Post-Mortem on the Russian Elections: What ‘Centrists’?

(Washington, D.C.): In the aftermath of last weekend’s elections for the
Russian legislature, the
conventional wisdom had it that the outcome was a victory for “centrists” led by Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin. The success of his newly created “Unity” Party, the pundits
proclaimed, would strengthen the hand of economic and other “reformers” in the Duma at the
expense of “hardline” Communists and foes of Western-style institutions and policies elsewhere
in the Russian body politic.

Fortunately, a valuable corrective was published in the Wall Street Journal by
Dr. Richard
Pipes, on 21 December 1999. Dr. Pipes brings to the subject not only a reputation as one of the
world’s most highly respected and acclaimed scholars of Russian and Soviet history. He is also
an accomplished policy practitioner — having helped shape from his position as the Reagan
National Security Council’s top specialist on Soviet affairs that Administration’s successful
efforts to bring down the “Evil Empire.” His essay is required reading for all those who want an
accurate reading on the ominous implications of the recent Russian vote — and what it portends
for U.S. and Western interests in the future.

Nationalism Triumphs Again

By Richard Pipes

Wall Street Journal, 21 December 1999

Russia’s parliamentary elections on Sunday are hardly a victory for moderate reformers, even
though Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s Unity Party came close to matching the Communists’
vote. The meteoric rise of Mr. Putin’s party is due to his government’s reversion to Soviet-style
military bullying and appeals to xenophobia. The Unity Party had virtually no other platform.

The election results will do nothing to thaw relations between Russia and the West, which, at
least on the rhetorical level, are reminiscent of the Cold War. Moscow contemptuously dismisses
Western protests against its ruthless military campaign against the Chechens. Mr. Putin has
declared that his country must revamp its economy and face (unspecified) foreign threats by
greatly increasing its military budget; Russia, he insists, will not surrender its sovereign rights for
foreign “lollipops.” President Boris Yeltsin on his recent visit to Beijing saw fit to remind
President Clinton that Russia remains a nuclear power. Sunday’s election results indicate that
most Russians welcome this anti-Western rhetoric.

Such behavior by politicians and such a public mood stand in stark contrast to Russia’s
temper
earlier in this decade, when the first postcommunist government, headed by the same Mr.
Yeltsin, vowed to pursue cooperation with the West and made good on this pledge by adopting
political and economic reforms designed to transform Russia into a Western country. Russia’s
foreign policy then, directed by the now-forgotten foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, aimed at the
country’s integration into the international community.

What happened? And who is to blame?

To begin with, the political and economic culture of a nation cannot be radically changed by
government decree. Values and attitudes inculcated over centuries are so deeply embedded that it
takes protracted new experience to alter them significantly.

Russia’s history has not prepared its people to feel kinship with the West or to regard its
institutions as relevant to them. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in the 15th century, Russia
was the only major country to profess Orthodox Christianity. The Orthodox Church regarded
both Catholicism and Protestantism as heresies and imbued its adherents with a sense of
alienation from, and hostility to, the West. This attitude became official ideology under the
communists, for whom the West was synonymous with capitalism. Little wonder that recent
opinion polls reveal that 69% of Russian citizens regard the West as an “enemy” and 58%
believe Russia should resist Western influences. All politicians in semi-democratic Russia must
take account of this sentiment.

In 1991-92, Russia formally adopted Western-style democracy. Parties burgeoned; programs
proliferated. But none of these democratic activities had much reality, for Moscow’s authority
steadily declined, devolving to regional governments and to private, often criminal, elements.

Here, too, history provides an explanation. Except for the decade preceding the 1917
Revolution,
Russia had always been ruled autocratically and administered bureaucratically. After 1917
followed more than 70 years of totalitarianism. The social underpinnings which a working
democracy requires were never given a chance to develop. Democracy, therefore, to a Russian
spells anarchy, something far worse than despotism. Thus it is no surprise that 50% of Russians
disapprove of multiparty elections, and only 21% favor them.

Such are the social and cultural realities behind Russia’s retreat from Western values. Neither
Russian reformers nor foreign well-wishers could do much to alter them.

In the first years of postcommunist Russia, the Clinton administration adopted the policy of
assisting pro-democratic and pro-market forces there with moral support, advice and limited
economic assistance. It was a sensible policy. But Washington has been too slow to recognize the
shifts that have been occurring in the past several years, pretending that Russia is solidly set on
its new course. America’s policies have combined insensitivity to Russia’s legitimate concerns
with tolerance of its imperial ambitions.

Thus NATO expanded into Eastern Europe, even though this caused Russia to feel isolated,
fostering xenophobia. At the same time, the U.S. was even slower than its European allies to
condemn Russia for its brutal aggression against Chechnya. Washington seems to operate on the
premise that any criticism of Mr. Yeltsin’s government plays into the hands of the Communists.
In fact, such pusillanimity strengthens the Communists, who some time ago abandoned calls for
a return to Soviet days and become a party of extreme nationalists. The Communists see in
foreign compliance proof that Russia must assert itself by force.

A sound policy toward Russia requires a combination of sensitivity and firmness, both of
which
are lacking in the Clinton administration. This said, presidential candidates should avoid raising
the spurious issue of who “lost” Russia. Russia didn’t belong to the West in the first place. No
amount of economic aid, no Marshall Plan, would have prevented events from taking their
course, for the money would either have been spent to delay reforms or ended up in the pockets
of highly placed thieves. Washington’s mistakes perhaps aggravated antidemocratic and
anti-Western trends, but ultimately the cause of Russia’s reversion to its old ways is its historic
legacy
and the absence of courageous leaders in Moscow willing to tell the people that their failures are
their own doing.

If anyone lost Russia–the Russia that might have been–it is the Russians themselves. And it
is
they who will have to recover it.

Richard Pipes is a history professor at Harvard and author of “Property and Freedom”

(Knopf, 1999).