‘Peace in Our Time,’ Take Two

(Washington, D.C.): At this writing, the particulars of the deal struck with the Serbian
government by Strobe Talbott, Victor Chernomyrdin and the EU’s representative, Martti
Ahtisaari, remain less than clear. Still, the broad outlines conform to the deal the Center for
Security Policy critiqued on 6 May 1999, following the announcement of the so-called “G-8”
agreement in Bonn. ¹ For the following reasons,
the present agreement seems exceedingly
unlikely to work out in a way that will be consistent with long-term U.S. interests:

• Milosevic will remain in power, relegitimated and unrepentant despite
  his indictment on war
  crimes, and in a position to strike again — perhaps next in Montenegro.

• The Russians will be rewarded for their role in brokering this deal with
  the opportunity to
  reoccupy part of Eastern Europe — at that a part they were unable to wrest from Marshal Tito
  five decades ago.

We can only guess at what the full cost will ultimately prove to be, in political,
strategic and economic (e.g., additional billions of dollars sluiced from the IMF and
World Bank’s coffers into Russian bank accounts in Switzerland, Cyprus and the
Cayman Islands and other black holes) terms.

• It will entail the open-ended deployment of at least seven-thousand heavily armed
  U.S.
  troops — which means, effectively three-times that number committed to the mission
  (when
  those training to go in and those who have just rotated out are included). These forces will be
  redeployed, probably permanently, from Germany. The costs of
  these deployments will,
  inevitably (at least over time), come out of the Pentagon’s hide. ²

In addition, America’s defense resources are already being sorely depleted
by the
diversion of funds needed to pay for the care and feeding of the refugees (not only at
Fort Dix, but in-theater). Replenishment of the war stocks squandered in this
campaign will be slow in coming and probably incomplete — leaving the U.S. military
even less prepared to deal with the real, strategically significant “contingencies” now
in the offing.

• As the UN Security Council will be asked to mandate the operation, that body will
  probably be the final arbiter concerning its nature and conduct — a further sign that
  NATO’s, to say nothing of the United States’, freedom of action will be circumscribed. Let us
  be clear: The emphasis on an “international” force does not mean that NATO will avoid
  having to foot the bill, just that it will not run the show.

• Of particular concern is the fact that U.S. forces in Kosovo will apparently
  not be under
  American command. This only increases the danger that our deployment there will
  risk
  another Somalia debacle if it turns out not to be a “permissive” environment.

In fact, there is little likelihood that Serb forces will completely
leave. (Claims that
we will be able to verify their full departure are laughable; we don’t know how many
are there now or their whereabouts.) Certainly, the Kosovo Liberation
Army will
not be completely disarmed.

Consequently, we should expect to see American and perhaps other international
forces caught in the cross-fire. Under those circumstances, it seems hard to
believe that “all the refugees” will actually return home — even if they had
someplace to which to return.

• Perhaps most odious of all, the American taxpayer will be obliged to pay the lion’s
  share
  of the huge costs associated with rebuilding not only Kosovo, but Serbia,
  as well. To the
  extent that Serbia remains under Milosevic’s control, such payments will amount to war
  reparations to his regime — a moral abomination, as well as a strategic disaster.

The Bottom Line

The deal negotiated by Strobe Talbott and Slobodan Milosevic via Russian and European
intermediaries is what one would expect: A Faustian compromise that gets President Clinton off
his latest petard at a monstrous expense. NATO may never recover from its pyrrhic victory; the
U.S. military’s hollowed-out status has been enormously exacerbated; Russia’s mischievous
pass-interference for an odious client has been rewarded and encouraged; and we are poised to
provide political and economic life-support for Milosevic’s regime.

At an absolute minimum, the price for any of this going forward and enjoying
congressional
support must be the immediate removal of Milosevic and the other indicted war criminals
to stand trial in The Hague.

¹ See the Center’s Decision Brief entitled
‘Peace in our time’ (No. 99-D 55, 6
May 1999).

²This deployment will also doubtless be cited to justify the next
disastrous shoe to drop: a U.S.
posting of “peacekeepers” on the Golan Heights as part of a deal between Israel and Syria.