a former congressional investigator, and author most recently of “Leading the
Way. How Vietnam Veterans Rebuilt the U.S. Military.”